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That a well-organized militia is essential to the security of a free
state is one of those fine sayings that, like the mild axiomatic truths
which adorn Root's system of penmanship, are often copied, but
never acted upon. We resolved it at town meetings; we proclaimed
it in flaming editorials; it did yeoman-service in many a closely-
contested election, on one side or [on the] other, or... on both;
orators waxed eloquent upon it ... ; it was the favorite toast at
many a banquet... ; Congress rang with it; the Executive endorsed
it; it was lugged into the learned opinions of the Judiciary: but
nothing came of it.
- The United States Service Magazine, September 1864
INTRODUCTION: THE SOCIAL AND JUDICIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
DISPUTE
Owning and carrying personal firearms-or at least the unbridled
right to do so-has become a freighted metaphor of American
individualism. With obvious linkage to the muscular nineteenth-century
frontier hero of myth and experience,1 the powerful image of pride can
be traced to Renaissance Florence by way of English pamphlets popular
in Revolutionary America.2 Mostly masculist, today's phantom of the
armed pioneer limns the true American patriot as loyal to great quasi-
religious principles thought to be the founders' creed. Emboldened by
his proclaimed stance of sturdy independent autonomy, this present-day
1. On the symbolic significance of the frontiersmen's conquest of the West in crafting the
American self-image, see SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE RITES OF ASSENT: TRANSFORMATIONS
IN THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 7 (1993); DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE
AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 51-52 (1966). In Boorstin's words:
[O]f all American myths, none is stronger than that of the loner moving west across the
land.... The courage to move to new places and try new things is supposed to be the
same as the courage to go it alone, to focus exclusively and intensively and
enterprisingly on one-self. Only so, we hear, could the threatened pioneer survive.
And so, it is said, an American way was born.
Id. at 51. But Boorstin makes the insightful point that, contrary to our popular intuitions, the
West was settled, not by lone frontiersmen, but by groups. "The lone adventurer was likely to
be a priest, a professional explorer, a surveyor, a guide, or a hunter. Early settlers, those who
took one-way passage and became the backbone of new Western communities, generally went
together." Id. at 52.
2. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1-19 (1967); 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, passim (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1965); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 506-09, passim (1975). The
Florentines and the Anglo-American pamphleteers both extolled the incorruptibly independent
citizen-in-arms serving public purposes. In contrast, there does not appear to be even a
subconscious public purpose behind today's frontiersman's taking up of arms. Indeed, it is
precisely the absence of a settled, constitutionally rooted public dimension to their arms bearing
that separates today's armed autonomists from the militia contemplated in the Second
Amendment. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 722-41.
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hero is scornful of the accretions of social enlightenment of the last 200
years and animated by a hearty distrust of government, which is seen as
having betrayed the grand design of the sainted founders in favor of a
debilitating social ethic. The hero has reinvented personal
responsibility and takes upon himself the basic obligation of defense of
self, land, and family against vaguely defined intruders of any stripe-
including the forces of government itself.
Despite its thick romantic patina and a disturbing xenophobic
strain, 3 the picture is not altogether repugnant to patriotic American
values. We do, as a nation, extol the values of individual responsibility.
The lessons of the colonial and western frontiers have been etched on
our national character.4 Indeed, an argument might be made that we
have maintained democracy as successfully as we have because of the
egalitarian ideals and skeptical attitudes towards authority that derive in
part from the early national experience. While our idea of the frontier
has been colored by generations of Hollywood scriptwriters, the legend
remains a vital component of contemporary notions of civic courage
and individual virtue. And, to the extent that the gun figures in our
image of the responsible, liberty-loving family protector who stands at
the center of our cherished self-image today, it cannot be lightly
dismissed. Symbols count.
With the resurgence of the militant individualist, interest has been
rekindled in the constitutional precept most closely associated with the
credo: the Second Amendment.5 Roused from its peaceful slumber
with its dormant companion, the Third Amendment,6 the proclaimed
right of the individual to keep and bear arms has been stitched like an
icon into the center of the banner around which our contemporary
3. See Garry Wills, The Militias: The New Revolutionaries, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 10,
1995, at 50, for an interesting and insightful portrayal of this isolationist strain of neo-militia
ideology. According to Wills, this isolationism is directed principally against European
"socialism." In the new militias, Wills points out, hostility focuses on the secret services and
communist reserve armies of Britain and Russia, which allegedly lie waiting in Mexico for
orders from agents in Washington (most prominent among these in recent years have been Bill
Clinton and George Bush) to assist the U.N. and U.S. armies in the final assault on American
individualism and liberty.
4. See BOORSTIN, supra note 1, at 52-57 (making the point that settlers adopted
communal, even regimented, ways to protect themselves against native tribes). See generally
LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN
AMERICA (1964) (discussing the colonial and early national frontiers as shapers of the national
character); FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Dover
1996) (1920) (discussing the far west frontier).
5. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
6. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Id. amend. III.
2000]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
frontiersmen rally. Largely ignoring the introductory clause: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State," the
individual rights brigade emphasizes the ringing language of the main
clause: "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." These people see in the provision, engraved in parchment, a
recognition of the basic liberty of each individual citizen, in his or her
private capacity, to possess lethal weapons without government
interference. It is, they claim, an entitlement written into the text of the
fundamental civic charter to add a stroke to the definition of the
freedom of the individual citizen every bit as important as the security
against unreasonable searches and seizures or the right not to be forced
to cooperate in one's own prosecution.,
Needless to say, there is another interpretation. Sometimes
carelessly labeled -sometimes carelessly articulated-the opposing
group takes the position that the Amendment was adopted to assure the
states' control over their local militias only.8 Embraced by gun control
7. See, e.g, Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations
by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597,
641 (1995) ("[T]he right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental, individual right, and...
statutes regulating this right should be narrowly construed against the government and in favor
of the people."); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 205-26 (1983) ("The unanimity with which
Federalists and Anti-Federalists supported an individual right to arms is a reflection of their
shared philosophical and historical heritage. Examination of contemporary materials reveals
that the Founders ardently endorsed firearms possession as a personal right and that the
concept of an exclusively state's right was wholly unknown to them.") (footnotes omitted);
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 658 (1991) ("For
too long, most members of the legal academy have treated the Second Amendment as the
equivalent of an embarrassing relative, whose mention brings a quick change of subject to other,
more respectable, family members. That will no longer do. It is time for the Second
Amendment to enter full-scale into the consciousness of the legal academy.").
8. Laurence Tribe, author of widely used casebooks on constitutional law but not, until
this year, of any specialized studies of the Second Amendment, aptly summarized the position
taken by the opposing group in the second edition of his American Constitutional Law.
According to Tribe, "[Tlhe central concern of the second amendment's framers was to prevent
such federal interferences with the state militia as would permit the establishment of a standing
national army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988). In the just published third edition,
however, Professor Tribe appears to have had a change of heart. In his much expanded
treatment of the subject, Tribe now expresses greater sympathy for those who read the Second
Amendment to accord a right to individuals to own guns for private purposes. See 1 LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 901-02 n.221 (3d ed. 2000). Tribe's seeming
conversion to the "individualist" camp, as well as his new take on the Second Amendment, are
analyzed in detail by Professor Carl Bogus in his lead article to this Symposium. See Carl T.
Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 3, 19-21 (2000).
With a few prominent exceptions (see, e.g, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131. 1162-73 (1991); Levinson, supra note 7, at 644-45; William
Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1255
(1994)), Tribe's summary articulated in his second edition continues to epitomize the position of
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advocates among others, this contingent refuses to acknowledge any
purpose or effect in the provision to assure individuals the absolute right
to keep guns. They argue that the newly liberated colonists, still
mistrustful of central government and its standing armies, wrote the
Second Amendment into the Bill of Rights out of concern over the
powers granted to the new federal government in Article I, Section 8;
powers expressly allowing Congress to "call[] forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions" as well as to "organiz[e], arm[], and disciplin[e]" them. It
was not enough that Clause 16 of Section 8 expressly reserves to the
states the "Appointment of the Officers" and the "Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." Fearing
federal control-even use of state militias against rebellious citizens of
the states -Antifederalists insisted on the Second Amendment (so this
contingent insists) to make sure Congress would not take away the
essential power of the local troops by depriving them of their weapons.
This take on the Second Amendment is often labeled the "collectivist"
approach by adherents and detractors alike.
In this raging hermeneutic controversy, the Supreme Court has
been, if not silent, strangely Delphic. Apart from an occasional
comment by a particular justice,9 the Court has spoken only four times
academic professionals in law schools and on history faculties who have entered the Second
Amendment debate. Typical of academic commentary in arguing against an individual right
component of the Second Amendment are, among others, Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of
Gun Culture in the United States, 1760-1865, 83 J. AM. HIsT. 425 (1996); Carl T. Bogus, Race,
Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993); Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed
Community: The Origin and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984);
Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940).
Similarly, the U.S. government is on record interpreting the Second Amendment to
establish the constitutional validity of state militias rather than a purely private right to arms. In
1912, for example, the attorney general issued an opinion adopting findings contained in a War
Department report labeling the Militia Reform Act of 1908, ch. 204, 35 Stat. 399,
unconstitutional and finding that the militia drew its essential constitutional legitimacy from the
Second Amendment. See Authority of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country, 29 Op.
Att'y Gen. 322 (1912). For a discussion of the attorney general's opinion and the report of the
War Department, see RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 324-25,
340 (Ind. Univ. Press 1984) (1967); Alan R. Millet, The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier, 69
REVUE INTERNATIONALE D'HISTOIRE MILITAIRE 97, 109 (1990).
9. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A powerful
lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that these gun purchases are constitutional rights
protected by the Second Amendment .... There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state
laws governing the purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted .... There is no
reason why all pistols should not be barred to everyone except the police. The leading case is
United States v. Miller, [see discussion infra text accompanying notes 34-36] upholding a federal
law making criminal the shipment in interstate commerce of a sawed-off shotgun.... The
Second Amendment, it was held, 'must be interpreted and applied' with the view of maintaining
a 'militia.' . . . Critics say that proposals [for gun control] water down the Second Amendment.
Our decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment, as noted, was designed to keep
20001
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on the subject of the Second Amendment. 0 The decisions, Cruikshank
(1876), Presser (1886), Miller v. Texas (1894), and United States v. Miller
(1939), are old, flawed in some respects, and, in the most critical
instance (United States v. Miller), somewhat ambiguous. Yet as scholars
on both sides of the erratic trajectory must acknowledge, lower courts,
excepting a single maverick federal district court in Texas," have read
alive the militia."); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 708 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) ("The right of citizens to keep, and bear arms has
justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong
moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers .... Story's much quoted
panegyric occurs in the context of a morose lamentation on the failure of the states to issue
militia regulations and the consequent decay of the venerable citizens' militia into disuse and
derision); MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Interview by Charlayne Hunter-Gault with Warren Burger
(PBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991) (Monday transcript #4226), available in LEXIS, News
Library, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer File ("If I were writing the Bill of Rights now there
wouldn't be any such thing as the Second Amendment .... This has been the subject of one of
the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word 'fraud,' on the American public by special interest
groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime. Now just look at those words. There are only three
lines to that amendment. A well regulated militia-if the militia, which was going to be the
state army, was going to be well regulated, why shouldn't 16 and 17 and 18 or any other age
persons be regulated in the use of arms the way an automobile is regulated? It's got to be
registered, that you can't just deal with it at will.... I don't want to get sued for slander, but I
repeat that they [the NRA] have ... had far too much influence on the Congress of the United
States than as a citizen I would like to see-and I am a gun man. I have guns. I've been a
hunter ever since I was a boy."); Warren E. Burger, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, PARADE
MAG., Jan. 14, 1990, at 4. In contrast, Justice Thomas has indicated support for an individualist
reading of the Second Amendment, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 n.2 (1997)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the "growing body of scholarly commentary" favoring an
individual right approach to the Second Amendment), and Justice Scalia has noted favorably
JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT (1994), see infra note 290.
10. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894);
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); see also
Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). In Perpich, the Court considered
claims by the governor of Minnesota that a federal statute contravenes the Militia Clauses of the
Constitution by preventing a governor from withholding consent to the federal call up of
National Guard units for overseas service if the governor's reason for withholding consent is his
or her objection to the purpose of the guard's overseas mission. The opinion by Justice Stevens
reviewed the history of American military policy and ascribed to the drafters of the Militia
Clauses an intent consonant with a collective purpose to the Second Amendment, see id. at 340-
41, but Justice Stevens did not address the Second Amendment or reach any Second
Amendment issues in his holding. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(considering the constitutionality under the Commerce Clause of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, which banned gun possession on school property, and striking down the statute for
failure to articulate any relationship between gun possession in school zones and interstate
commerce). For a discussion of the possible Second Amendment implications of the majority
and dissenting opinions in Lopez, see infra text accompanying notes 56-57; cf. United States v.
Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding the Youth Handgun Safety Act in the face of a
Lopez based challenge because the Act, unlike the statute in Lopez, is expressly directed at
economic activity and, hence, well within the commerce power); accord United States v.
Michael R., 90 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996).
11. In United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999), the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas became the first and only court to decline to follow
United States v. Miller in a Second Amendment case, upholding a Second Amendment challenge
to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
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the opinions consistently down to the present day.12 The two Supreme
Court cases exercising the most influence on lower courts have been the
first and last in the series, United States v. Cruikshank and United States
v. Miller. In essence, Cruikshank teaches that the Second Amendment
is not binding on the states, and United States v. Miller teaches that the
Second Amendment does not invalidate all federal laws prohibiting
weapons.
Cruikshank-notwithstanding two problems discussed below
3-
continues to make sense to today's courts; it would be odd, to say the
least, to read the Second Amendment as prohibiting states from
undermining their own freedom and security. Regarding the Second
Amendment, the Cruikshank Court wrote:
The right ... of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose" .... is not a
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner
dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second
Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has
been seen, means no more than it shall not be infringed by
Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the National Government .... 
1 4
This aspect of Cruikshank was restated in Miller v. Texas,5 the
third of the Supreme Court's four Second Amendment cases. However,
both Cruikshank and Miller v. Texas came down well before the wave
12. The Emerson decision awaits review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit is the only federal appeals court not to have ruled on a Second Amendment
case. Every other federal circuit court has relied on United States v. Miller at least once in
rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to firearms regulations. All but the First Circuit,
which last took a Second Amendment case in 1942, see Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st
Cir. 1942), have followed United States v. Miller in the last three decades; no fewer than seven
circuits have done so since 1995. See United States v. Scanio, No. 97-1584, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29415 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1998); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
813 (1995); United States v. Warm, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997);
Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also United States
v. Henson, 55 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to
18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)( 8 )); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65-66 n.8 (1980) (reaffirming United
States v. Miller) ("These legislative restrictions [18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1), making it unlawful for
convicted felons to receive firearms transported in interstate commerce] are neither based upon
constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.
See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no
right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia')."). No reported decisions question the
Second Amendment holdings of Cruikshank, Presser, or Miller v. Texas.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 16-20, 30-33.
14. 92 U.S. at 553.
15. 153 U.S. at 538.
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of incorporation decisions by which the Supreme Court applied most of
the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights against the states. 6 In fact,
Miller v. Texas, like Cruikshank, is archetypally pre-incorporationist in
tone and style, relying on, inter alia, Baron v. Baltimore,7 and the
Slaughter-House Cases.18  One might, therefore, be inclined to ask
whether Cruikshank's nineteenth-century holding that the Second
Amendment does not bind the states survives the incorporation of most
of the Bill of Rights over the course of the twentieth century. But since
the Supreme Court early rejected "total" in favor of "selective"
incorporation, 19 and since no subsequent court has applied the Second
Amendment against the states, Cruikshank- dated as its jurisprudence
may seem-has not been overturned by implication through the general
triumph of incorporation. Indeed, modern cases state forthrightly that
Cruikshank's Second Amendment holding is still law of the land. 0
The Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms thus
remains one of the few rights enumerated in the first eight amendments
not to have been incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus
made binding upon the states.2' In part, this reflects the Second
16. The Supreme Court has not passed on the Second Amendment since the wave of
incorporation decisions during the Warren era. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(guaranteeing against the states the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (enforcing against the states the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (enforcing against the states the right
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free of compelled self-incrimination); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (enforcing against the states the Sixth Amendment right to confront
opposing witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (enforcing against the states
the right to a speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (enforcing against the states
the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses).
17. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
19. The guarantees of individual rights against the federal government set out in the first
eight amendments are not now considered to apply on aggregate directly against the states via
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, they all-save the right to
keep and bear arms, the right against quartering, the right to grand jury indictment, and the
right to jury trial in civil controversies where more than twenty dollars is in dispute -have been
applied individually by federal courts against state action on the grounds that they are
fundamental to the principles of fairness and ordered liberty inherent in due process. This
development is known as selective as opposed to total incorporation. See Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 323-26 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (rejecting total incorporation, but articulating the
rationale that procedural principles fundamental to the sense of ordered liberty inherent in due
process can be enforced against the states); Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting) (setting forth the classic argument for total incorporation).
20. See, e.g., Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 729-30 (9th
Cir. 1992).
21. The others are the right against quartering of troops, the right to grand jury indictment,
and the right to jury trials in civil controversies where more than twenty dollars is in dispute.
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Amendment's concern with federalism. Unlike the First,22 Fourth,23
Fifth,24 Sixth,25 Eighth,26 and possibly even the Seventh 27 Amendment
guarantees of personal liberties, the Second Amendment is aimed
directly at preserving the balance of powers between federal and state
governments. 28 As such, it lacks a private liberty component that could
be applied as a limit to state action against individuals identical to the
limit on federal action originally enshrined by the framers.29
Legally irrelevant, but morally more vexing than Cruikshank's pre-
incorporation vintage, is the fact that the case worked a shameful
perversion of justice which should rightly place it alongside Dred Scott
in the annals of judicial infamy. Cruikshank affirmed a federal circuit
court order arresting judgment upon a jury verdict convicting six of
several thousand members of the "White League" (a.k.a. the Ku Klux
Klan) for banding together in disguise to obstruct black citizens from
voting and to take retribution against blacks for appearing at the polls
and for carrying arms to protect themselves. The undertakings of the
"White League" that led to the prosecution of Cruikshank climaxed in
the Colfax Massacre in which several hundred blacks were murdered by
22. Freedom from religious establishment, free exercise of religion, freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom to petition the government for redress of
grievances. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. Security against unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers, and
effects; security against general warrants (description of elements of a valid warrant). See id.
amend. IV.
24. Rights of the criminally accused to presentment or grand jury indictment, security
against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, and against takings except for public use with just compensation. See id. amend
V.
25. Right to speedy and public trial by jury of the state and district, to be informed of the
nature and cause of criminal accusation, to confront witnesses, compulsory process, and to
counsel. See id. amend. VI.
26. Freedom from excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. See
id. amend. VIII.
27. Right to jury trial in civil suits where value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars,
freedom from reexamination of fact tried by jury except under the rules of the common law.
See id. amend. VII. These rights have not been incorporated against the states.
28. See infra Part I.B.5.
29. In this respect, the Second Amendment resembles the Tenth Amendment. Under the
Tenth Amendment, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X. The principle that powers not delegated to the federal government are
reserved to the states denies the federal government the exercise of nondelegated powers, and
by implication therefore affords some additional protection to nonspecified individual rights.
However, this principle could not logically be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment as a
limitation on state powers without doing violence to the overarching federal system established
by the Constitution. In fact, the Tenth Amendment expressly preserves the unlimited police
powers of the states in so far as they are not expressly curbed by the Constitution or reassigned
to the federal government.
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the Klan, which was then in the process of "redeeming" Louisiana from
Reconstruction rule. Cruikshank had been the only successful federal
prosecution in the wake of the atrocities, and arresting judgment in the
case thus assured that the massacre went unpunished.30
The Supreme Court's decision rested in part on a narrow reading
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that has
since been wholly superseded.31 Of perhaps partially redeeming value,
Cruikshank -while steeped in the formalism characteristic of the age of
pedantic pleading-is still cited for the nobler proposition that due
process requires an indictment to set forth with particularity and factual
specificity each element of an offense with which a defendant is
charged.3 2  But to a less formalistic eye, this aspect of Cruikshank
reflects less a concern for the rights of the accused than it does a
30. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 529-31, 550 (1988).
31. Technically, Cruikshank held that the constitutional rights of two black citizens, Levi
Nelson and Alexander Tillman, had not been criminally violated when they were prevented by
armed Klansmen from voting in a Louisiana election (the decision does not make clear whether
this was a state or federal or combined election, because the indictment failed to set forth the
answer to this question with sufficient particularity and detail). The Court held that the statute
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to incidents of national citizenship, and that,
while the right not to be prevented from voting on account of race was an incident of national
citizenship, the right to vote itself remained purely an incident of state citizenship, and that
because the indictment merely stated that black voters had been prevented from exercising their
suffrage and did not specify that they had been denied this right on account of race, the actions
alleged in the indictment did not fall within the statute. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Waite thus took a very narrow reading of the scope of federal constitutional rights
protected by the Enforcement Act and contemplated within the Fourteenth Amendment. To
this day, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is burdened by a similarly restrictive reading, see
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 408-11 (12th ed. 1991), while jurisprudence under
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses has grown far more expansive in its protection of
individual rights. See id. at 410, 601-08. See also the excellent discussion in Doe v. Daily News,
L.P., 660 N.Y.S.2d 604, 610-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), regarding the supersedence of Cruikshank
on the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The
Cruikshank Court reached the Second Amendment question because Nelson and Tillman had
endeavored to protect themselves against the Klansmen with weapons of their own, and held
that there was no constitutional right against disarmament by private actors. The opinion
implies that the only right of national citizenship contained in the Second Amendment is that of
keeping and bearing arms for service in the militia free of unwarranted molestation by the
federal Congress. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 592-93 (1876). Interestingly, it
is by no means clear from the record that Nelson and Tillman were not in fact disarmed while
serving in the militia, because Louisiana's legitimately elected Republican governor had called
out heavily black loyalist militia units to police the polling stations and resist the insurrectionist
forces of the "White League." Of further interest is the fact that the "White League" operated
under the authority of Louisiana's rival self-proclaimed Democratic governor, which raises the
question of whether Nelson and Tillman might be said to have been disarmed "under color of
state law" while serving dutifully in the militia, circumstances that would, even under Justice
Waite's absurdly reductionist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act,
constitute a civil rights violation. See generally FONER, supra note 30, at 529-31, 550 (discussing
the situation in Louisiana in 1873).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178, 180 (7th Cir. 1979).
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reactionary Court's desire to circumvent the congressional intent behind
the Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.33
If Cruikshank-its dubious provenance notwithstanding -remains
readily understandable purely as Second Amendment precedent,
United States v. Miller is more problematic from the standpoint of
Second Amendment doctrine. The single critical sentence in that
decision 4 is read by the individual right advocates as saying that the
weapon in question, a sawed-off shotgun, could be proscribed only
because it was not the sort of gun likely to be among the ordnance of a
militia.35 This reading suggests that other sorts of weapons -handguns,
automatic rifles, assault guns, even rocket launchers and machine
guns-are immune from government regulation. The opposing position
reads the Court's language as confirming the inescapable connection
between the right to have arms and the purposes of a collective militia,
saying in effect that the proclamation of the major clause is dependent
on its service to the minor. The unfortunate ambiguity in United States
v. Miller's holding is, to some extent, relieved by the Court's recognition
in the same opinion that the "obvious purpose" of the Second
Amendment is "to assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness of [state militias] .... [The Amendment] must be
interpreted and applied with that end in view.
'36
Between Cruikshank and United States v. Miller, the Supreme
Court handed down two other Second Amendment opinions, the first of
which one writer has called the most important decision in the field.37 In
33. See generally FONER, supra note 30, at 529-34, 569, 587 (discussing the Supreme Court's
flaunting of the purposes of the Reconstruction amendments); see also Doe, 660 N.Y.S.2d at
610-11 ("[T]he radical plan to protect the Negro by subjection of the states was thus
'demolished' by Waite and his associates [referring to the decisions in Cruikshank and the
Slaughter-House Cases] .... This marked the overthrow of the congressional plan of
reconstruction within seven years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment." (quoting
BRUCE R. TRIMBLE, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE: DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1938)));
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89-98 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
34. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) ("In the absence of any evidence
tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches
in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument.").
35. See David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 44-48 (1976); Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 63, 88-89; Art Black, From Trenches to Squad
Cars, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1982, at 30, 72-73.
36. 307 U.S. at 178.
37. See Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of
the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 996 (1975) ("[U]ndoubtedly the most
important Second Amendment case was Presser v. Illinois.").
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1886, in Presser v Illinois,38 the Supreme Court considered constitutional
challenges to the Military Code of Illinois. The case arose from a
criminal charge brought under a portion of the Code prohibiting men
from "associat[ing] themselves together [in any] military company"
other than the regularly constituted state militia, or from drilling or
parading without permission of the governor. 9 In upholding Hermann
Presser's conviction for leading an armed parade of his Lehr und Wehr
Verein40 through the streets of Chicago without leave from the governor,
the Court made clear that the Second Amendment does not sanctify
wholly private militia operating without state license or authority.41
The Presser decision is the best reasoned of the Supreme Court's
Second Amendment cases. But unfortunately for purposes of the
present controversy, Presser addresses Second Amendment
considerations only tangentially. The Presser opinion is devoted chiefly
to rejecting well thought (if misplaced) preemption and supremacy
arguments by appellant's co-counsel, Lyman Trumbull. The former
Senate judiciary chairman and moderate Republican leader during
Reconstruction 4 maintained that the entire Military Code of Illinois,
consisting largely of the Illinois Militia Act of 1879, was
unconstitutional. According to Trumbull, the Illinois code allowed an
organized state militia of no more than 8,000 men, but the federal
Militia Act of 1792, by which Congress occupied the field in respect to
militia organization, actually required the states to maintain general or
common militias, consisting of the entire nonexempted, military-aged
male population. 43 Because the state act was incompatible with federal
law, Trumbull insisted, it must give way in the face of the Supremacy
Clause. 44 The Supreme Court, however, invoked the doctrine of
severability, and held that the only provisions of the code relevant to
Presser's indictment-namely those barring armed parades by
unlicensed bodies without gubernatorial permission-were clearly
constitutional, and therefore declined to pass on the constitutionality of
38. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
39. Military Code of Illinois, Act of May 28, 1879, ch. 192, § 5 (current version as amended
at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1805/94 (2000)).
40. This translates as the "Teaching and Defense Club," which helps round out what is
indeed a rather alarming image of Presser's spiked-helmeted, rifle-bearing Germans on
unlicensed marches through Chicago in celebration of ostensibly worthy civic values.
41. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 264-65.
42. On Trumbull's constitutional politics, see FONER, supra note 30, at 226, 243-47, 250,
272, 336, 453-56, 507.
43. See Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff in Error, reported in Presser, 116 U.S. at 256, 256-
57.
44. See id. at 259.
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the rest of the state militia code.45
In so far as the Second Amendment was concerned, the Presser
Court reaffirmed Cruikshank, stating that the Amendment restrained
only congressional action.46  It also rejected a related Fourteenth
Amendment claim on the grounds that any right to serve in the state
militia was a creature of state law, and not a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship.47  Interestingly, the Court conceded in dicta that
because "all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved
military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the
states," the states cannot prohibit the people from keeping and bearing
arms "so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for
maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing
their duty to the general government. '48  However, this prohibition on
state-ordered disarmament of the federal militia reserve existed apart
from the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. 49 Instead, it reflected
what the Court called the "prerogative of the general government, as
well as its general powers" respecting the "reserve militia of the United
States."50  The Court thus invoked a concept of federal supremacy
derived from the "calling forth" and "provid[ing] for"5 powers under
the Constitution to imply a prohibition against state interference with
arms bearing in the federal militia. This federal right of the people to
45. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 263. As the court explained:
We have not found it necessary to consider or decide the question thus raised as to the
validity of the entire Military Code of Illinois, for, in our opinion, the sections under
which the plaintiff in error was convicted may be valid, even if the other sections of the
act were invalid. For it is a settled rule "that statutes that are constitutional in part
only will be upheld so far as they are not in conflict with the constitution, provided the
allowed and prohibited parts are separable."
Id.
46. See id. at 265.
47. See id. at 266-67.
48. See id. at 265; see also United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285-86 (3d Cir. 1996)
(declining to read United States v. Miller as affording Second Amendment protection to
possession of weapons of colorable military character absent a connection to lawful use in the
legitimate militia). As Judge Sloviter wrote:
[H]owever clear the Court's suggestion that the firearm before it lacked the necessary
military character, it did not state that such character alone would be sufficient to
secure Second Amendment protection. In fact, the Miller Court assigned no special
importance to the character of the weapon itself, but instead demanded a reasonable
relationship between its "possession or use" and militia-related activity.
Id. at 286 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
49. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
50. See id.
51. Cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16 ("The Congress shall have Power... To provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States .... ).
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keep and bear arms, like the state right to keep and bear arms
guaranteed by the Second Amendment, had no application outside the
context of militia service. To the Supreme Court,52 as well as to Lyman
Trumbull,53 the right(s) to arms protected the states and the nation
against over-large standing armies by enabling a militia, but served no
private purposes.
The other Supreme Court case touching the Second Amendment is
the first Miller case, Miller v. Texas,54 in which the Court dismissed a
Second Amendment claim for want of jurisdiction and lack of a federal
question. Beyond refusing to apply the Second and Fourth
Amendments against state courts ("it is well settled that the restrictions
of these amendments operate only upon the federal power, and have no
reference whatever to proceedings in state courts"),5 Justice Brown's
1894 opinion says nothing at all about the scope of the Second
Amendment protection of the right to bear arms.
In addition to these four familiar cases, the Supreme Court has
recently addressed the subject of constitutional restraints on gun control
legislation in a celebrated Commerce Clause case, and in so doing cast
light indirectly on the possible approach of the current justices to a
52. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 264-65. In the Presser Court's words:
The right voluntarily to associate together as a military company or organization, or to
drill or parade with arms, without, and independent of, an act of Congress or law of the
State authorizing the same, is not an attribute of national citizenship. Military
organization and military drill and parade under arms are subjects especially under the
control of the government of every country. They cannot be claimed as a right
independent of law. Under our political system they are subject to the regulation and
control of the State and Federal governments, acting in due regard to their respective
prerogatives and powers. The Constitution and laws of the United States will be
searched in vain for any support to the view that these rights are privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States independent of some specific legislation on
the subject.
Id. at 267.
53. In Trumbull's words: "The citizen of the United States has secured to him the right to
keep and bear arms as part of the militia which Congress has the right to organize, and arm, and
to drill in companies." Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff in Error, reported in Presser, 116 U.S. at
256, 257-58. The Supreme Court clearly understood Trumbull's argument for a right to arms as
premised on the militia's desirability as an alternative to a standing army. Thus the Court
reported:
It is said [by counsel for plaintiff in error] that the object of the act of congress is to
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining all the able-bodied male citizens of the
states, respectively, between certain ages, that they may be ready at all times to
respond to the call of the nation to enforce its laws, suppress insurrection, and repel
invasion, and thereby avoid the necessity for maintaining a large standing army, with
which liberty can never be safe ....
Presser, 116 U.S. at 261-62.
54. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
55. Id. at 538 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876); Baron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
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Second Amendment challenge. In United States v. Lopez, 6 decided in
1995, the Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990-
which outlawed carrying guns in the vicinity of schools-for failure to
articulate any tenable relationship between gun possession in school
zones and the regulation of interstate commerce. The decision has been
hailed by scholars as the opening salvo in the Court's postmodern
campaign to revitalize the federal structure of American government by
considering critically the too-ready-and heretofore unchallenged-
invocation by Congress of its powers to regulate interstate commerce.
As far as Lopez's possible Second Amendment implications are
concerned, the clearest guidance as to any justice's reading of the right
to arms emerges not from the majority, but from a brief dissent by
Justice Stevens. In his words:
Guns are both articles of commerce and articles that can be used to
restrain commerce. Their possession is the consequence, either
directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In my opinion,
Congress' power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the
power to prohibit possession of guns at any location because of
their potential harmful use .... ?7
Thus, Justice Stevens clearly assumes that gun possession lacks any
constitutional protection that might render prohibition under the
commerce power void or even suspect. If not quite as apparent, the
majority opinion in Lopez appears to have similar implications
regarding the lack of constitutional protection for a private right to own
guns. The majority not only ignored suggestions by amici curiae,
Academics for the Second Amendment et al., that the Gun Free School
Zone Act be struck down as violative of the Second Amendment, but,
perhaps more significantly, took for granted throughout its opinion that
Congress could regulate or prohibit gun possession to the extent that it
had a rational basis for so acting pursuant to its power to regulate
commerce.
The issues joined in the above Supreme Court cases, if not well
known to more doctrinaire polemicists, have been thoroughly
expounded in the growing academic literature on the subject. It is not
our intention to provide yet another critical review of the positions and
arguments by those who have preceded us into the fray. Rather, we
mean to submit an interpretation of the Second Amendment less often
heard and, we feel, more persuasively supported by textual analysis and
historical material than the polar positions that divide the protagonists.
56. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
57. Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In brief, the hypothesis we shall advance is this: The Second
Amendment cannot be read as a simple guarantee to the states that
they will be able to maintain armed troops subject to their command
despite what Article I, Section 8 might appear to say to the contrary.
Such a reservation of ungranted power, if such there were, would more
likely be found in the Tenth Amendment. 8 From the text as well as a
fair understanding of the contemporary ethic regarding arms and
liberty, it seems to us overwhelmingly evident that the principal purpose
of the Amendment was to secure a personal, individual entitlement to
the possession of arms. We cannot, however, (as the individual right
contingent generally does) 59 disregard entirely the first part of the text
proclaiming "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State." The question becomes, then, how does the
introductory phrase affect the scope of the individual right to arms
secured in the language of the second clause of the Amendment.
Here, as a matter of textual analysis, we regard it as highly
significant that of the several great entitlements enunciated in the first
eight amendments, no other is hedged by a conditional or explanative
clause. The founders could have said, introducing the First, for
example, that "free communication being essential to the intelligent
exercise of the franchise, Congress shall make no law, etc." If they had,
the gloss might have had a different sheen; laws restricting artistic
expression, commercial speech, or other communication unrelated to
voting might have been tolerated. But they did not. They could have
written in the Fifth that "torture being inimical to the dignity of man,
and likely to induce false confessions, no one shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself." 60 But they did not. So too, introductory
clauses might have altered the impact of the single provision of the
Fourth Amendment or the several of the Sixth. The unconditional
rights announced in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
58. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
59. Residents and visitors of northern Virginia will perhaps have noted that, as recently as
1999, the NRA Headquarters building, visible from Interstate 66, proudly displayed the motto
"The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Shall Not Be Infringed," but failed to quote the
Amendment's introductory language. The sign has since been removed.
60. Had they done so, the doctrine of self-incrimination might have developed in accord
with the interpretation expounded by Professor Albert Alschuler, who argues that "as
embodied in the United States Constitution, the privilege against self-incrimination was not
intended to afford defendants a right to remain silent or to refuse to respond to incriminating
questions. Its purpose was to outlaw torture and other improper methods of interrogation."
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent,
94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2631 (1996).
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might then have been construed considerably less generously.
In the light of this unique introductory language, we understand
the Second Amendment as though it read: "Inasmuch as and so long as
a well regulated Militia shall be necessary to the security of a free state
and so long as privately held arms shall be essential to the maintenance
thereof, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed." This is not an arbitrary choice among available readings. As
we shall show in Part III, the grammatical structure of the Amendment
precludes reading the provision as severable, independent clauses, one
of which might stand though the other falls. In our paraphrase we part
company from the most devoted of the individual right advocates. The
uncompromisable point of difference is that, to us, the language of the
Amendment cannot support a right to personal weaponry independent
of the social value of a regulated organization of armed citizens-
notwithstanding comments in other contexts by some of the founders
regarding guns and the ideal of personal responsibility.
To be sure, more than a few utterances by leading figures of the
Revolutionary and constitutional period do endorse shooting and gun
possession as tokens of firm and independent character. Perhaps the
most cited instance thereof is the following homily by Thomas Jefferson
in which he advises his fifteen-year-old nephew concerning the value of
sport shooting as a character-building exercise:
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to species of exercises, I
advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the body, it
gives boldness, enterprize, and independance to the mind. Games
played with the ball and others of that nature, are too violent for
the body and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun
therefore be the constant companion of your walks.
61
Jefferson's dictum reveals as much about the eighteenth-century
English-speaking aristocracy's distaste for rowdy and plebeian
soccer 62 as it does about his constitutionalism. Yet Jefferson was in
fact one of the few political leaders of the Revolutionary generation
61. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 19, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 405, 407 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1953).
62. See RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790, at 98-104 (1980)
(discussing the nature and cultural importance of sport in late colonial Virginia). To the
Anglican gentry, soccer and cricket rated less loathsome than brawling and cockfighting, but
were still considered unfit for gentlemen, who preferred the hunt, shooting, fowling, (lawn)
bowling, croquet, horseracing, and boxing. The gentry generally involved themselves in
horseracing and boxing only in a sponsorship and wagering capacity, leaving the prizefighting
and jockeying to champion slaves. For an interesting and insightful description of the sociology
of horseracing in the colonial South, see EDWARD HOTALING, THE GREAT BLACK JOCKEYS:




to go beyond endorsing gun ownership as a sporting attribute of
manly and genteel character, and discuss weapons possession outside
the context of militia service as a property worthy of constitutional
protection. 63  In the third version of his 1776 draft constitution for
Virginia-which, incidentally, the commonwealth declined to adopt-
Jefferson proposed that no "free man be debarred the use of arms
[within his own lands or tenements]."64 This proposition, radical as it
was, perhaps represented a retreat from an earlier draft of the
proposed fundamental law for Virginia, which would have guaranteed
an unqualified right that "freem[e]n shall [never] be debarred the use
of arms, ''65 presumably on public, common, and unclaimed lands as
well as their own. Neither version became law in the Old Dominion,
a fate shared by a number of other radical provisions of Jefferson's
draft constitutions, including a clause guaranteeing fifty-acre land
grants to every person not otherwise entitled to vote, 66 thereby
elevating the general populace into the propertied electorate, rather
than debasing electoral qualifications to the meanest level of the
commonest man.
Jefferson's early radicalism respecting constitutional entitlements
to gun possession went the way of his land redistribution and
emancipation schemes. 67 By the time of the Chesterfieldian letter to his
63. Samuel Adams was one of the few others. See infra notes 341, 456 and accompanying
text (discussing Adams's effort to append a draft amendment securing a private right to arms to
the recommendations that the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention submitted to Congress).
64. Thomas Jefferson, Third Draft of Virginia Constitution (1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 356, 363. Boyd's notation indicates that the words
"within his own lands or tenements" were not entirely legible in the best-preserved text, but that
this represents a probable reading.
65. Thomas Jefferson, First Draft of Virginia Constitution (1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 329, 344.
66. See Jefferson, supra note 64, at 362 ("Every person of full age neither owning nor
having owned [50] acres of land, shall be entitled to an appropriation of [50] acres or to so much
as shall make up what he owns or has owned [to] [50] acres in full and absolute dominion, and
no other person shall be capable of taking an appropriation.").
67. In 1776, Jefferson drafted a comprehensive, gradual emancipation plan for Virginia as
Bill No. 51 in the proposed laws that the Committee of Revisors (Jefferson, Edmund Pendleton,
and George Wythe) eventually submitted to the state legislature in 1779. See Thomas Jefferson,
Draft of Bill No. 51: A Bill Concerning Slaves, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 61, at 470, 470-72. This is the same project that produced the Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom, but the emancipation measure did not become law; in fact, it was not introduced as a
bill because members of the assembly "concluded that the public mind would not bear the
proposition [of emancipation]." DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HiS TIME: JEFFERSON THE
VIRGINIAN 264 (1948). By 1779, when the General Assembly took the bill calling for the
revision of the laws of Virginia under consideration, Jefferson had been elected governor. See
id. at 264. During his governorship, Jefferson maintained a scrupulous distance from the
legislative process consistent with his belief in the strict separation of powers, and played no role
in the introduction of any bills. See generally id. at 261-64.
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nephew, Jefferson's praise of firearms was no longer articulated on
constitutional grounds. A few years later, writing Madison from Paris
with advice on the desirability of the proposed federal Bill of Rights,
Jefferson spoke exclusively of protecting a right against standing armies,
and made no mention of arms or weapons at all.68
Indeed, save for Jefferson's failed 1776 proposals and Samuel
Adams's rejected draft amendment of 1787,69 we know of no comments
by leading figures of the Revolutionary generation concerning the value
of private arms possession made in the context of drafting or
interpreting the Constitution, the Second Amendment, militia
legislation, or related state constitutional provisions. Exhortations
lauding the virtues of shooting, including Jefferson's to his nephew,
were inevitably made in an extra-legislative situation and without any
legislative reference.70 In contrast, for Jefferson's peers on the political
6& See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 438, 440; see also discussion infra notes 379-
83.
69. See 3 WILLIAM V. WELLS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SAMUEL ADAMS 267
(1865); see also infra notes 341, 456 and accompanying text.
70. Further illustration is provided by George Washington's sporadic correspondence with
his Fairfax neighbors regarding hunting and the chase. On balance, Washington and the
Fairfaxes seemed more involved with hounds than with guns, being more inclined to the fox
hunt (and perhaps also dog-based pest control) than to shooting game. See, e.g., Letter from
Bryan Fairfax to George Washington (Oct. 15, 1769), in 8 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 261, 262 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds., Univ. Press of Va. 1993)
(discussing the hound Fry's debut as a fox hunter, and the question whether it would be beneath
his canine dignity to be borrowed by some of Washington's slaves for the purpose of culling the
local raccoon population); Letter from Bryan Fairfax to George Washington (Aug. 3, 1772), in 9
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra, at 77, 77-78 (regarding a gift of sporting hounds
whose skill Mrs. Washington had questioned to Mrs. Fairfax). Still, it cannot be denied that
they did shoot. See Letter from George William Fairfax to George Washington (Feb. 22, 1773),
in 9 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra, at 183, 183-84 (explaining that the political
climate dictated the elder Fairfax's imminent departure for the home country (taking with him,
of course, Lady Fairfax -Washington's favorite Sally), but that a set of pistols should be left at
his seat for Colonel Washington's use in hunting on Fairfax's lands, which, according to the
annotation, see id. at 184 n.2 (citing Washington's diary), Washington spent the next two days
doing with the younger Fairfax and associates (while Washington's diary remarked the party
"found a fox," it is to be expected hounds rather than guns perpetrated the ultimate act)).
The most important point for present purposes is that Washington used the term "arms" in
a military, as opposed to a sporting, context. See Letter from George Washington to George
Mason (Apr. 5, 1769), in 8 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra, at 177, 178, in which
Washington discusses the pending association (a nonimportation agreement) and reflects:
At a time when our lordly Masters in Great Britain will be satisfied with nothing
less than the deprivation of American freedom, it seems highly necessary that
something shou'd be done to avert the stroke and maintain the liberty which we have
derived from our Ancestors; but the manner of doing it to answer the purpose
effectively is the point in question.
That no man shou'd scruple, or hesitate a moment to use a---ms in defense of so
valuable a blessing, on which all the good and evil of life depends; is clearly my
opinion; yet A---ms I wou'd beg leave to add, should be the last resource; the
de[r]nier resort. Addresses to the Throne, and remonstrances to parliament, we have
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stage, arms-related discourse in a legislative context focused on securing
or organizing the militia rather than protecting a private right to own
guns for recreational or other personal purposes. The most telling
collateral utterance relating to the language of the Second Amendment
is doubtless the Militia Act of 1792. Passed by Congress only one year
after the Amendment's ratification, the Militia Act aimed to flesh out
the right to arms described in the Amendment. It provided:
That every citizen so enrolled [in the militia] and notified, shall,
within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or
firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a
knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than
twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock,
each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or
with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty
balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of
powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when
called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out
on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a
knapsack.7
This statute, the light it sheds on the Second Amendment, and its
importance to the evolution of the militia are analyzed in detail below in
Part II.A.1. But for now, it is sufficient to compare the language in the
statute to that in Jefferson's avuncular maxim. The statute reflects the
military reference of the framers' obligation-focused "rights talk" in the
Second Amendment, while Jefferson's aphorisms on the sporting,
manly, and salubrious nature of shooting, not only lack a military
reference, but pivotally remain wholly apolitical, extra-legal, and
unconcerned with rights.72
already, it is said, proved the inefficiency of; how far then their attention to our rights
& privileges is to be awakened or alarmed by starving their Trade & manufactures,
remains to be tryed."
Arms then, unlike "hounds," "dogs," or even "pistols" implied to Washington military action
with a strong political dimension, so much so that he dared not spell out the word in the context
of embracing a potentially treasonous combination to protest actions and policies at least
putatively vested with legitimate authority by his dread Sovereign (and namesake) Georgius
Tertius Rex Britanniae et Hiberniae.
71. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271, repealed by Dick Act, ch. 196,
32 Stat. 775 (1903).
72. Indeed, it is worth remarking that, unlike the framers of the Second Amendment,
Jefferson spoke not of bearing arms at all, but simply of a "gun" being his nephew's "constant
companion [on his] walks." The Second Amendment speaks not of guns, but of the right "to
keep and bear Arms." In late-eighteenth-century usage, bearing arms was a term of art with an
obvious military and legal meaning. "Carrying a gun" lacked the restrictive technical
connotations of bearing arms, and the Second Amendment nowhere mentions a "right to carry a
gun." Cf. Garry Wills, Why We Have No Right to Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Sept. 21, 1995, at 62, 64-65 (setting forth a scholarly exposition of the etymology and technical
meaning of bearing arms); discussion infra pp. 593-94. In this sense, even Jefferson's
constitutional proposal of 1776 (although not his original draft thereof) admits quite plausibly of
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At least as early as 1840, courts acknowledged that the terms "keep
and bear Arms" had military connotations inconsistent with assertions
of personal rights to carry whatever weapons pleased the individual.
73
Moreover, this recognition reflected long established usage, not
linguistic innovation. 74 In our analysis, then, the individual right to keep
and bear arms secured in the Second Amendment is a right without
application outside the context of service in state or federal militia. As
our focus shifts forward from the time of the Republic's founding, we
will demonstrate that the critical context surrounding the personal right
to bear arms set down in 1789 has experienced dramatic, substantial,
and material changes; changes which began even in the early years of
nationhood, accelerated over the course of the nineteenth century, and
reached the very foundations of the right in the twentieth century.
In the early years of the Republic, compulsory, universal militia
service gave way to the volunteer principle, as the militia-of-the-whole
fell into proverbial disfavor, disrepute, and desuetude.75 Even more
fundamentally, from 1808 onward, Congress provided an annual
appropriation of $200,000 with which the states could purchase militia
arms,76 thereby taking the first steps down a long road leading to the
national government's complete assumption, during the early twentieth
a less expansive, exclusively military reading. Cf discussion supra pp. 421-23.
73. See Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). In Aymette, the court was
interpreting a provision of the Tennessee Constitution, which then provided that "[t]he free
white men of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense." The
court stated in its opinion:
[E]very free white man may keep and bear arms. But to keep and bear arms for what?
If the history of the subject had left in doubt the object for which the right is secured,
the words that are employed must completely remove that doubt. It is declared that
they may keep and bear arms for their common defence. The word "common," here
used, means, according to Webster: 1. Belonging equally to more than one, or to many
indefinitely. 2. Belonging to the public. 3. General. 4. Universal. 5. Public. The
object, then, for which the right of keeping and bearing arms is secured is the defence
of the public. The free white men may keep arms to protect the public liberty, to keep
in awe those who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the
constitution. The words "bear arms," too, have reference to their military use, and
were not employed to mean wearing them about the person as part of the dress. As
the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is secured is of a general and
public nature, to be exercised by the people in a body, for their common defence, so
the arms the right to keep which is secured are such as are usually employed in
civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military equipment.
Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
74. See Wills, supra note 72, at 64; see also David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the
Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 554 (1991) ("The militia
must be the people acting together, not isolated persons acting individually.").
75. See MARCUS CUNLIFFE, SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE MARTIAL SPIRIT IN
AMERICA, 1775-1865, at 202-12 (1968).
76. Act of Apr. 23, 1808, ch. 55, § 1, 2 Stat. 490, 490. For an analysis of the law, see
CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 193; discussion infra note 538 and accompanying text.
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century, of the arming of the militia, which the Militia Act of 1792 had
rested with the individual, able-bodied man.77 Even as early as the Civil
War, when the nation first confronted the need for mass mobilization
under the Constitution, all state enrollees and volunteer companies
were sworn into federal service.78  And after considerable initial
confusion regarding the bounds of state and federal authority, all arms
used by the 2,666,999 soldiers who served in the Union armies79 were
procured and issued by the federal government.80
In 1903, following the great disorder which accompanied
mobilization of state guard units during the Spanish War and Philippine
insurrection, Congress finally acted under pressure from President
Roosevelt to subdivide the militia-of-the-whole-by then entirely
fictitious-into an active militia (the National Guard) and unorganized
militia (the nonenrolled male population between eighteen and forty-
five years of age). At the same time, the federal government
standardized state units and equipment and, in return for massive
increases in federal funding, the states accepted vastly enhanced federal
supervision of militia training.8'
Congress acted again in 1908 to make the National Guard the
country's first-line reserve, providing that the organized militia would
be called forth before the raising of federal volunteers. 82  More
fundamentally, Congress waived existing territorial limitations on
National Guard call ups, thereby attempting to bypass the issue of the
constitutionality of militia service outside the United States which had
plagued the president and the War Department in the wars of 1812-15,
1846-48, and 1898-1901. Within a few years, however, both the
attorney general and the judge advocate general of the army had
written reports finding this use of the militia to be unconstitutional,
8 3
presenting Congress anew with the problem of legally deploying
77. See Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271, repealed by Dick Act, ch.
196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). For an analysis of the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, see CUNLIFFE,
supra note 75, at 184; WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 93-94; discussion infra notes 482-91 and
accompanying text.
78. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 204; Wiener, supra note 8, at 191.
79. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 216-18.
80. See id. at 203-04.
81. See Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). For analysis of the Dick Act, see Perpich v.
Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 342 (1990); MARTHA DERTHICK, THE NATIONAL
GUARD IN POLITICS 26-27 (1965); WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 320-22; Wiener, supra note 8, at
193-96.
82. See Militia Reform Act of 1908, ch. 204, § 5, 35 Stat. 399, 400-01.
83. See 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322 (1912).
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American reservists overseas.84
This controversy came to a head during the preparedness
movement that preceded American entry into World War I. The
bitterly contested National Defense Act of 191685 "federalized" the
organized militia, which was thenceforth known only as the National
Guard, and integrated it into the command structure of the War
Department and the regular army. Upon Congressional authorization,
the president was empowered to draft guardsmen into federal service
for the duration of the emergency specified by Congress. In the years
before World War I, then, the state militias were being integrated into a
federally supervised United States Army National Guard supplied with
standardized, congressionally prescribed arms purchased with federal
funds and kept in state arsenals, which too were increasingly financed
by the national government. During the same period, the states
acknowledged delegation of the provision of security against invasion to
the U.S. Army and the organized reserves, laying the framework of
federal relations that allowed the massive mobilization of citizens into
soldiers in both world wars.
86
The next step on the road to federal integration was taken during
the Hundred Days of 1933.87 Congress made the National Guard part
of the army during peacetime as well as war, justified its administration
for the first time not under the Militia Clause but under the Army
Clause of the Constitution, and "eliminated the word 'Militia' from the
War Department organization by changing the name of the supervisory
agency to National Guard Bureau." 88 Crucially, the states now accepted
the dual enlistment system whereby guard members took simultaneous
oaths to serve in their state units and in the regular army when called up
to national duty.89 Presidential authorization to draft individual guard
84. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 324-25.
85. National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166.
86. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 344-50.
87. Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153 (amending the National Defense Act of 1916,
ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166).
88. See Wiener, supra note 8, at 209. Wiener comments that "the 1933 Act proved
conclusively that a well-regulated militia is impossible of attainment under the militia clause,
and can be organized only by resort to the plenary and untrammeled powers under the army
clause." Id.
89. The dual enlistment system continues in force to this day. In the words of Justice
Stevens:
Since 1933 all persons who have enlisted in a State National Guard unit have
simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the United States .... [U]nder the
"dual enlistment" provisions of the statute that have been in effect since 1933, a
member of the Guard who is ordered to active duty in the federal service is thereby
relieved of his or her status in the State Guard for the entire period of federal service.
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
members into federal service, which had facilitated mobilization in
World War I but had dissolved the traditional state units, now gave way
to a delegated power to order guard units into federal service whenever
Congress declared a national emergency and authorized troop use in
excess of the regular forces. Finally, in 1952, Congress did away with
the requirement of the declaration of an emergency and gave the
president essentially discretionary power to call up National Guard
units with gubernatorial consent.90
In the years since World War II, however, the roll of a mass reserve
in assuring national security has seriously diminished, in part because
the technical complexity of equipment and tasks required of the modern
army have dictated a heightened emphasis on professionalism, and in
part because nuclear arsenals have made massed war drawing all the
personnel reserve of the country increasingly unlikely. The need for a
whole nation in arms has-in all likelihood, permanently-disappeared.
At the same time, conscription has become so unpopular as to border
on being politically unfeasible. In this climate, the volunteer principle
has again supplanted the draft as the recruiting mechanism for fighting
the limited wars of the nuclear age, leaving no shadow of the old
militia's universality or compulsory service obligation about today's
National Guard.9'
These historical processes, treated in detail in Part II, have
fundamentally changed the militia and the context in which it operates.
Taken together, we will argue, historical developments have altered a
vital condition for the articulated right to keep and bear arms. While
not exactly obsolete, the Second Amendment has become, like the
Third, dormant: of no significance or effect on Congress's gun
regulation power unless or until the conditions of the enactment are
revived, state militias92 are restored, and militia members are required
to arm themselves. It might illustrate our position regarding the present
posture of the Second Amendment to imagine a provision of the 1789
Bill of Rights reading as follows: Commerce within and between the
several States being essential to the economy of the Nation, the right of the
people to breed and keep horses shall not be infringed. Should
government, at some level that is bound by the provision, enact today a
Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1990).
90. See id. at 346.
91. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 505-06.
92. By a "state militia" we mean an official state military organization as contemplated by
the Second Amendment and not self-styled private bands of paramilitary citizens. See supra
notes 37-53 and accompanying text (discussing Presser v. Illinois).
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restriction on the number of horses that might be stabled within a
designated area, no constitutional challenge would be heard, we will
claim, because the right created by the provision had gone into
suspension when equine commerce was taken over by the internal
combustion engine.
We are proposing that the first clause of the Second Amendment-
which cannot be ignored-must be read as a condition for the principal
clause. And it is significant that-even if rhetoric concerning the virtue
of economic self-sufficiency and citizen defense had permeated late-
eighteenth-century thinking on this side of the Atlantic-the condition
imposed by the text is not: "Self-reliance and the virtue of arms being
necessary to the maintenance of personal security, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Such a condition,
it might well be maintained, would never change and would keep the
enunciated right as alive today as it was when enacted. To those who
would have it so, we express our regrets but, as they have often said to
their gun control opponents, wishing will not make it so. If one side is
stuck with one clause, the other is as fully bound to take account of the
other.93
It should be unnecessary to emphasize that our position says
nothing whatsoever about the legality or wisdom of possessing arms, the
types of weapons people may own, or regulation of the manner and
purposes of carrying them. We say only that such entitlement or
prohibitions as there may be must emanate from a source other than the
Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. And it is,
in our view, entirely fitting that the democratic branch-free of
constitutional constraints -should from time to time enact, amend,
repeal, and reenact, locally or federally, such rules regarding private
access to weapons of various sorts as may seem wise.94
93. Cf Wills, supra note 72, at 73 (citing Levinson, supra note 7, at 657-59).
94. In essence, we are repeating Justice Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905). If the "Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics," id. at 75, neither does the Second Amendment enact Wayne LaPierre's Guns,
Crime, and Freedom (1995). Justice Holmes wrote regarding the Court's grafting of substantive
due process limitations against economic regulation onto the Fourteenth Amendment that "a
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism
and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire." Id. (Holmes, of course,
lived to see the Soviet constitutions of 1918 and 1924.) He felt that the judiciary's agreement or
disagreement with a particular social or economic policy "has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law." Id. He had no doubt that it was settled law that
state legislatures "may regulate life in many ways which [Justices of the Supreme Court] as
legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical [as a maximum-hours law for
bakery workers]." Id. To Holmes, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause restricted
legislative action only to the degree that "a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the most difficult component of our argument will be
neither the linguistic nor the historical, but the theoretical: How do
changing times affect the meaning of ancient texts? Here, eschewing
the modem, pragmatic Posner,95 we come closer to Justice Scalia's view
that the original intention of the framers, inferred from text according
to a hypothetical contemporary understanding, should govern as long as
and insofar as critical, assumed, underlying social and technological
factors remain fundamentally unchanged.96  Since most such things
evolve in some respects, what constitutes an unchanged critical factor is
obviously a matter of judgment. But it does seem clear that a provision
relating to horses enacted in an era of exclusively horse-powered land
transportation loses its force when the mode of commerce is utterly
altered. To this general theory of construction, we would add that an
express recognition in the governing text of the dependence of a right
on a particular social condition makes our interpretative model
considerably easier to apply.
This, then, is our plan of argument. Following this introductory
summary, this Article treats the ideological roots of the Second
Amendment in Part I. Much of what we set forth there is familiar
ground to scholars of the eighteenth century. In the light of the high-
decibel controversy surrounding the modem import of the
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our law." Id. at 76.
In essence, we are arguing that the Second Amendment should never become a vehicle for
judicial imposition of restraints grounded in social theory on state or national legislatures'
abilities to regulate, restrict, or prohibit possession of firearms for purely private purposes. The
Second Amendment was intended to prohibit Congress or the president from disarming state
militias by disarming their members. To read into it any other limitations on legislative
authority would be to engage in long-discredited Lochnerian intervention. Activism of that
stripe would differ entirely from Warren-era judicial insistence that the Reconstruction
Congress intended the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to afford citizens the
same civil rights under state law as they were guaranteed under federal law by the express terms
of the Constitution, and criminal defendants the same procedural rights in state court as they
would be afforded under the explicit terms of the Bill of Rights in a federal trial. How such
activism might compare to judicial insistence that textually unspecified rights to sexual and
reproductive liberties lurk within the penumbra of specified rights of criminal defendants (or
home owners!) is a closer, more delicate, and more contentious question. But to the extent that
libertarians are less interested in political outcomes than principles of jurisprudence, this last
consideration might occasion pause for thought. In other words, if Judge Bork is right on Roe v.
Wade, then the NRA has no Second Amendment argument against the Brady Law. See
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
110-15, passim (1990).
95. For the new, pragmatic thesis, see Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1640-42 (1998).
96. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See also the thoughtful discussion in Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings:
Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 397-98 (1995).
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constitutional provision, it may come as a mild surprise to lawyers not
overly steeped in early-American political theory to find much general
accord regarding seventeenth- and eighteenth-century antecedents and
the function of arms and the militia in the design of the new American
political experiment. We describe the understanding of the founding
generation as derived from the political thought that impressed itself on
the minds of those concerned with the nature of just and enduring
government. Here we draw upon not only the influential sources in
America of the late eighteenth century, but also explore the collateral
expressions of the founders and their contemporaries to find the most
likely purposes and assumptions underlying the text. This will
constitute the web of historical context from which the meaning of the
text may be read. Then, in Part I we will describe the evolution of the
military unit called militia to its present (non)status in the social fabric
of contemporary America.
Thereafter, in Part III, we turn to the Second Amendment's
meaning today, seen, as we think it must be, in the light of its history
and its context-a context very different from that which existed when
the Amendment was written. We will stress that because the operative
language of the Second Amendment is predicated on the existence of a
specified social and military condition,9 fidelity to the Amendment
requires that the rights it guarantees be assessed in the light of today's
militia's constitutional posture, its status under state and federal law, the
manner in which it is armed, and its role in the preservation of the
states' and the Union's military and civil security. The inquiry will focus
on how far these rights contemplated in reference to the militia as it
existed in theory and practice in 1791-when individual members were
responsible for arming themselves -survive after that militia has
vanished in fact (and very nearly in name as well). In our Conclusion,
then, the Second Amendment reemerges in its original meaning,
protecting rights fundamental to the vitality of the militia, the
constitutionally preferred system of national defense. But as the
Second Amendment resurfaces with the meaning with which it was
invested over two hundred years ago, it also enters into a modem
America in which that original meaning, at least for the time being, no
longer has any scope for application or operation. Finally, we will
undertake to respond to three eminent scholars who have expounded
theses at variance with our own.




I. ARMS, THE MAN, AND THE MILITIA: THE HISTORY OF A
CONCEPT
A. The Militia and the Militia Ideal in the Historiography of the
American Revolution
Many have been baffled by the language of the single sentence that
is the Second Amendment. Just what should we make of the odd-
indeed unique -preamble, the language that precedes (but otherwise
seems to bear no connection to) the ringing declaration of the right to
keep and bear arms? Some have emphasized that since the militia was,
at the time, the whole people (free, white, adult, male people anyway),
the words "Militia" in the first clause and "people" in the second clause
are synonymous, and the right of arms is extended only to the militia as
such.98  Others, as vehemently, would regard the preamble as nothing
but introduction, of no more substantive significance than an indrawn
breath before the delivery of the message. 99 And the message, like
others in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, is
unequivocal: now and forever, in military pursuits and all others, guns
98. See, e.g., Weatherup, supra note 37, at 991-92. Weatherup notes that Madison, while
speaking to the adequacy of the unamended Militia Clauses at the Virginia convention, used the
words "people" and "militia" as synonyms, "as [he did in] the Second Amendment, which he
was later to draft." Id. The passage to which Weatherup refers is, however, not without its
ambiguities. Madison actually does not use the terms "people" and "militia" interchangeably.
Rather, he uses "militia" to mean the people's agent, as opposed to the people themselves. In
the following passage (the one that Weatherup had in mind), our sense is that Madison uses
"people" to suggest an agency relationship in much the same way as New York does when it
refers to the "People" to mean the state prosecutor acting on behalf of the state's inhabitants:
If resistance should be made to the execution of the laws, [Madison] said, it ought to be
overcome. This could be done only in two ways-either by regular forces or by the
people. If insurrections should arise, or invasions should take place, the people ought
unquestionably to be employed, to suppress and repel them, rather than a standing
army. The best way to do these things was to put the militia on a good and sure
footing, and enable the government to make use of their services when necessary.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 378 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863) [hereinafter STATE DEBATES].
The reporter's is clearly not a verbatim transcript. While the indirect, descriptive
rendering of Madison's speech set down in State Debates does suggest that the militia called to
duty serve as the people in action, it very much leaves open the question whether the militia and
the people are coextensive in their rights. See also Cress, supra note 8, at 23-24 (rebutting an
individualist argument much like Weatherup's, first advanced by Robert E. Shalhope in The
Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982)). But see Williams,
supra note 74, at 554 (theorizing that the individualistic interpretation is fundamentally
inconsistent with the republican principles out of which the Second Amendment sprang).
Republicanism supports the idea of a militia only insofar as a militia is a collective entity acting
for the common good. See id.
99. Joyce Lee Malcolm, for one, sees the first clause as "amplifying" rather than
"qualifying" the second. Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms:
The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 314 (1983).
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are an individual entitlement immune from government curtailment.100
Fair consideration of the ample historical record, however,
discloses that to the framers, the ratifiers, and indeed to the polity of
new-fledged Americans generally, the language of the provision could
hardly have been a more felicitous expression of its scope, intent, and
purpose. There seems to us little doubt that the provision protected as
an individual right (and in more democratically generous form) 101 the
ancient custom of free, adult citizens to keep and to carry arms,102 but
100. See, for example, Halbrook, supra note 7, at 598, who notes that when Madison
introduced the Bill of Rights in 1789, he explained that the amendments "relate first to private
rights," thereby endorsing what Halbrook assures us was a "leading popular analysis" under
which "the people [were] confirmed.., in their right to keep and bear their private arms."
101. The progenitive English Bill of Rights of the seventeenth century conditioned the right
to "have Arms" on station and Protestantism-class and religion-based restrictions that the
Americans elected not to incorporate into the Bill of Rights of 1789. Compare An Act
Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill
of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2, 7 (Eng.) ("That the Subjects which are Protestants
may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law."), with
U.S. CONST. amend. II. See also detailed discussion infra notes 178-201 and accompanying text.
102. The ancient right figured highly in Blackstone's reckoning, not as one of the three
primary (natural) rights (personal security, personal liberty, private property), but as one of the
five auxiliary (political) rights without which the primary rights would be "dead letter[s]." See 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *140-45. Blackstone described these five auxiliary
rights as (1) the constitution, powers and privileges of Parliament; (2) the limitation of the king's
prerogative; (3) the right to apply to the courts of justice for redress of injuries; (4) the right of
petitioning the king or either house of Parliament for redress of grievances; and (5) the right of
subjects to have arms for their defense. See id. at *141-45; see also 1 EDWARD COKE, THE
FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY UPON
LITTLETON § 71.a. (19th ed. 1853). At first blush, Blackstone may appear to endorse an
unbridled right to arms for defense of self as well as realm and weal, but it is well to note that in
the context of his times, Blackstone took for granted a high degree of regulation,
circumscription, and exclusion to the right to arms he described. More fundamentally, the Bill
of Rights is not generally read to have enshrined the common law as memorialized by
Blackstone, but to have constitutionalized exactly those rights that it expressly articulates and to
have given them the scope defined by the terms of the amendments themselves or subsequently
by judicial inquiry. Thus Blackstone is a useful constructive aid in so far as he elucidates terms
of art appearing in the Bill of Rights, but when looking to Blackstone for guidance as to
meaning, we should not cross over into grafting his assertions of legal principle into the Bill of
Rights, or into giving legal principles protected therein precisely the scope they are assigned in
the Commentaries. See, for example, Justice Brennan's analysis of the First Amendment right
to free speech in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964), and in particular his
commentary on the Sedition Act of 1798, expressing the Court's sense that even though that act
had never been subjected to judicial review, it almost certainly had been unconstitutional ab
initio. Justice Brennan implicitly rejected the position maintained by some High Federalists
during the controversy surrounding enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts that the First
Amendment constitutionalized the law of libel as set forth by Blackstone, and hence accorded
free speech no greater protections than those recognized by the common law of libel in
England. The Court went on to endorse Madison's famous argument that establishment of the
American constitutional Republic marked a fundamental departure from English common law
precedent. See id. at 274-75. By insisting that "make no law means make no law," Justice
Brennan was as persuasive in this context from a textualist standpoint as he was from the
perspective of the "living Constitution" with which he was often more closely associated. On
Justice Brennan and the Sullivan opinion, see generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE
SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
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only in the context and for the advancement of the organized,
communal military units generally believed to be indispensable to the
preservation of political liberty. 103 During the ratification debate, some
radical Antifederalists did call for a wider, purely private right to own
weapons, but, at least outside of New Hampshire, theirs remained
marginal voices.104 On the other hand, innumerable contemporary
utterances, cutting a wide swath across the political spectrum and
spanning the full breadth of the nation, support our militia-focused
reading. For the moment, we choose but one such expression from the
Virginia Ratifying Convention. Virginia's recommended constitutional
amendments, drafted principally by George Mason and appended to its
vote of ratification, include language that is virtually identical to the
Second Amendment, but more illuminating:
Seventeenth, That the people have the right to keep and bear arms;
that a well regulated Militia composed of the body of the people
trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free
State. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to
liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the
circumstances and protection of the Community will admit; and
that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to
and governed by the Civil power. 105
Like the framers of the Second Amendment two years later,
Virginians at the ratifying convention imbedded the right to keep and
bear arms in a web of related military principles. As Robert E.
Shalhope writes, "more often than not [Americans of the Revolutionary
generation] considered these rights inseparable." 106 Bearing implied
making muster, equipped and ready for service; keeping entailed steady
103. There were, of course, exceptions to this general consensus, chiefly among the arch-
Federalists. Many veterans of the Revolutionary officer cadre did not consider the militia
necessary (or even useful to) the preservation of national security. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8,
at 80-81, 88; see also discussion infra notes 272-81 and accompanying text. Alexander Hamilton
went further-he did not believe the militia useful to the preservation of political liberty.
Hamilton's view of the militia's utility to the conservation of liberty has much to do with his
conception of the type of liberty sound government was designed to secure. To Hamilton,
liberty meant no more than the ability of the financial and commercial classes to rely on a strong
executive's ability to check the mobocracy, and to this end, the militia was hardly a useful tool at
all, but rather a foil. See Williams, supra note 74, at 575-76. But see LANCE BANNING, THE
JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY passim (1978) (discussing
the republican conception of Hamilton's politics).
104. For a fuller discussion, see infra pp. 484-86.
105. For a detailed analysis of this passage, along with other utterances from the ratification
period in favor of and against constitutional protection for a communal or private right to arms,
see infra Part I.B.4.
106. Shalhope, supra note 98, at 611. Shalhope, however, does not share our position that
the right to keep and bear arms had no meaning outside the militia context. See id. at 614.
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readiness to serve when called upon.107 For the founding generation and
for near contemporaries, then, the right to bear arms, far more than
others enshrined in the Bill of Rights, brooked, tolerated, invited, and
even demanded regulation because of its communal and military
context. 1
08
As the Virginia Ratifying Convention's conjunction makes plain,
the right of arms was not therefore an individual right in the same sense
as the rights expressed in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and even the First
Amendments to the United States Constitution. These are rights the
exercise of which protected personal integrity, often at the expense of
common interests. They reflect distinctly postclassical ideals, rooted in
the principles of the common law, but accorded a basis in larger political
theory only by the individual rights philosophers of the eighteenth
century who forged the first modem conceptions of liberal democracy.
They owe as much to the Enlightenment as to the Renaissance. In
contrast, the personal right expressed in the neoclassical language of the
Second Amendment was understood by principal draftsman James
Madison to serve the interests of the commonweal by buttressing
community security and reducing the sway of a dangerous, potentially
usurpatory standing army.
10 9
The extent that we are today bound by the understanding of our
foreparents, how far the running sands erode or reshape the governing
intent of ancient text is, of course, an endless and perhaps fruitless
debate. 10 But we think the significance of dramatically altered context
two centuries later is especially loud and clear in the case of the Second
Amendment, because the framers explicitly stated their social and
107. See Wills, supra note 72, at 64.
108. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 9, at 708. In the often cited "palladium of liberties"
passage, Justice Story calls for more forceful regulation of the militia in order to breathe life
into the fundamental right to keep and bear arms. Story captures nicely the great irony behind
the Second Amendment: Far from having any record of interfering with peoples' rights to keep
and bear arms-suggesting that those rights required constitutional protection-the post-
Revolutionary state and federal governments devoted considerable and largely unavailing
efforts towards convincing citizens that they should indeed exercise these very rights and appear
properly armed and accoutered on the muster day. The people by and large showed themselves
less and less inclined to do so. See, e.g., CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 177-212.
109. For a discussion of Madison's conversion to the cause of a bill of rights and his role in
drafting the Second Amendment, see infra pp. 493-96.
110. For an excellent summary of some the most influential approaches to originalism, see
Jack Rakove's insightful Introduction to INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 3, 3-10 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). For a classic exposition of the
viewpoint that we are expressly bound by the original meaning of constitutional and statutory
text, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAT-ER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1990). See also the intelligent commentaries of Gordon S. Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary
Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin contained in Justice Scalia's book.
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ideological premise in the same breath as the right they enunciated.111
Hence, in this Part, we will develop the historical argument that the
right expressed was individual, and that it was deemed vital enough to
be enumerated among the fundamentals because, in the republican
framework of this particular provision, it was deemed a communal
bulwark.
To pursue this inquiry into purpose and meaning, we must return
to the frame of mind of the late eighteenth century."' As the Pulitzer
and Bancroft Prize winner Gordon Wood, among others, has argued,
the prevailing political climate in this epoch among Americans of all
classes and conditions was vigorously intellectual and historicist.113 The
American Revolution was, like the framing and adoption of the
Constitution, a revolution of ideas. 14 To Wood, the Revolution
involved taking honored old ideas seriously, while the Constitution
fashioned new ideas to serve old purposes."1 5 In this philosophical
climate, "Militia" and "bear[ing] arms" were pedigreed terms of art,
deeply steeped in meaning that was then as intuitively clear as it is now
opaque. Both were central constructs in a system of thought with which
the constitutional generation was intimately familiar, and with which
many of its representatives were virtually obsessed."6  This was the
111. Since the First Congress took the pains to express its intent in the language of the
Second Amendment itself-something it did for none of the other amendments in the Bill of
Rights-this intention became incorporated into the Constitution by the Amendment's
ratification. Therefore, the legislative intent behind the right to keep and bear arms demands
particular fidelity; indeed, one could argue it becomes determinative of the scope of the right
protected.
112. Here, we insist that history is important, that text takes meaning from context, and that
the Constitution cannot be remade at will to reflect changing sensibilities. At the same time, we
step away from the devoted originalism that would bind us to interpretations that make sense
only by ignoring the evolution of ideas and institutions.
113. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
4-10 (1969).
114. Reflecting upon the momentous events of his youth, John Adams wrote to Jefferson in
1815:
What do we mean by the Revolution? The war? That was no part of the Revolution;
it was only an effect and consequence of it. The Revolution was in the minds of the
people, and this was effected, from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years before a
drop of blood was shed at Lexington. The records of the thirteen legislatures, the
pamphlets, newspapers in all the colonies, ought to be consulted during that period to
ascertain the steps by which the public opinion was enlightened and informed
concerning the authority of Parliament over the colonies.
Reprinted in BAILYN, supra note 2, at 1, 1.
115. See WOOD, supra note 113, at viii-ix, 83-90, 593-615.
116. On republicanism as the ideology that drove the American Revolution, see generally
DOUGLAS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974);
BAILYN, supra note 2; H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY
AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1965); 1 PAMPHLETS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, supra note 2; J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS,
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intellectual universe of civic humanism or classical republicanism,"7 the
political culture that formed the starting point for constitutional debate
in late-eighteenth-century America.
18
Until the late 1950s, most American historians assumed that the
constitutional universe of the founding period could be reduced to a
recapitulation of Locke's Second Treatise on Government. An
outpouring of brilliant scholarship during the next two decades amply
demonstrated that the constitutionalism of the founders and framers
had in fact had a rather different predicate, that Locke was not a
fundamental figure in their political hagiography, and that Americans of
the constitutional period were far closer to the radical, civic, and
communitarian impulses of the English Commonwealth and the
Restoration-era opposition than to what twentieth-century writers have
wrongly styled "Lockean" individualism. 119 These insights became the
LANGUAGE, AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (1973) [hereinafter
POCOCK, POLITICS]; POCOCK, supra note 2; THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1644, 1688, 1776
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980); WOOD, supra note 113; Cecelia Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The
Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1955). For
historiographical reviews of scholarship on the American Revolution emphasizing the
republican perspective, see Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American
Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982) [hereinafter Shalhope, Republicanism]; Robert
E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of
Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972). For a
countervailing perspective, arguing that overestimation of republicanism's role in late-
eighteenth-century America has obscured a protocapitalist animus at the root of Jeffersonian
democracy, see JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790s (1984) (Appleby's title refers to Jefferson's party, not to the classically
derived ideology); see also John Ashworth, The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal
Capitalists?, 18 J. AM. STUD. 425 (1984). Even the neoliberal revisionists concede the centrality
of republican ideology during the emotionally charged years before the Revolutionary War.
117. The terms "civic humanism" and "republicanism" connote different historical phases of
what is essentially a single political ideology. We use the term "civic humanism" to refer to the
political ideology of the Florentine Renaissance, as described particularly by POCOCK, supra
note 2, at 183-218. James Harrington expanded upon these Florentine principles during the
English Commonwealth, and his political thought became known as classical republicanism. See
id. at 381-422. By itself, the term "republican" has been used to refer to the entire system of
thought from Machiavelli onwards, but the term refers also more narrowly to the eighteenth-
century American variant, which is described best in the first part of WOOD, supra note 113, at
3-90.
118. Notwithstanding critiques such as Appleby's, see APPLEBY, supra note 116, it remains
difficult to overstate the influence of classical republican ideology on the formation of the
American political design. Yet, for thoughtful commentary from an egalitarian and feminist
perspective concerning the dangers of a potential republican revival in contemporary politics
and jurisprudence, see Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic
Republicanism, 99 YALE L.J. 661 (1989). See also Williams, supra note 74 (offering another
interesting take on the up and down sides of "neorepublicanism").
119. In American historiography, a long-standing assumption that Locke was the dominant
figure in eighteenth-century political thought, and the determinative influence behind the
ideology of the Revolution (see, e.g., CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:
A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1942)), did not survive focused, detailed
probing of the pamphlets and papers of the Revolutionary period during the 1950s and '60s,
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central tenets of a new republican paradigm, which in great measure
determined the course of writing about early American history from the
late 1960s into the early 1980s.120
Not only did leaders of the Revolutionary era dwell on the
radical thought of the Interregnum English Commonwealth and the
Restoration opposition, the Americans also applied this republican
ideology to the constitutional questions of their own time-including
the issues of the relationship of liberty to arms possession and the role
of the military in civil society. In the words of Lance Banning:
No man's thought is altogether free. Men are born into an
intellectual universe where some ideas are native and others are
difficult to conceive. Sometimes this intellectual universe is so well
structured and has so strong a hold that it can virtually determine
not only the ways in which a society will express its hopes and
discontents but also the central problems with which it will be
concerned. In 1789 Americans lived in such a world. The heritage
of classical republicanism and English opposition thought, shaped
and hardened in the furnace of a great Revolution, left few men
free.
121
The republican ideology that went so far in defining the political
world of Revolutionary America rested on a short set of assumptions
about the nature of people and the state. Like their Commonwealth-
Whig forbears during and after the English Civil War, Americans of the
Revolutionary period assumed that public virtue was both the source
and goal of all legitimate exercise of public authority. Public virtue
implied a common purpose, a dedication that transcended individual
which ushered in the republican historical revision. See, e.g., POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note
116, at 107 ("[Tihe textbook account of Augustan political thought as Locke et praeterea nihil
badly needs revision."). Locke's chief political influence, it emerged, flowed from his status as a
representative Restoration-era opposition thinker, not from any proto-individualism inherent in
his political writings. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 34-54. Moreover, Locke was known to the
colonists, not so much as a political theorist, but as the epistemologist behind An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (1690) and the pragmatist behind Some Thoughts
Concerning Education (1693). See GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 167-74 (1978). Finally, it emerged during the 1980s that
Locke was hardly a conservative individualist at all, for he had not written his Two Treatises of
Government after the fact in the 1690s to provide the post-Settlement government with
theoretical underpinnings, but instead had penned the Second Treatise as a revolutionary
manifesto in support of the Rye House Plot of 1682-83, an abortive regicidal and
communitarian combination spearheaded by Locke's patron, the radical Whig leader Earl
Shaftesbury. See RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE'S TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 327, passim (1986).
120. For a summary of the republican understanding of late-eighteenth-century American
political thought, see the works cited supra note 116, particularly Shalhope, Republicanism.
121. Lance Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793,
31 WM. & MARY Q. 167, 178-79 (1974) (footnote omitted).
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interest. 22  Its antithesis was corruption, both individual and
constitutional. 123 Individual corruption could take the most obvious and
literal form of soliciting or working improper, self-serving influence in
government, or it could manifest itself in economic dependence that
sapped the individual of his or her independent will and ability to make
public-minded choices. 124  Constitutional corruption arose from
interbranch imbalances or from imbalances in power among social
orders, which undid the carefully nourished historical stability of the
polity.
12
One of the vilest engines of constitutional corruption was the
standing army and the system of debt, taxation, influence, and executive
bureaucracy upon which it depended. Military power in the hands of a
professional band of soldiers-whose loyalty to the government was
unleavened by personal commitment to the community, the people, or
the concerns of local security-was anathema to the ideals of civic
virtue. Expensive, disengaged, brutal, and unthinking (and most likely
composed of ne'er-do-wells and foreigners as well), the standing army
was corruption of the body politic incarnate1 26 The surest antidote to
this sort of corruption was reliance on a militia of independent and
virtuous freemen who supplied their own arms for the defense of the
Republic.'27 In the words of one seventeenth-century pamphleteer,
[T]he only Ancient and true Strength of the Nation [is] the Legal
Militia .... The Militia must, and can never be otherwise than for
English Liberty, because else it doth destroy itself, but a standing
Force can be for nothing but [royal] Prerogative, by whom it hath
its idle living and Subsistence.
28
In this system of thought, then, independent arms and militia were
interlocking central concepts. Early in the evolution of republican
ideology, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were
perhaps the central concepts. 29  However, as time wore on and
republican ideology was shaped more and more by English and
122. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 113, at 65-70.
123. See, e.g., id. at 28-36; POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 93-94.
124. See POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 92-93.
125. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 113, at 18-36; cf. POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 88.
126. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 2, at 61-63.
127. See POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 126.
128. Id. (quoting A LETTER FROM A PARLIAMENT MAN TO His FRIEND (1675), reprinted in
2 STATE TRACTS: BEING A COLLECTION OF SEVERAL TREATISES RELATING TO THE
GOVERNMENT, PRIVATELY PRINTED IN THE REIGN OF K. CHARLES 1168 (London 1693)).
129. On the centrality of the possession of independent arms to the thought of James




eventually by American experience, the relative importance of various
components of republicanism underwent adjustment. While
independent arms possession long retained symbolic and rhetorical
significance, by 1787 Madison's "American science of politics"'
130
focused more on structural safeguards for republican government (and
hence on the dangers of a standing army) than on the character of the
individual best suited to prop up a republic (and hence on the linkage of
gun ownership to virtue). Whether Federalist or Antifederalist,
American political theory of the constitutional period no longer relied
principally on an ideal of independent arms possession-even if it
descended from ideology that did, and even if it still engendered
rhetorical flourishes on the virtues of independent arms similar to those
which had informed political thought at an earlier time. This sea change
in political principle is developed in detail in Section 2 of this Part. In
the intervening subsections, we will examine the evolving role of arms
possession in republican political theory, from its origins in the
Renaissance up until its last flowering in the antifederalism of the Bill of
Rights and the Second Amendment. What ultimately emerges is a
Second Amendment expressing a constitutional preference for
government independent of standing armies rather than a right to arms
existing wholly without public or military context.
1. Civic Humanism
At least part of the ideology of the American Revolution had its
origins in the Italian Renaissance. As J.G.A. Pocock developed the
argument some twenty-five years ago, Renaissance statesmen-
especially Machiavelli in Florence -wrestled with renewed conceptions
of the interrelations of politics, history, and human nature. 3' In the
Middle Ages, political systems-even history itself-had seemed
relatively stable. The same organic interdependence of prince, clergy,
nobles, soldiers, and people characterized all of Christendom, forming
an ingrained pattern transferred with slight variations from generation
to generation. The Renaissance brought a consciousness of change, of
evolution, and the consequent appreciation of the inherent instability of
130. Wood coins this phrase to refer to the political system of the Constitution, which he
sees as Madison's innovative structural and federal resolution of the fatalistic and pessimistic
aspect of the republican paradigm. Blending, checks and balances, phased and filtered
elections, judicial review, and enumerated powers rendered possible a survivable polity
composed of less than virtuous citizens. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 593-618.
131. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 156-218; see also Richard B. Morris, The Origin and
Framing of the American Constitution, 9 REVUE INTERNATIONALE D'HISTOIRE MILITAIRE 41
(1990) (likewise noting the debt to Machiavelli and the classical republican ideal of civic virtue).
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human society.13 2
In the Italian city-states where the Renaissance first and most
brightly flourished, rediscovery of the history of republican Athens and
Rome brought also a particular sensitivity to the instability of the
republic over time. Historically conscious Florentines and Venetians
bemoaned the inability of the ancient republican institutions to
withstand historical change and decay. In crafting their own republican
city-states, Renaissance statesmen sought to create some certainty that
their political systems might, unlike their classical predecessors,
endure.133 But Machiavelli more than others understood that the new
republics, too, would inevitably decline.3 4  To him, republican
government depended on republican society, in which individuals acted
virtuously for public purposes and not corruptly and selfishly for private
ones. The highest public purpose was, of course, defense of the republic
itself."'35
Yet according to Machiavelli's Discourses, defense achieved by
granting a powerful king absolute control of a strong standing army was
chimerical.136  Although that power might repel foreign enemies, it
surely corrupted the virtue of the citizen. If it buttressed the republic in
the short term, it undermined it over the long haul. Propped up by a
standing army, government would no longer flow from deliberation and
the individual's sense of duty to the commonweal, but from
"placemen," office-seekers, and influence peddlers buying and selling
favor with the powerful magistracy necessary to administer the vast
military establishment. Access to decision-making authority would
become purchasable, and decisions would be made to suit private
purposes. The military itself would no longer be employed chiefly in
necessary defense, but in elaborate foreign campaigning designed to
justify expanding its size, influence, and bankroll. The once virtuous
and independent-minded republican citizenry would become politically
passive and civicly feeble; the republic would go over to absolutism, and
the state itself would eventually fall to more vigorous competitors.137
132. See POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 81-90.
133. See id. at 85-86.
134. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 156-218; POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 88.
135. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 201-03, 386.
136. In the next century, Francis Bacon echoed Machiavelli's views, commenting that a
prince who depends upon professional soldiers "may spread his feathers for a time, but he will
mew them soon after." FRANCIS BACON, Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates, in 6
THE WORKS OF SIR FRANCIS BACON 446 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1861), quoted in Lois G.
SCHWOERER, "No STANDING ARMIES!" THE ANTIARMY IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 10 (1974).
137. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 413-15.
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In the classical mode then, republican survival was premised largely
on a capacity for defense arising apart from a specialized, full-time,
state-financed military establishment. Here, at the center of the civic-
humanist paradigm, was the arena in which the citizen-soldier could
assert his independence and virtue in the service of the republic. The
ideal of the citizen-soldier was embodied in the legendary General
Cincinnatus, who had been called from the plough to the defense of the
Roman republic. To act in the spirit of Cincinnatus in the early
Renaissance era required economic independence: one had to have the
wherewithal to carry one's own arms in the service of the republic.13 8
Hirelings and mercenaries, paid by the state to carry arms they could
not furnish independently, served as foils to the classical republican
ideal, for they acted not from motives of virtue, but merely at the
bidding of the powerful.139 As developed below, this archetype passed
through Commonwealth ideology and English political pamphlets into
the mainstream of American Revolutionary thought.140 Thus, private
arms in the public service played an important part in early Americans'
conceptions of public duty and, in turn, in their understanding of
political stability in a changing world.
2. The English Civil War and the Classical Republicans
Even as sixteenth-century Italian writers celebrated the virtues of
classical citizen-soldiers, the nations of Continental Europe were
experiencing a "military revolution,' 1 41 during which the feudal array
yielded to the antithesis of an armed citizenry, the professional army.142
13& See POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 90-93, 112-14 (discussing the importance of
independently furnished arms); cf. GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND
THE ENLIGHTENMENT 225-30 (1984) (discussing the image of Cincinnatus).
139. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 210-11.
140. For a detailed study of anti-army and pro-militia ideals in English political thought
from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, see generally SCHWOERER, supra note 134,
passim. Schwoerer discusses evidence of Machiavelli's influence on English early modem anti-
army thought. See id. at 17-18. But it is easy for one to underestimate Machiavelli's influence in
the English-speaking world by dwelling on his reception into English political thought during his
own lifetime. According to Schwoerer, he became much more familiar to readers on both sides
of the Atlantic through archrepublican Henry Neville's translations of his works-including The
Discourses, The Florentine History, and The Arte of Warre (found in The Works of the Famous
Nicholas Machiavel, Citizen and Secretary of Florence)-which were published in 1680, 1694,
and 1695 and reprinted throughout the eighteenth century in England, Scotland, and America.
See id. at 114-15.
141. This phrase gained currency with the publication of Professor Michael Roberts's
Inaugural Lecture, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660, delivered at Queens University, Belfast,
in January 1955. For a summary of Roberts's historiographical influence and a discussion
expanding on Roberts's ideas, see GEOFFREY PARKER, THE MILITARY REVOLUTION:
MILITARY INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF THE WEST, 1550-1800, at 1-5, passim (1988).
142. See generally id. at 14-28 (discussing professionalization and expansion of armies in the
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But while Renaissance learning spread from Italy to England during the
Tudor period, the military revolution did not.143 In Elizabethan
England, physical separation from Europe, reliance on naval defense
against foreign powers, and the conjunction of imported neoclassical
ideals with native prejudices against professional soldiers helped
engender policies favoring modernization of the historic militia rather
than creation of a standing army to guard the Protestant state against
Catholic invasion or subversion.'"
The term "militia" did not enter the English language until 1590.145
However, an institution analogous to the militia existed as a holdover
from the pre-Norman customary duty of male subjects of every social
rank to appear in arms whenever the Saxon fyrd was summoned to
defend king and country, a species of obligation existing quite apart
from the separate Anglo-Norman duty to bear arms in the array. In
1558, the first year of Elizabeth's reign, England's system of military
obligation was reorganized, with control of the county forces devolving
to local aristocratic potentates henceforth called county lord-
lieutenants. 46 This localism was jealously guarded against royal control
as long as the militia continued to be a politically relevant institution in
England. In 1573, legislation created "trained bands" of selected men
to serve as the core of the county militia. A full-time force was
assembled to meet the threat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, but it
disbanded quickly after the crises, and thereafter the trained bands and
county militia served as England's only army apart from a small force of
the Queen's Guards.
147
Elizabeth's successor, James I, ruling in both England and
Scotland, took little interest in military affairs for their own sake.148 But
James was greatly concerned with expanding English royal prerogative
context of technological changes, in particular, the advent of commercial credit, the coming of
siege artillery, the rise of "horizontally" designed siege-resistant fortification, and the triumph of
archers and gunners over cavalry on the battlefield).
143. See SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 12, 16-18 (discussing English isolation from the
military revolution and England's reception of neoclassical and Renaissance attitudes towards
soldiers). Parker points out that England made limited experiments implementing progressive
fortification design under the Tudors, see PARKER, supra note 141, at 26-28, and thus dates the
arrival of the military revolution in England to the sixteenth century. But for present purposes,
the important consideration is that large, professional armies were not introduced into the
British Isles until Cromwell's time. See SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 52.
144. See id. at 10-12.
145. See id. at 14; see also 6 NEw ENGLISH DICTIONARY 438 (Sir James A.H. Murray ed.,
1908).
146. See SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 14.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 12.
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and expounding theories of absolute monarchical powers, 4 9 and, in this
context, the harmonious relations between the Crown and Parliament
so characteristic of England's first golden age came to an end. As
tensions between the Crown and Parliament intensified, seventeenth-
century British politics were given up to ideological and political
struggles, focusing on issues of religion and separation of powers and,
after the coronation of Charles I, on crises of military funding,
organization, and control. 150
Quarrels between the king and Parliament over military issues
began as altercations about strategy in Europe, but at length joined
constitutionally more explosive questions concerning control of the
taxing power, the Crown's attempt to rule without Parliament, and the
scope of royal power over the religious establishment and dissenting
churches.1"1 The pacifist James I long succeeded in ignoring
parliamentary pressure for direct British intervention to support the
Protestant cause in the Thirty Years' War, but by the close of James's
reign, the king's favorite Buckingham was interjecting English
expeditionary forces into French campaigns with disastrous results.152
Upon the accession of Charles I in 1625, the new king made clear his
eagerness to involve England more directly in the Continental war. But
unlike the haphazard naval privateering undertaken with the Crown's
blessing through the early stages of the war, raising a large army for
action in Europe required that Parliament create new revenue by
imposing taxes.153 Parliamentarians, jurists, scholars, and the educated
realm agreed that the king did not enjoy the power of taxation without
parliamentary consent. Yet Parliament suspected that voting high taxes
to raise an army would leave Charles virtually unchecked in the exercise
of those powers and prerogatives he did legitimately wield. If the king
secured the revenue his army required, his opponents feared he could
dispense with Parliament by dissolving it and not calling a new one.
Without Parliament to pass statutes and voice opposition, Charles's
149. For the divine right theory expounded by the first two Stuarts, see JAMES VI OF
SCOTLAND (JAMES I OF ENGLAND IN 1603), TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES (1598) and
BASILIKON DORON (1599); CHARLES I, EIKON BASILIKE (1649) (possibly ghostwritten by Dr.
John Gauden), three classic (and self-interested) early tracts on absolutism.
150. See generally GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, ENGLAND UNDER THE STUARTS
(1904) (still the classic history of seventeenth-century England); J.P. SOMMERVILLE, POLITICS
AND IDEOLOGY tN ENGLAND, 1603-1640 (1986). For a good specialized study of military
practices in seventeenth-century England, see SCHWOERER, supra note 134.
151. See generally LACEY BALDWIN SMITH, THIS REALM OF ENGLAND, 1399-1688, at 206-
15 (4th ed. 1983). See also SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 3-4.
152. See id. at 20.
153. See id.
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critics argued, the door would open to the king's unpopular High
Church religious program.
5 4
Exasperated by parliamentary intransigence over the right to
control taxation and by the tone of Parliament's Petition of Right of
1628, Charles I did indeed decide to circumvent the Legislature, calling
no Parliament at all from 1629 to 1640.155 Charles endeavored to
finance his personal rule by imposts and excises, forced loans, billeting
soldiers on the public contrary to law, and by imposing an unpopular
and unsuccessful levy called the ship money, which attempted to
requisition from inland cities and counties a cash equivalent to the ships
coastal jurisdictions customarily surrendered for royal service.116 The
final failure of this scheme and the king's desire to raise money to build
a navy and intervene on the Continent led to the begrudging convention
of the Short and Long Parliaments in 1640. By November 1641, the
inability of the king and Parliament to settle the "Constitutional
Question" over the power of taxation had unleashed the English Civil
War.1 57
Political issues that fueled the English Civil War were not resolved
during that conflict or in its immediate aftermath. Images forged and
questions raised in the mid-seventeenth century long endured in the
minds of English-speaking people, and, almost 150 years later, these
familiar civic dilemmas still exercised unrivaled influence on the
developing ideology behind the American Revolution, Constitution,
and Bill of Rights.158 At the heart of England's seventeenth-century
154. See SMITH, supra note 151, at 217-25.
155. See id. at 222-25.
156. See id. at 225-29.
157. See id. at 229-33.
158. See generally BAILYN, supra note 2, at 33-34. As Bailyn describes it:
[W]hat dominated the colonists' miscellaneous learning and shaped it into a coherent
whole, was the influence of still another group of writers .... The ultimate origins of
this distinctive ideological strain lay in the radical social and political thought of the
English Civil War and of the Commonwealth period; but its permanent form had been
acquired at the turn of the seventeenth century and in the early eighteenth century, in
the writings of a group of prolific opposition theorists, "country" politicians and
publicists.
Id. at 34.
The allegorical importance of the English Civil War and of republican thought to George
Washington is captured nicely in WILLS, supra note 138. According to Wills, Washington was
heavily influenced by Joseph Addison's Cato (1713), the most popular play in eighteenth-
century America. Indeed, Washington is said to have seen it staged over two hundred times,
and he cited from it liberally and often. Cato can be understood as an allegory on the Civil War,
in which Cromwell appeared in the guise of the great Roman republican who lent the play its
name. Addison's message was of the infinitely greater nobility of republicanism to Caesarism,
and, according to Wills, Washington consciously patterned his retirement from military
command, and his refusal to be king, after Cato. See id. at 133-37.
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quest for constitutional settlement were questions concerning the
relation of the legislature and the executive to armed individuals, the
militia, and standing armies. The same issues crystallized again in the
1780s, across the Atlantic, in the efforts to forge what became the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Yet the English
Civil War and the Commonwealth left a mixed legacy for the Second
Amendment's framers and interpreters. 159
To begin with, Commonwealth ideology-the republican principles
at the heart of the parliamentary cause-developed into the
background of accepted political values that Americans on all sides of
Revolutionary and constitutional politics took for granted. 16°  Thus,
during the formative period of the American Revolution, Whiggish
fidelity to the gospels of the Commonwealth and of Restoration-era
opposition amounted to almost the whole of the American ideology.
Central to this line of thinking were the tenets of legislative supremacy,
limits over executive power, and suspicion of standing armies.161 During
the "critical period1 62 before ratification of the Constitution, the
"ancient" English rights and liberties characterizing the Commonwealth
ideal informed the beliefs of Federalists and Antifederalists alike.163
But if Americans in the 1780s universally accepted the fundamental
principles of the parliamentary cause of the 1640s, the English Civil
War's lessons directly touching the army and citizen-soldiers were not
159. In the words of Professor Pocock:
The Civil War of 1642 had broken out in a dispute between king and parliament for
control of the county militia, and had, until the regiments were new-modeled, been
fought between elements of that armed force, the only one which England then
possessed. Some of the opposition to Cromwell's Protectorate from within the army
had come from New Model idealists who still believed themselves to be a people in
arms and resented being placed under the direct control of the head of state. The
Restoration of 1660-itself in part the work of an army willing to disband itself rather
than live at free quarter-had carried with it an unequivocal declaration vesting
control of the militia in the king; but a necessary counterpoint to this principle had
been an unspoken but no less unequivocal insistence that it should only be the county
militia-the freeholders in arms under the gentry as their natural leaders-over which
the king was to exercise command.
POCOCK, supra note 2, at 410.
160. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 34.
161. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 15-17, 20, 41-43.
162. The description of the postwar years of Confederation government as a critical period,
during which fundamental questions of union, order, and liberty hung in the balance, gained
currency via publication of JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783-
1789 (1896). This image was famously reassessed in MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789 (1950).
163. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 404-05, 410-11 (discussing the emerging Federalist
conception that unchecked populism imperiled established rights and liberties); id. at 536-40
(discussing the Antifederalist reliance on traditional Whig theory to attack the proposed
constitution and urge a bill of rights).
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unambiguous. The victorious (parliamentary or) English army was a
republican army in the sense that it comprised civic-minded,
independent-thinking, politically conscious citizen-soldiers fighting
expressly for the public good (the Commonwealth).164  Oliver
Cromwell's New Model Army was, however, also arguably the first
modern regular army.1 65 Ploughmen and artisans rallied to the "Good
Old Cause" 166 for nonmercenary purposes, but they became full-time,
highly regimented professional soldiers, differentiated according to
merit and function, not according to birth and station.167 More even
than being in the service of the state, they became, or endeavored to
become, the state. I68  Finally, with the paradigmatic passing (or
ossification?) of their virtue and revolutionary idealism, they became
something that bore a marked and disturbing resemblance to a standing
army, 169 which example Americans of the immediate pre-Revolutionary
period firmly eschewed.
70
Beyond this, even the militia and the system of militia
164. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 372-76. On the ideological ambiguities at the heart of the
New Model Army's changing sense of mission, see generally SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at
51-71.
165. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, GOD'S ENGLISHMAN: OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE
ENGLISH REVOLUTION 63-70 (Norman F. Cantor ed., 1970); SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at
51-52.
166. This phrase, referring to nostalgia for the Commonwealth among Civil War veterans
unhappy with subsequent counter-republican developments, occurs commonly in the academic
literature. See, e.g., A.H. Woolrych, The Good Old Cause and the Fall of the Protectorate, 13
CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 133 (1957); J.G.A. Pocock, James Harrington and the Good Old Cause: A
Study of the Ideological Context of His Writings, 10 J. BRIT. STUD. 30, 32 (1970). It has its
origins in the influential Humble Petition of Several Colonels of the Army of 1654, which
referred to the "good cause ... that old cause mentioned in our publike Declarations and
Engagements." Id. at 32 n.7.
167. In Cromwell's famous words: "I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that
knows what he fights for and loves what he knows than what you call a gentleman and is nothing
else. I honour a gentleman that is so indeed." Cromwell expanded, "If you choose godly honest
men to be captains of horse, honest men will follow them.... A few honest men are better than
numbers." HILL, supra note 165, at 67.
168. See G.E. AYLMER, REBELLION OR REVOLUTION? ENGLAND, 1640-1660, at 94-102
(1986); SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 71. But see also the following from an anonymous
radical pamphleteer:
It is our conquest, not the Army's: the Army being considered as the people's power,
chosen by the people, paid by the people, entrusted with the people's welfare and
defence, acting all-hitherto they have done and we hope shall-for the good, liberty
and freedom of the people. By "people" is meant the sound, well-affected part, the
rest are the conquered subdued part, who can challenge no right in the free election,
which is the fruit of conquest.
Anonymous, The Extent of the Sword (1653-54), quoted in HILL, supra note 165, at 79.
169. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 412-13.
170. See SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 196 (discussing American opposition to standing
armies in the run up to the Revolution); id. at 189 (discussing that opposition's roots in the anti-
army reaction during the Interregnum).
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administration became problematic in the aftermath of the English Civil
War. Under the rule of the major generals, Cromwell organized all of
England into full-time militia districts, which were regimented,
standardized, and supervised to an extent that, with the waning of
revolutionary Puritan zeal, seemed oppressive. 7' As Commonwealth
gave way to Protectorate and finally to Restoration, not only
Cromwell's one-time secretary John Milton mused upon the waning of
republican glory.'72  In 1656, James Harrington published his
Commonwealth of Oceana, the classical republican parable of England
and its political culture. He expounded the ideal of the citizen-soldier-
statesman transferred from Florence into English idiom. Harrington's
imagination brought forth a militiaman who might never have won the
war, but who nonetheless represented the militia's most stoically civic
and individualist principles.17 3 This fantasy of the early Cromwellian
Commonwealthman, rather than the living veteran struggling for
political accommodation after the war, passed into the pamphlets of
later generations of Real Whig English opposition thinkers, and from
thence into the spirit of '76, and finally, in transfigured form, into the
militia mythos of today.
174
3. The Glorious Revolution and the English Bill of Rights of 1689
The English Commonwealth/Protectorate was a military republic,
spending as much as ninety percent of government income on the army,
navy, and militia. 175  After the death of Oliver Cromwell in 1658,
parliamentary and republican leaders proved unable to resurrect a
political consensus in favor of either the military establishment or the
administrative and revenue mechanisms necessary to sustain that
171. See David Underdown, Settlement in the Counties, 1653-1658, in THE INTERREGNUM:
THE QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT, 1646-1660, at 165, 165-82 (G.E. Aylmer ed., 1990);
SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 62-63.
172. See generally JOHN MILTON, THE READY AND EASY WAY TO ESTABLISH A FREE
COMMONWEALTH (1660). According to the OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE
653 (Margaret Drabble ed., 5th ed. 1985), Milton wrote this book in "a last-minute attempt to
defend the 'Good old Cause' of republicanism and to halt the growing tide of royalism and the
defection of 'the misguided and abused multitude."' The extent to which Milton's great later
works, Paradise Lost (1667), Paradise Regained (1671), and Samson Agonistes (1671), served as
allegories on the vanished Commonwealth is, of course, the subject of varied interpretations.
For an excellent recent discussion of the political implications of Milton's writings, see DAVID
NORBROOKE, WRITING THE ENGLISH REPUBLIC: POETRY, RHETORIC AND POLITICS, 1627-
1660, at 109-39, 433-98 (1999). In addition, Mr. Merkel thanks Dr. Andrew King of University
College, Oxford, for sharing liberally during the writing of this paper his insights on Milton,
seventeenth-century literature, and seventeenth-century culture.
173. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 361-422; POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 104-47.
174. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 38-44.
175. See PARKER, supra note 141, at 62.
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martial system. In the end, the Protectorate collapsed under the
combined weight of its military apparatus and its inability to forge a
constitutional consensus settling and legitimizing its own continued
existence. 176 But Restoration of the monarchy in 1660 only recast the
fundamental military/constitutional questions of the day, it did not
submerge them. Old Commonwealthmen and new Whigs soon
perceived familiar abuses in Stuart military policy. Criticism of the
Crown and the army became widespread in the 1670s; in the next
decade, "No Standing Army" became with "No Popery" the most
prominent mantra of Opposition politicians and pamphleteers. 177 At
length, the Country/Whig/Opposition joined forces with William of
Orange to thwart the Stuart vision of an absolutist Britain and usher in a
constitutional monarchy. The English constitutional Settlement
achieved with the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 embodied principles
that would remain fundamental to the framers of the American
Constitution and Bill of Rights one hundred years later. 178  The
accommodation the Convention Parliament reached with William and
Mary after the flight of James II was memorialized in the Declaration of
Rights of February 12, 1688; consisting of two sections, a written
catalogue of grievances against the old executive, and a set of
stipulations of parliamentary and individual rights that the new
monarchs bound themselves to respect.
179
The Declaration of Rights spoke to the same concerns over
maintenance of standing armies and disarmament of the citizen army
that prompted passage of the American Second Amendment in the next
century. The Declaration reflected Whig resentment of the Stuart
government's confiscation of arms in opposition strongholds, where the
militia could not be expected to side with the Crown in the event of a
new civil war. Likewise, it condemned royal establishment, without full
parliamentary authorization, of a large, professional army composed
disproportionately of Irish Catholics and officered by the Crown's
Catholic sympathizers, in clear violation of the Test Act of 1661. As
176. See generally SMITH, supra note 151, at 266-71.
177. See generally SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 136-47.
178. See generally I@OlS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 289-90
(1981).
179. See Convention Parliament, The Declaration of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, Assembled at Westminster (Feb. 12, 1688), reprinted in JACK N. RAKOVE,
DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 41, 41-45 (1998); William III, His
Majesties Gracious Answer, to the Declaration of Both Houses (Feb. 15, 1688), reprinted in
RAKOVE, supra, at 45. See generally SMITH, supra note 151, at 303-06. The Declaration of
Rights, with some modifications, became statute with the passing of the Bill of Rights on
December 16, 1689. See SCHWOERER, supra note 178, at 3.
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critics of the Stuart Court declaimed throughout the 1670s and '80s, this
new army was designed not to protect English security or even to
project English interests abroad, but to provide employment for royal
favorites and to cow and harass the parliamentary opposition that
considered itself the natural defender of the Protestant nation against
royal and papal usurpation.180
At the center of the first section of the Declaration of Rights was
the charge that "the late King James the Second, by the Assistance of
divers Evil Counsellors, Judges, and Ministers Employ'd by Him, did
endeavor to Subvert and Extirpate the Protestant Religion, and the
Laws and Liberties of th[e] Kingdom." 18, In its indictment of the old
monarchy, the Convention complained that the deposed king conspired
to violate religious and political liberties by such abusive means as
Levying Money for and to the Use of the Crown, by Pretence of
Prerogative, for other time, and in other manner, than the same was
granted by Parliament[,] [Article 4]
[R]aising and keeping a standing Army within this Kingdom in time
of Peace, without consent of Parliament; and Quartering Soldiers
contrary to Law[,] [Article 5] [and]
[C]ausing several Good Subjects, being Protestants, to be Disarmed at
the same time, when Papists were both Armed and Imployed contrary
to Law. [Article 6]182
Among the royal concessions demanded by the Convention
Parliament in the second section of the Declaration of Rights were
stipulations
That levying of Money for or to the Use of the Crown, by pretence
of Prerogative, without Grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in
other manner, than the same is or shall be granted, is Illegal[,]
[Article 4]
That the raising or keeping a standing Army within the Kingdom in
time of Peace, unless it be with Consent of Parliament, is against
Law[,] [Article 6] and
That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their
Defence suitable to their Condition, and as allowed by Law.
[Article 7]183
With these last three provisions, the Convention secured legal
protection for the English polity against royal funding of standing
armies by illegal taxes, against royal maintenance of unfunded standing
180. See SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 136-46.
181. See Convention Parliament, supra note 179, at 41.
182. Id. at 42.
183. Id. at 43.
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armies during peacetime without parliamentary consent, and against
royal disarmament of subjects Parliament deemed suited to bearing
arms in the militia. In so doing, the Convention constitutionalized the
Whig theory of legislative supremacy that had animated anti-army
politics throughout the seventeenth century, and effected a major shift
in the locus of sovereignty from Crown to Parliament. As Lois
Schwoerer suggests, the crown that William III accepted in 1689 was
hence a very different crown than that for which Charles I raised his
standard in 1641, for which he lost his head in 1649, and to which his son
was restored in 1660.184
Although the Convention Parliament could successfully make a
bloodless revolution, it could not, technically, speak with the sovereign's
voice under accepted principles of constitutional law.18 1 It was a
fundamental axiom of the ancient law that only "the King in
Parliament" was sovereign over the English people. The Convention,
however, had been elected and convened with the throne "vacant"
following James's "abdication.1' 86 It was therefore with a view to
legitimacy that an act of the Convention transformed that body into a
constitutionally familiar Parliament soon after William and Mary's
coronation, and that Parliament then reduced the Settlement embodied
in the Declaration to proper statutory form in the Bill of Rights on
December 16, 1689.187 Changes were made in the statutory language
specifying the order of succession to the throne, requiring that the
monarch be Protestant, clarifying the prohibition on the dispensing
power (by which Charles II and James II authorized individuals to
disobey the law), and adding a preamble and segues; but the language
regarding standing armies and the right to arms remained identical to
that used in the Declaration of February 12.188 In that form, the right to
arms remains established in Britain to this day.
89
The earliest draft of the Declaration of Rights, known as the Heads
of Grievances, said more about arms and the militia than the final
versions of the Bill of Rights and the Declaration. The Heads of
Grievances, reported by a radical Whig-dominated rights committee in
184. See SCHWOERER, supra note 178, at 7, 291, passim.
185. See id. at 267.
186. See id. at 126-27, 25-26.
187. See generally id. at 267-80.
188. See id. at 27-28.
189. See MALCOLM, supra note 9, at 165. But consider that this right has not interfered with
any subsequent parliament's ability to place stringent curbs on ownership and use of firearms,
most recently with the Firearms (Amendment) Act, 1997, ch. 5 (U.K.), outlawing ownership of
hand guns in the wake of the Dunblane Primary School massacre.
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the House of Commons on February 2, 1689, ten days before the
Declaration passed, included the statement that "[t]he acts concerning
the militia are grievous to the subject," 9° and further circumscribed the
right to arms by stipulating that "[i]t is necessary for the public safety,
that the subjects, which are Protestants, should provide and keep arms
for their common defense, and that arms which have been seized and
taken from them be restored."1 91
Recently, much debate concerning the amendments that the
American Congress proposed in 1789 has focused on the clauses
enacted and rejected by the English Parliament in 1689. One argument
favored by Joyce Lee Malcolm and a growing entourage of individualist
interpreters of the Second Amendment concerns the deletion by the
House of Lords of the just-quoted language from the arms and militia
clauses proposed in the Heads of Grievances. Striking this language-
and in particular deleting the "arms for their common defense" clause -
Malcolm argues, demonstrates that the Convention Parliament was
concerned not with protection of the militia, but rather with preserving
a private, personal, and individual liberty to keep weapons for any
purpose whatsoever. 92 While Malcolm's analysis dwells heavily on
deleted passages, she pays less attention to the plain meaning of the text
actually enacted. Moreover, her argument concerning the likely
significance of the deletions suffers from its failure to take count of the
legislative context in which the "common defense" clause was
expunged.
The original draft submitted by the rights committee called for the
protection of two sorts of rights: those which were -at least arguably -
already established by English law, and those which would require
enactment of new statutes to become part of the corpus juris.
Responding to suggestions made by the Upper House when it reported
back its marked-up copy of the rights committee's draft, the full House
of Commons first classified enumerated rights based on whether or not
their establishment required creation of new law, and then voted to
190. THE HEADS OF GRIEVANCES art. 5, reprinted in SCHWOERER, supra note 178, app.2 at
299. This article refers to the Restoration Militia Acts, which confirmed royal command of the
militia, royal appointment of officers in the militia, and royal use of martial law to compel the
militia to engage in objectionable and allegedly illegal acts, such as confiscation of arms held by
subjects deemed opposed to the king or his military and religious policies. See SCHWOERER,
supra note 178, at 76. Shifting command of the militia (and indeed, command of the army and
the power to make war) from king to parliament was among the radical Whig objectives left
unfulfilled by the Glorious Revolution. Cf. id. at 289.
191. THE HEADS OF GRIEVANCES art. 7, reprinted in SCHWOERER, supra note 178, app.2 at
299.
192. See Malcolm, supra note 99, at 307-12.
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strike each and every clause guaranteeing a right not firmly established
under existing law. 193 This "shift to the right" eliminated not only the
proposed injunction against militia disarmament containing the
"common defense" clause, but ten other cherished Whig principles as
well. 194 It struck from the Declaration all of the radical Whig assertions
as to what new laws the new king should accept, and left intact only the
"undisputed" and "ancient" rights that King James stood accused of
violating and Prince William was asked to acknowledge before
accepting the crown. By curtailing the scope of the rights proffered by
the radical Whig-dominated rights committee, party managers hoped to
render the constitutional settlement less revolutionary in appearance,
and hence more palatable to moderate Whigs, Tories, conservative
elements in the House of Lords, and to Prince William himself.195 In
this light, elimination of the militia clause and the other putative
statutory innovations did not reflect the triumph of privatistic
individualism, but rather a concession to corporatist traditionalism.
This was common ground to Whig, Tory, aristocrat, gentleman, guild
member, and craftsman alike, all united in resistance to absolutism. At
the same time, the deletion helped conciliate parliamentary lawyers
who opposed the Stuarts' extralegal rule, but scrupulously stayed within
the bounds of the established law as they indicted the old regime.
196
The plain meaning of the enacted language, like the legislative
context from which that language emerged, also undermines Malcolm's
reading. If the rights committee version allowed subjects to have "arms
for their common defense," the enacted language allows subjects
"[a]rms [only] for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as
allowed by Law."' 97 This statutory language patently stops short of
conveying an unfettered general license to carry weapons. And in so far
as our ultimate concern remains with text that actually became (codified
or memorialized) law, the insertion rather than the deletion is of course
the most significant feature of the Lords' amendment. Instead of
guaranteeing arms to all who would mobilize for the common defense,
the Declaration of Rights acknowledged the right to possess such
personal arms as were suitable to the subjects' "conditions," meaning
class or station. And the stipulation that such arms be "allowed by law"
193. See SCHWOERER, supra note 178, at 23.
194. See id. at 23-25.
195. See id. at 284-85.
196. Cf. id. at 284-87.
197. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of
the Crown (English Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2, 7 (Eng.).
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not only incorporated all of the restrictive, class-oriented gun and game
laws enacted since Parliament first limited small firearms ownership in
1541,198 but simultaneously held out an invitation to pass new statutes
further clarifying and controlling the right to arms, which Parliament
quickly accepted.199 Neither the Declaration nor the Bill of Rights, then,
created a new universal right to hold weapons without prior
parliamentary or customary license.
In any case, in 1789 the framers of the American Second
Amendment chose not to employ the language of the English Bill of
Rights regarding the right to "have Arms." James Madison, who had
labored so hard to bring about the separation of church and state in
Virginia, had no desire to saddle the American Bill of Rights with
religious qualifications.200 Still, it is useful to reflect that the language of
1689 resonates with the same powerful suspicions of a potentially
subversive military establishment that informed the Second
Amendment. Not only did the English Bill of Rights warn against the
dangers of a standing army, but it complained that under the closet
Catholic, James II, the wrong sort of men-unrepublican men, who
took their orders from a foreign prince (the "Bishop of Rome," i.e., the
Pope) rather than arriving at political decisions independently -had
been entrusted with arms ownership for service to the state. 20 1  If
Americans were by 1789 moving slowly away from anti-Catholicism as
the touchstone of republicanism, 0 2 they had hardly abandoned the
198. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of Firearms
Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 567,572 (1998).
199. See id. at 571. Within weeks after passage of the Bill of Rights, Parliament voted to
disarm Catholics, and, in 1691, the Commons voted 169 to 65 to reject an amendment to
pending game legislation that would have annulled existing class-based gun ownership
restrictions and allowed all Protestants to keep guns. See id. One member commented that the
proposal would "arm the mob, which I think is not very safe for any government." Id. (quoting
Sir John Lowther).
200. See generally THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 142-48 (1986). Curry describes
Madison's efforts to defeat a proposed assessment giving state government support to clergy of
denominations specified by taxpayers and Madison's subsequent stewardship of Jefferson's
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom through the Assembly. In Madison's Virginia, anti-
popery was still a recognizable and forceful paradigm, but as Curry explains, the Virginia gentry
of Madison's youth were confident enough to take toleration for granted. Madison himself
moved one step further and led the vanguard of reformers in advocating complete
disestablishment.
201. The suspicion that Catholics were beholden to subversive, alien authority was founded
on more than paranoia and prejudice. In 1689, the Bill of Rights expressly required office
holders and oath takers to abjure the papal doctrine immunizing assassins of Protestant heads of
state and commanding Catholics residing in Protestant governed lands to rise in resistance to
local authority. See English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2, 15.
202. For a detailed but impressionistic account of anti-Catholicism in early America, see
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 280-
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belief that there were those whose character and political principles
fitted or unfitted them for military service or leadership. Nor had they
given up entirely the notion that provisions of the constitutional law
might serve to optimize the civic virtue of individuals in military
service.23 But as developed below, a large measure of Madison's
innovative genius in the organic Constitution is reflected in his reliance
on federalism and formal separation of powers rather than
constitutional reification of the republican character to preserve the
political stability that came from republican military institutions.204 As
we shall see, under the government established by Madison's seven
original articles, armed service by Catholics seemed far less dangerous
than in Stuart England, not only because Protestantism's enhanced
regional and global security made toleration of Catholics inherently less
threatening, but because neither of the political branches of the new
national government was given the ready ability or impetus to turn a
standing army against the nation. Yet unlike Madison, the
Antifederalists remained skeptical of any central power, no matter how
circumscribed by checks and balances. They insisted that the
survivability of republican institutions was linked inexorably to the civic
character of individuals, and saw in universal, but noncompelled, militia
service not only a safeguard against the monarchic standing army, but
82, passim (1986). As Miller makes clear, American anti-Catholicism flourished as a subspecies
of nativism from the 1830s onwards. See id. at 275-77, 283-84. But this anti-Catholic ideology
differed fundamentally from the historically rooted Anglo-American anti-Catholicism nurtured
in the English Civil War and hardened by the Popish Plot and Exclusion crisis. It is this earlier
incarnation of anti-Catholicism, with all of its overtones of Whiggish constitutionalism, that was
on the wane by 1775 as Whiggery blended into Enlightenment rights theory. But see J.C.E.
CLARK, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERTY, 1660-1832: POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL
DYNAMICS IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WORLD 296-381 (1994). Clark argues that anti-
Catholicism played a determining role in the decision to separate from Britain, with particular
reference to, among other issues, the opposition of the Virginia gentry to the proposed
establishment of an Anglican bishopric in the 1770s, see id. at 344, and the opposition of New
Englanders and Presbyterians throughout the colonies to the Quebec Act of 1774 making
Catholicism the official religion of that province, see id. at 360, both of which resistance
movements cast British policy towards the colonies in the light of popish plots. On the New
England response to the Quebec Act, see also MILLER, supra, at 280-82. For the purposes of
the Quebec Act, the territories in which British authorities recognized the establishment of the
Roman religion extended far beyond Quebec proper southwards past St. Louis to present day
Cairo and westwards some miles further than Duluth, thus encompassing over half the habitable
surface of British North America. See LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE
REVOLUTION, 1763-1775, at 130-31 (1954).
203. Cf. WOOD, supra note 113, at 506-10. Wood makes this point with reference to social
and political leadership; his insights are especially applicable in the case of the military.
204. Cf id. at 602-15; discussion infra notes 318-26 and accompanying text. Again, Wood's




affirmation of the republican character upon which the militia ideal was
based.2 05
4. The Opposition Tradition and Its American Reception
The parliamentary government that emerged in Britain after the
accession of George I in 1714 was based on one-party consensus.
Nearly every member of Parliament professed himself a Whig and
endorsed the Settlement and Bill of Rights of 1689, parliamentary
supremacy, Hanoverian rule, and the (parliamentary) union with
Scotland of 1707.206 Consequently, British opposition of the period was
mainly extraparliamentary. "Country" opponents of the administrative
style pursued at court by a narrow circle of ministers and
Parliamentarians under the control of Robert Walpole expressed
themselves largely by pseudonymous newspaper and pamphlet
denunciations of the government. Pamphleteers of this era-most
importantly Viscount Bolingbroke and the tandem of John Trenchard
and Thomas Gordon-invoked the republican spirit of the past century
to serve as a foil to the corrupt, commercial, administrative ethos of the
times.207 While remaining marginal in England, the writings of the
"Real Whig"20 opposition school resurfaced with renewed vigor in
America during the 1760s and '70s.2°9 As Bernard Bailyn demonstrated
in his compilation, Pamphlets of the American Revolution,10 this
205. These points are developed infra Part I.B.4.
206. See WILLIAM B. WILLCOX & WALTER L. ARNSTEIN, THE AGE OF ARISTOCRACY,
1688 TO 1830, at 62-64 (4th ed. 1983).
207. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 35-36.
208. The Real Whigs, or Old Whigs, disassociated themselves from the Court Whigs in the
1690s and clung to the principles of 1689. As Lois Schwoerer explains, after coming to power
with the accession of William and Mary:
Court Whigs... became increasingly conservative. They resisted the efforts of Tories
to link them with republican notions, deism, and popular rights and to tar them with
the charge of "deposing" James II .... Old Whigs joined with Country Tories to form
a "New Country Party," which generally reiterated the arguments of the right of
resistance, the contractual basis of government, and the sovereignty of the people
(however "people" was defined) that had appeared in debates and tracts at the time of
the revolution. [By 1710, when Court Whigs forsook the Dissenters in favor of Court
Tories to form a majority,] the bankruptcy of Court Whiggism was laid bare. Debate
on "revolution principles" was no longer the focus. Passive obedience to Parliament
and parliamentary sovereignty became official Whig doctrine with the success of the
Septennial Act of 1716 and the ascendancy of Sir Robert Walpole. For their part
Country Whigs and Country Tories denounced "corruption" and oligarchy.
SCHWOERER, supra note 178, at 290. Real Whiggery survived as an extra-parliamentary
opposition movement in Hanoverian England, long after Toryism became dormant.
209. See BANNING, supra note 103, at 71-72.
210. 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, supra note 2. See
especially BAILYN, supra note 2, at 22-54, where Bailyn consolidates and summarizes the
ideology of the hundreds of pamphlets he had studied. See also BANNING, supra note 103, at 72-
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opposition dogma of early Hanoverian England, in the form of reprints,
recapitulations, and pseudonymous rehashing, became the driving
intellectual engine of the American Revolution.2 11
Antipathy to standing armies was a central precept of Trenchard
and Gordon's Real Whiggery that resonated well in American ears.212
According to Bailyn, American colonists "universally agreed ' 213 with
Trenchard's famous 1697 Argument, Shewing, that a Standing Army Is
Inconsistent with a Free Government .... 214 There, Trenchard set down
how "unhappy nations ha[d] lost that precious jewel liberty... [because]
their necessities or indiscretions ha[d] permitted a standing army to be
kept amongst them. '215 Indeed, militarism was widely blamed for the
collapse of republican government in Venice, Sweden, and Denmark,216
and militarism was feared as the most likely cause of the demise of
republicanism in British America.217
Some pamphleteers used the standing army issue as a springboard
for individualistic panegyrics on the virtue of provincial militia, and
unfavorable comparisons between these stoic rustics and the decayed,
shiftless characters who made up Britain's "mercenary" professional
army. Thus, in 1773 a "British Bostonian" admonished the home
country not to "make the Americans subject to their slavery."
"Americans," this Bostonian fumed,
will not submit to be SLAVES, they know the use of the gun, and
military art, as well as any of his Majesty's troops at St. James's, and
where his Majesty has one soldier, who art in general the refuse of
73, 75.
211. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 35-36, 61-63, 112-19.
212. See id. at 36; SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 195-96.
213. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 62.
214. JOHN TRENCHARD, ARGUMENT, SHEWING, THAT A STANDING ARMY IS
INCONSISTENT WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT, AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH MONARCHY (London 1697). The significance of this
pamphlet in its original context is described in SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 174-75. In 1697,
in the aftermath of the War of the Grand Alliance, Trenchard and his Real Whig allies
campaigned successfully to reduce drastically the scale of King William's wartime army. See id.
215. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 62 (quoting TRENCHARD, supra note 214).
216. See id. at 64-65; WOOD, supra note 113, at 30. Wood writes:
In the course of a single year both Sweden and Poland had been enslaved, leaving on
the continent only the Swiss cantons and the Dutch provinces free; and their liberty
appeared short lived. "Where is the kingdom," devout Whigs asked, "that does not
groan under the calamities of military tyranny?"
Id. (quoting Jonathan W. Austin, An Oration Delivered March 5th, 1778 (Boston 1778)). But
the military overthrow of the Danish republic in 1660, as described in Robert Molesworth's An
Account of Denmark (reprinted ten times in British North America during the eighteenth
century), was the colonists' favorite example of the dangers inherent in maintenance of large
standing armies. See SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 190.
217. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 63.
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the earth, America can produce fifty, free men, and all volunteers,
and raise a more potent army of men in three weeks, than England
can in three years.
21 8
In a similar vein, but with less certainty and a greater sense of
balance, the English Real Whig Richard Price commented in the
aftermath of the American Revolution that
Free States ought to be bodies of armed citizens, well regulated,
and well disciplined, and always ready to turn out, when properly
called upon, to execute the laws, to quell riots, and to keep the
peace. Such, if I am rightly informed, are the citizens of America.
The happiest state of man is the middle state between the
savage and the refined, or between the wild and the luxurious state.
Such is the state of society in CONNECTICUT, and in some others
of the American provinces; where the inhabitants consist, if I am
rightly informed, of an independent and hardy YEOMANRY, all
nearly on a level-trained to arms, -instructed in their rights-
clothed in home-spun-of simple manners-strangers to luxury-
drawing plenty from the ground-and that plenty, gathered easily
by the hand of industry .... 219
The eighteenth-century republicanism on which the
Revolutionaries drew so heavily focused as much on constitutional
balance as on the centrality of arms possession to republican character.
In eighteenth-century America, republicanism not only served to
champion public over private purposes, the ideology also
accommodated itself to a collectivist vision of politics. Thus, in 1774,
Josiah Quincy, a future signer of the Declaration of Independence,
cautioned that "supreme power is ever possessed by those who have
arms in their hands and are disciplined to the use of them."2 0 As Bailyn
writes with a nod to Jefferson's Rights of British America, colonists on
the eve of independence agreed "absolute danger to liberty lay in the
absolute supremacy of 'a veteran army'-in making 'the civil
subordinate to the military... instead of subjecting the military to the
civil powers."
221
218. JOHN ALLEN, AN ORATION, UPON THE BEAUTIES OF LIBERTY, OR THE ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE AMERICANS, at xiii-xiv (Boston 1773), quoted in Shalhope, supra note 98, at
606.
219. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, AND THE MEANS OF MAKING IT A BENEFIT TO THE WORLD 16, 69 (London
1784), quoted in Shalhope, supra note 98, at 605.
220. JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACT OF PARLIAMENT, COMMONLY
CALLED THE BOSTON PORT BILL; WITH THOUGHTS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND STANDING
ARMIES (Boston 1774), quoted in BAILYN, supra note 2, at 61.
221. BAILYN, supra note 2, at 61 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE
RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
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Less visionary than Harrington's 1656 treatise Oceana, eighteenth-
century republicans rehearsed endless object lessons in the demise of
actual historical commonwealths that had gone over to corruption and
civic passivity.222  All the while they stressed institutional balance
alongside individual virtue as barriers against corruption and
absolutism.23  The standing army remained their arch symbol of a
corrupted polity, but this reflected the standing army's tendency to
subvert legislative independence as well as its displacement of virtue
from the individual. By the middle of the eighteenth century, fear of
power, corruption, and the imperial magistracy were eclipsing the
independence of the soldier-statesman as principal icons of
republicanism in Anglo-American constitutional discourse. 2 4
5. Rethinking the Provincial Militia during the Great War for
Empire
One reason behind the changing role of the militia in American
political thought is that the militia was itself declining as a military and
indeed as a cultural institution in the pre-Revolutionary years. 225 As the
frontier receded westward during the first half of the eighteenth
century, the danger of Indian attack became ever more remote in the
settled, relatively populous eastern counties. By the time of the French
and Indian War (1757-64), compulsory militia service proved
unenforceable. 2 6 According to Professor Lawrence Cress, Americans
in
the middle of the eighteenth century... no longer considered
defense the responsibility of the entire community.... The militia
had not disappeared, but it had all but lost its military significance,
becoming more a reflection of local political relationships and a
lingering symbol of the responsibilities as well as the rights of a
citizen in a free society. 227
Not only had the institutional militia decayed in the established
supra note 61, at 121, 134).
222. See SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 191.
223. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 63-64.
224. See LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 3-8 (1982); cf. POCOCK, supra note 2, at 506-11.
225. See generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
345-69 (1958), for a fascinating impressionistic account of the tension between centrifugal
individualism and the metropolitan and provincial governments' quests for organization that
characterized the colonial militias. Boorstin reports that only in the immediate frontier
environment of the earliest settlements was the organizational impulse readily accepted by the
population.
226. See Bellesiles, supra note 198, at 580, 583; cf. WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 15-16.
227. CRESS, supra note 224, at 3.
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colonies, but many, if not most, easterners no longer possessed that
familiarity with firearms and marksmanship that frontier existence
reputedly instilled in their grandfathers and great-grandfathers. 28 Few
even owned guns or complied with regulations mandating that militia
members maintain government-issued muskets at home.229 And with
little immediate stake in imperial rivalries between France and Britain,
and no sense of peril from France's Indian allies, few eastern farmers of
middling means rallied to the royal cause from 1757 to 1764. Those
militiamen who made muster tended to vanish when ordered into long
campaigns outside the borders of their home colonies.230 British and
provincial authorities soon realized that success against French arms in
North America would depend on regulars231-that is, British soldiers-
and long-serving colonial volunteers.
23 2
George Washington, a militia colonel and wealthy Virginia squire
with considerable speculative and patriotic interests at stake in the
French and Indian War, was one Anglo-American who shared British
sentiments wholeheartedly. 233  Reflecting on militia units under his
command during the early stages of the war, he wrote his British
commander:
Militia, you will find, Sir, will never answer your expectation, no
dependence is to be placed upon them; They are obstinate and
perverse, they are often egged on by the Officers, who lead them to
acts of disobedience, and, when they are ordered to certain posts
for the security of stores, or the protection of the Inhabitants, will,
on a sudden, resolve to leave them, and the united vigilance of their
officers can not prevent them.23
4
Indeed, Washington was so dispirited by the performance of his own
militia, and so impressed by the British regulars with whom he served in
Braddock's ill-fated campaign and afterwards, that he could only hope
exposure to the regulars might help transform the Virginia militia into a
respectable and efficient fighting force. "Discipline," he wrote
optimistically, "is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers
formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all; and may, in
a manner peculiar to us, who are in the way to be joined to Regulars in
228. See Bellesiles, supra note 198, at 577.
229. See id. at 580, 582-83.
230. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 14-16.
231. See id. at 16; BOORSTIN, supra note 225, at 358-60.
232. See CRESS, supra note 224, at 3.
233. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 16.
234. Letter from George Washington to Colonel John Stanwix (July 15, 1757), in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96, 97 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-44).
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a very short time,... [set us apart] from other Provincials."235
The French and Indian War ended successfully for Washington and
the Americans, with the Treaty of Paris in 1763 securing British
sovereignty in Canada and, in the process, severing the connections
between hostile frontier Indians and their French allies and arms
suppliers. But in the years after the war, Anglo-American colonists
became restive in the face of Britain's increasingly aggressive American
tax enforcement policies -policies that resulted largely from victory
over the French and the consequent burdens of policing an enlarged
New World empire. 236
6. A Constitutional Crisis and a Standing Army: The Republican
Nightmare Becomes Reality
In 1763, the subjects of George III's established American
dominions seemed the most contented, patriotic, and British of
peoples.237 But in the victory over France and in the completeness of
Britain's conquest of North America lay seeds of discontent that
ripened into the old Empire's dissolution, consummated only twenty
years after the Treaty of Paris in a second treaty of the same name. At
the root of the impending troubles was the problem of war debt. The
conflict of 1757-63, the fourth of seven titanic struggles for empire that
kept Britain and France at war more years than not between 1697 and
1815, was the most expensive yet. 238 George III, young, headstrong,
friendless save for his tutor Bute, and determined to rule as well as
reign, confronted at war's end a national debt of £122,603,336.239 To
compound the situation, policy considerations favored maintenance of
the wartime army rather than demobilization.240 Policing the Indian
frontier, keeping up garrisons in the strategic towns of Halifax, Quebec,
and St. Augustine, and sinking the record debt required revenue.
All this left the king's new prime minister, George Grenville,
desperately seeking fresh sources of income. A wine tax at home irked
members of Parliament and their kin; a cider tax produced riots.
235. George Washington, General Instructions to all the Captains of Companies (July 29,
1757), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 234, at 109, 114.
236. See generally BOORSTIN, supra note 225, at 361; J.G.A. Pocock, Political Thought in the
English-Speaking Atlantic, 1760-1790: The Imperial Crises, in THE VARIETIES OF BRITISH
POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1500-1800, at 246, 259 (J.G.A. Pocock et al. eds., 1996).
237. See DON HIGGINBOTHAM, THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: MILITARY
ATTITUDES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, 1763-1789, at 21 (1971).
238. See GIPSON, supra note 202, at 55.
239. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 237, at 34.
240. See id. at 33.
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Meanwhile, the American colonies were hardly taxed at all-yet were
inhabited by some of the most prosperous and fortunate people on the
face of the globe. To the ministry, it seemed all too obvious that the
Americans should help pay for the army that delivered them from the
French and protected them from the Indians.2 41 The remaining decade
of British rule in America was given to futile efforts to discover an
effective formula for imposing and collecting this American
contribution to the exchequery. Little did Grenville know how deeply
he and his successors would offend the colonists' sense of constitutional
propriety by imposing imperial taxes.
From the American perspective, the various tax schemes of the
1760s and '70s-the Stamp Act, the Sugar Act, the Townshend Duties,
and the Tea Act-presented, with different degrees of vexatiousness,
the same series of problems. Principally, the taxes were deemed
unprecedented, usurpatory, and, therefore, threatening.242  To the
provincial lawyers, printers, and political agitators destined to lead a
revolution, these tax-related issues appeared fundamentally as problems
of constitutionalism. The American sense of constitutionalism,
moreover, was more historical than legalistic. It focused, as we have
argued, on a Whiggish interpretation of seventeenth-century British
history, and in particular, on the Glorious Revolution, Settlement, and
Bill of Rights of 1689.243 As Britain essayed ever-bolder tax collection
schemes, Americans came to realize, with more than a little sense of
shock, that the British ministry did not share the Americans'
interpretation of the British Constitution. The more Americans
stressed the fundamental Whig maxims at the heart of their
understanding of the Settlement, the more they realized British officials
did not take their Whiggery seriously. In particular, Americans came to
the grim realization that British officials did not understand that the Bill
of Rights should apply in favor of American provincial legislatures in
precisely the same manner that it applied to benefit the Parliament at
Westminster.2" And given the Americans' own unwavering
commitment to the proposition that the principles of 1689 protected
them as well as those other Englishmen across the water, it was a
forgone conclusion that ministerial imposition of taxes not voted by the
legislature(s) for the purpose of maintaining an army and servicing a
241. See GIPSON, supra note 202, at 57-59.
242. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89, at 36 (3d ed. 1992).
243. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 237, at 14.
244. See ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1763-1789, at 132 (1982).
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debt must occasion a constitutional crisis.
It would be difficult to overestimate how Whiggish Americans
were in the closing days of the old Empire. Reprints of Trenchard and
Gordon's Cato's Letters, those famous republican denunciations of the
Walpole government that ran originally in newspapers of the 1720s,
appeared in nearly forty percent of the public and private libraries in
late colonial British North America, then the most literate society in the
world.245 Cato of course laid down a precise, analytic description of the
eschatology of a republic's demise.246 And one by one in the 1760s and
'70s, Cato's steppingstones on the road to subversion surfaced before
the colonials' horrified eyes. Not only did the ministry attempt to
enforce internal taxes voted by the Westminster Parliament in which
the Americans were not represented, but it dispatched a swarm of
revenue officers to serve in hitherto unknown posts and established
incentives for these officials to seize property, cargo, and even ships for
sometimes trivial reasons. Not only did the ministry expand the role of
both provincial and Crown executives in local affairs, it sought to free
royal governors from provincial legislative control by paying their
salaries directly from London.247  When the New York Assembly
hesitated to provide funds to compensate property owners for
quartering regulars, the ministry ordered the Assembly suspended.248
And when restive locals embarked on a campaign to intimidate royal
administrators in Boston-unlike New York, not an established
garrison town-the newly established Colonial Office in Whitehall
ordered British regulars to occupy the city. 249
No aspect of the imperial taxation regime spawned greater
resentment than the employment of a standing army to buttress British
authority in the unruly colonies. Historically, Americans had not
questioned the British army's limited presence in the colonies.2 10
Smallish coastal garrisons in Savannah and Charleston were welcomed
as deterrents against Spanish or Indian raids and even slave
insurrection, and the nearby presence of full regiments at St. Augustine
afforded both economic advantage and a sense of security. 251
245. See CRESS, supra note 224, at 34-35.
246. See id.; BAILYN, supra note 2, at 43-46.
247. For a succinct summary, see MORGAN, supra note 242, at 54.
248. See MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 244, at 151.
249. See GIPSON, supra note 202, at 189-91.
250. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 237, at 16-17.




While some citizens in New York complained of crassness and
bad manners on the part of soldiers in the town's midsized garrison,
others welcomed the army and navy's trade. Outside the Deep South
and New York City, the army was largely unknown, with the bulk of
Britain's American strength stationed in scattered posts in the
interior, and large garrisons in Canada and the Caribbean. The
standing army was distant, and Americans largely assumed the Bill of
Rights and parliamentary supremacy would protect them against the
sort of militarist abuses associated with the Stuarts.25 2 But attitudes
changed drastically in the late 1760s as British officials first
questioned the applicability of constitutional guarantees to the
colonies, and then redeployed substantial western garrisons to New
York and Boston to prop up the new customs collection apparatus.353
The arrival of four regiments of regulars in Boston on October 1,
1768 confirmed the worst fears of Whiggish patriots. It is "the
indefeasible right of subjects," the Boston Town Meeting swiftly
resolved,
to be consulted and to give their free consent in person or by
representatives of their own free election to the raising and keeping
a standing army among them; and the inhabitants of this town,
being free subjects, have the same right derived from nature and
confirmed by the British constitution as well as ... [their] royal
charter; and therefore the raising or keeping a standing army
without their consent in person or by representatives of their own
free election would be an infringement of their natural,
constitutional, and charter rights .... 254
Although doomsayers had long suspected Governor Bernard would
seek the aid of troops from nearby Halifax, few were prepared for the
initial sense of dismay, alarm, and disbelief that accompanied the
sight of the army disembarking in Boston harbor. "To have a
standing army! Good God! What can be worse to a people who have
tasted the sweets of liberty!" Andrew Eliot wrote to Thomas Hollis
when he first sighted the troop ships in Boston harbor. "Things are
come to an unhappy crisis; there will never be that harmony between
Great Britain and her colonies that there hath been; all confidence is
at an end; and the moment there is any blood shed all affection will
cease."215
252. See id. at 3-4, 8-11.
253. See generally id. at 13. On New York, see MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 244, at 144-45; on
Massachusetts, see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 237, at 39-44.
254. SIXTEENTH REPORT OF THE BOSTON RECORD COMMISSIONERS 263 (1768), quoted in
BAILYN, supra note 2, at 113.
255. Letter from Rev. Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis (Sept. 27, 1768), in 4
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As the ubiquitous republican Cato described presciently the events
that would come to pass as an antirepublican conspiracy uncoiled, so
too did he set forth in his Letters precisely what steps to take to stave off
subversion and save the Republic.2 6 These steps, familiar enough to
every sentient colonial, were the very steps taken by the first Whigs in
the 1680s, when the party of Shaftesbury and Locke rose in resistance to
Stuart usurpation and articulated the fundamentals of Whiggery that in
American minds formed the bedrock of English constitutionalism. 2
57
The course of resistance to tyranny flowed naturally from loyalty to the
true Constitution. And in the face of illegal taxation, executive
usurpation, and army occupation, the colonists' self-evident
constitutionalist remedies included refusal of local courts and juries to
enforce Crown directives, reassertion of local legislative supremacy, and
revival of the local militia.
The presence of the army, in its new, alarming role, signaled the
need to implement resistance according to this familiar Whig paradigm.
Colonists most attuned to politics and ideology took the lead in goading
less radical countrymen into a heightened state of political awareness
and participation. Following the occupation of Boston, agitators and
philosophers unleashed a torrent of republican anti-army pamphlets
celebrating the virtues of provincial citizen militia and denouncing the
perceived depravity of the imperial army.258 The Journal of the Times
articles, syndicated throughout the colonies, furnished a day-by-day
account of Massachusetts "under military rule," 259 and the circulars
distributed by the Boston committee of correspondence consciously
hearkened back to the seventeenth century's radical, insurrectionary
opposition. 260 But even though Revolutionary theorists and
pamphleteers pointed the way towards military confrontation, during
the first occupation of Boston (1768-72), violent resistance to Crown
authority remained confined largely to intimidation of politicians and
officials, tarring and feathering, rioting, and ransacking of houses.2 61 A
large majority of the population remained committed on some level to
reconciliation and reestablishment of civilian rule within the theoretical
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 428 (4th ser.), quoted in BAILYN, supra
note 2, at 114.
256. See BAILYN, supra note 2, 43-46.
257. See ASHCRAFT, supra note 119, at 291-333. On the Americans' application of this
history to the late imperial constitutional crisis, see CRESS, supra note 224, at 35-36.
258. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 112-19.
259. See id. at 114.
260. See MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 244, at 232-33.
261. See id. at 200-03.
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confines of the old order, and local government nowhere crossed over
into organized, armed resistance to the established sovereign.
2 62
The army withdrew not long after the acquittal of the soldiers tried
for the Boston Massacre, and the repeal of the Townshend Duties
restored a kind of calm before the storm in the early seventies. 263 But in
December 1773, the Sons of Liberty dumped the cargo of three British
merchantmen into Boston Harbor to protest the Tea Act by which
Westminster reasserted its taxing power over the colonies, and
Parliament responded quickly with the Boston Port Act (closing the
port to trade), the Administration of Justice Act (removing venue to
England for criminal trials of Crown officers), the Massachusetts
Government Act (vesting legislative and jury functions with the
executive), and the Quartering Act (permitting seizure of unoccupied
buildings, such as empty warehouses, to serve as barracks).264 Troops
returned from Halifax to strengthen the garrison at Castle William in
the harbor, and others took up quarters in the town itself.
265
Intercolonial economic resistance to British occupation and policy
resumed according to patterns of cooperative nonimportation and
nonexportation established during the Stamp Act and Townshend
Duties crises. But within Massachusetts itself, political resistance via the
traditional, constitutional organs of civil government was now defined
as illegal, if not treasonous. As appeals to law and reason proved
unavailing, the Lockean moment of dissolution of government and the
appeal to heaven loomed ever likelier. Thus, the Intolerable Acts
inspired Massachusetts's General Court and many of the other
provincial legislatures to reanimate their colonies' historic militia to
serve as constitutional counterweights to the redcoats. Arms were
purchased in Europe, 266 militia laws were enforced, and training was
intensified.267 By the spring of 1775, when General Gage, commander
of the British regiments around Boston and royal governor of
Massachusetts, issued orders to surrender to central storehouses militia
arms previously kept in private homes and ordered the army to
confiscate arms not duly turned over to the government, colonial
262. See MORGAN, supra note 242, at 43, 46, 50-51; see also GIPSON, supra note 202, at 190-
91,200, 205,208.
263. See BAILYN, supra note 2, at 117-18.
264. See id. at 118-19.
265. See generally ROBERT W. TUCKER & DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, THE FALL OF THE
FIRST BRITISH EMPIRE: ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 327-28 (1982).
266. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 237, at 50.
267. See generally id. at 10, 45-46; MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 244, at 256, 259.
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hostility towards ministerial policy had swollen to a fever pitch.68 In
March, the army seized gunpowder in Charleston and cannon in
Cambridge without encountering resistance.269 But shots were fired on
April 19, 1775, when provincial militia at Lexington and Concord
confronted British regulars searching for colonial powder stores. 2 70 By
nightfall, over one hundred soldiers and militiamen lay dead and
dying,27' and invasion, independence, and eight years of war were in the
balance.
7. The Continental Army and the Militia during the American
Revolution
Soon after American protest escalated into armed resistance,
republican rumination about standing armies clashed with the hard
reality of military campaigning. Given his tastes, sentiments, and
especially his unsatisfactory experiences with militia units during the
French and Indian War, it is hardly surprising that Washington quickly
set about forging a regular army upon his appointment as commander
in chief by the Continental Congress on June 15, 1775.
"Let us have a respectable Army, and such as will be competent to
every exigency," the commanding general pleaded to Congress.
272
While the effort to create a regular army met with considerable
hardships through the course of the war, the performance of militia
under his command only intensified Washington's compulsion to mold a
European-style professional force under Continental colors.273 After
the American disasters at Long Island and Brandywine during the
summer of 1776, Washington informed Congress that if he were "called
upon to declare upon Oath, whether the Militia have been most
serviceable or hurtful upon the whole; [he] should subscribe to the
latter. 2 74 "Regular Troops," the general later reflected,
alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence
as for offence .... No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary
26& See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 237, at 46.
269. See MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 244, at 264.
270. For a rather bloody and macabre account, see id. at 269-71.
271. See THE TOLL OF INDEPENDENCE: ENGAGEMENTS AND BATTLE CASUALTIES OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3 (Howard Peckham ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1974) [hereinafter
TOLL OF INDEPENDENCE].
272. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Dec. 16, 1776), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 234, at 379, 380.
273. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 31-36.
274. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1776), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 234, at 106, 112.
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to resist a regular force .... The firmness requisite for the real
business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of
discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single
instance that would justify a different opinion .... 271
Washington's opinions, while they were untempered, were hardly
idiosyncratic. Indeed, the disillusion of military and political leaders
with America's historic militia became general and widespread soon
after colonial grievances with Britain erupted into war.2 76 Still, the
militia was not as consistently useless as some of Washington's
comments suggest. In the action at Bunker Hill, volunteer companies
formed in anticipation of hostilities acquitted themselves very well. But
they were defending fixed positions. What Washington realized from
the start of the war was that no American militia, not even elite
volunteer units who had devoted long hours to training, could
successfully engage mainline British regulars in pitched battle on open
fields.277 Indeed, Washington did not have sufficient confidence in his
Continentals- even after the institution of systematic European-style
drill under Inspector General Friedrich von Steuben-to challenge
British strength directly with the best of American regular forces.278
American success depended on surprise, maneuver, an excellent
artillery arm, and taking outnumbered British detachments at a
disadvantage. The principal American victories -Trenton, Princeton,
Saratoga, and Yorktown-were all of this pattern. When American
infantry units met the main British army head-on, as on Long Island or
at Brandywine, the result was invariably a rout. Final victory owed far
more to American perseverance, French assistance, and the loss of
275. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 15, 1780), in 20
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 234, at 49,49-50.
276. See, for example, Hamilton's retrospective comments on the reputation of the wartime
militia:
I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and
would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had
like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might
have been saved. The facts which from our own experience forbid a reliance of this
kind are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady
operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully
conducted by a force of the same kind .... The American militia, in the course of the
late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to
their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country
could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable
they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by
diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.
THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 195 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
277. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 33.
278. See id. at 35.
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British political will than it did to any mythical prowess of the
backwoods militiaman.279
On a theoretical level, the demands of a major war for professional
armies contradicted a firmly rooted republican ideology that favored
citizen-soldiers. Reality, leaders reluctantly acknowledged, was not
consonant with their own revolutionary rhetoric, which dwelled heavily
the on civic virtue of citizen-soldiers and the abuses of British militarism
in order to justify the American cause. Accordingly, the Revolution
demanded some degree of accommodation between political theory and
experience. To compound matters, the pure republicanism that had
ushered colonials towards separation with relative doctrinal ease
suffered serious strains as it passed from a mere opposition creed into a
principle of majority government. With the war's end, republican
ideology necessarily had to become a philosophy of balanced
constitutionalism for peacetime, as much as a theory of individual civic
courage best suited to moments of military crises.280 It was therefore
inevitable that the role of the man of arms in American political theory
would be rewritten as America settled into independence after the
second Treaty of Paris.
Washington, of course, did not desire to see the new nation's
security staked on the historic militia system that had proven so
inadequate during war. "The Jealousies of a standing Army," he wrote,
"and the Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote; and in my
judgement, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be
dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my
Ideas,... is certain, and inevitable Ruin .... "281 But as a leading
historian of the United States Army has aptly commented, "Washington
himself could not base his prescriptions for the future military policy of
the United States solely upon the combat experience of the
Revolution."128 Professor Weigley continues,
The nature of a permanent American Army was a political issue,
the decision of which could influence the whole larger question of
the nature of the United States. A society of free men had grown
up in America partly because at the beginning the citizenry had
relied on themselves for their own defense. To establish a standing
army would be to accept a European import that had been
designed in the first place to buttress monarchy. Even if American
circumstances minimized any likelihood that an American standing
279. See id. at 39-42, 67-68.
280. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 398-403.
281. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress, supra note 274, at 112.
282. WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 74.
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army would promote a despotism, the creation of such an army
might nevertheless contribute to a more centralized and more
powerful government than many leaders of the Revolution thought
wise .283
The tension between republican hostility to standing armies and the
desire of strong government men for security flared up again and again
through the tumultuous 1780s. It was not even tentatively resolved until
a new balance was struck with the adoption of the Second Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
B. Madisonian Structuralism: The Place of the Militia in the New
American Science of Government
1. The Confederation Government Tries-and Fails-to Organize
the Militia
The Second Amendment-and the Bill of Rights as a whole-
arose in response to Antifederalist fears of powers either vested in or
not expressly withheld from the federal government by the
Constitutional Convention in 1787. The Convention's delegation of
militia powers to Congress and the executive, and partial removal of
military powers from the states, was presaged by attempts to establish a
military system and to regulate the national militia during the "critical
period" before 1787. As early as 1783, the Confederation Congress and
army leaders such as Washington, Henry Knox, and von Steuben were
directing their attention to the permanent, peacetime organization of
the military in the new nation. In April 1783, Congress appointed a
committee, which included Hamilton and Madison, to "consider what
arrangements it will be proper to make in the different departments
with reference to a peace. '284 Hamilton wrote to General Washington,
who consulted with Knox, chief of artillery for the Continental army,
von Steuben, the inspector general, and other top aids before reporting
his Sentiments on a Peace Establishment.28 Washington bid for the
largest regular force he felt Congress might conceivably authorize, but
bowing to political necessity, he based his proposed system of peacetime
defense largely on the militia.
283. Id. at 74-75.
284. CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 180.
285. This document is set out in JOHN MCAULEY PALMER, WASHINGTON, LINCOLN,
WILSON: THREE WAR STATESMEN app. at 375-96 (1930).
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The old commanding general argued:
[E]very Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government,
owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal
services to the defence of it, and consequently that the Citizens of
America (with a few legal and official exceptions) from 18 to 50
years of age should be borne on the Militia Rolls .... 286
But this was simply his theoretical starting point. His vision of militia in
action was decidedly more statist, more federalist, more select, and
more professional. He favored twice yearly musters and inspections of
the general body, from which would be selected the "Van and flower of
the American Forces, '287 a "Continental Militia," patterned after the
Continental army and held ready for service, "nearly in the same
manner the Minute Men formerly were .... 12 8   Washington's
Continental militia would drill two to four weeks per year, wear federal
uniforms, and carry standard equipment supplied from state arsenals.
By their example, it would become "universally reputable to bear Arms
and disgraceful to decline having a share in the performance of Military
duties. '289
Washington would have preferred not to rely on militia at all, but
hostility to standing armies was too widespread in and out of Congress
to make this a realistic possibility. The best he could hope for was that
Congress would authorize a small professional army to be
supplemented by a federally supervised militia. The Continental militia
Washington envisioned was consequently no ad hoc militia-of-the-
whole, and certainly nothing like the self-proclaimed Michigan militia290
of today, but an organized, trained, select reserve army of the United
States, equipped with standard issue arms. Supporting the regular
American army, Washington's Continental militia would have become
the nation's first-order reserve.
Washington's proposal was but the first in a long, unavailing line
of efforts to select out from the universal militia a more efficient and
better-trained cadre of citizen-soldiers for national service. Plans of
286. Id. at 388.
287. Id. at 389.
288. Id. at 392.
289. Id. at 393; see also CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 181.
290. For commentary on today's self-styled "militia," see Wills, supra note 3, which features
an interesting photograph of the South Michigan Regional Militia Wolverines 14th Brigade, 4th
Division, on a training exercise with dangerous dogs. Justice Scalia has also had occasion to
take note of the Michigan militia. While discussing the insurrectionist favorite, Joyce Lee
Malcolm's To Keep and Bear Arms, which he labeled an "excellent study," Justice Scalia added
that the author was not even "a member of the Michigan Militia, but an Englishwoman."
(Malcolm is in fact American.) See SCALIA, supra note 110, at 136-37 n.13.
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this type, labeled select militia schemes, quickly aroused the same sort
of republican suspicions as proposals favoring standing armies. A few
years later, during the ratification debate, the Federal Farmer, one of
the most influential antifederal pamphleteers, summed up the
republican argument against select militias as follows:
Should one fifth, or one eighth part of the men capable of bearing
arms, be made a select militia, as has been proposed, and those the
young and ardent part of the community, possessed of but little or
no property, and all the others put upon a plan that will render
them of no importance, the former will answer all the purposes of
an army, while the later will be defenceless. 91
Just a few months later, the Federal Farmer elaborated on his
objections to selection:
These corps, not much unlike regular troops, will ever produce an
inattention to the general militia; and the consequence has ever
been, and always must be, that the substantial men, having families
and property, will generally be without arms, without knowing the
use of them, and defenseless; whereas, to preserve liberty, it is
essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms,
and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them; nor
does it follow from this, that all promiscuously must go into actual
service on every occasion. The mind that aims at a select militia,
must be influenced by a truly anti-republican principle .... 292
The Confederation Congress never acted on the original select
militia plan set forth in Washington's Sentiments. However,
congressional inaction in this instance does not imply principled
rejection so much as indifference and inertia. In the lax days after the
war, when members yearned to return to private life and the affairs of
their own state legislatures, quorums seldom assembled at Princeton,
Annapolis, or Philadelphia.293 Indeed, after the energetic Jefferson left
for France in the spring of 1784, Congress accomplished very little of
291. OBSERVATIONS LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION; AND TO SEVERAL ESSENTIAL AND
NECESSARY ALTERNATIONS IN IT. IN A NUMBER OF LE'TERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER
TO THE REPUBLICAN [hereinafter LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER] (letter of Oct. 10,
1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214, 242 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). At the
time of its publication, and for many years thereafter, the Federal Farmer was widely attributed
to Richard Henry Lee, but in more recent years scholars such as Herbert Storing and Gordon
Wood have raised doubts about Lee's authorship of the Farmer. See also Jack N. Rakove, The
Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 103, 105, 144
(2000).
292. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER (letter of Jan. 25, 1788), supra note 291, at 342.
293. During the 1783-84 sessions, Congress was compelled to change its situs on three
occasions, owing to the pressure of anti-Continental mobs demanding debt relief and back pay
to veterans. See MALONE, supra note 67, at 403-04.
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substance for several years. A plan for militia organization suggested by
von Steuben was ignored entirely1
9 4
Notwithstanding von Steuben's and Washington's earlier rebuffs,
Henry Knox submitted a Plan for the General Arrangement of the
Militia of the United States soon after his appointment as secretary of
war by Congress in 1786.295 More carefully detailed than Washington's
Sentiments, Knox's General Arrangement served for many years as the
standard blueprint for reforming the militia by selection. Knox
proposed to retain the militia-of-the-whole in theory, 296 but to divide it
into three corps according to age: an "advanced corps" aged eighteen to
twenty, a "main corps" aged twenty-one to forty-five, and a "reserved
corps" aged forty-six to sixty. 97 The advanced corps would train six
weeks a year, while demands on the main and reserved corps would be
less severe, thereby reducing dislocation to families and the economy.
2 98
The intensive training required of young militiamen allowed Knox to
envision eventual abolition of the regular army, thus holding out some
hope that archrepublicans might find the plan palatable. But like
Washington's Sentiments three years before, Congress neglected Knox's
plan during the remaining months of Confederation government.
2 99
When the new federal government eventually assembled in New York
in 1789, it inherited a small regular army of some six hundred men from
the old regime, but no national militia system was in place, and
administration of state militia remained still an entirely local affair.
3°°
2. The Military, the Militia, and the Philadelphia Convention
As Gordon Wood has argued in his Creation of the American
Republic, the men who would frame the Constitution became
increasingly certain in the years after the 1783 Treaty of Paris that
294. FRIEDRICH VON STEUBEN, A LETTER ON THE SUBJECT OF AN ESTABLISHED MILITIA,
AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS, ADDRESSED TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1784). For a discussion of von Steuben's plan, see CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 182.
295. Henry Knox, A Plan for the General Arrangement of the Militia of the United States
(1786). For a description of Knox's plan with commentary, see PALMER, supra note 285, at 84-
94.
296. See PALMER, supra note 285, at 87.
297. See id. at 88.
298. See id.
299. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 182.
300. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 89. The Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 95, 95-
96, legalizing the army inherited from the Confederation government, confirmed an earlier act
authorizing a force of 840, but only 672 were actually in service at this time. See WEIGLEY,
supra note 8, at 89.
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American domestic politics were headed in the wrong direction.3 10 They
shared with men who would become Antifederalists a perception that
Americans had fallen away from the public virtue of the Revolutionary
War days. In fact, almost all commentators of the mid-1780s remarked
(in archetypally republican fashion) that the nation was given up to
luxury, to money making, even more to money spending, and to self-
service. 02 If there was no general agreement as to who the best sort of
people were, there was general agreement that they were no longer in
national politics.3 03 In the 1780s, more then ever before or since, the
focus of power was on the states, more precisely in the state legislatures,
and more precisely still in the lower or popular houses of the state
legislatures. The radical state constitutions of the Revolutionary period
provided for generally weak executives, gave wide latitude to the
popular branch of the legislature, and prevented the propertied and
commercial classes from concentrating greater influence than their
numbers alone justified in lawmaking, appointments, and
administration. The "failure" of the post-revolutionary state govern-
ments was illustrated most dramatically by Massachusetts's severe
difficulties suppressing western rebels who demanded debtor and tax
relief.04 The slowness of the militia to respond to orders to put down
the Shaysites, and the fact that several units went over to the rebels,
highlighted the weakness of the executive and the lack of vigor in any
military or law enforcement system depending on the militia to execute
the law. Many future Antifederalists considered this lack of vigor to be
the beauty of the existing system; but to future Federalists, the militia's
ineffectual efforts against the Shaysite rebels became perhaps the most
compelling impetus to the formation of a stronger Union with a more
vigorous executive, reliable military, and effective judicial system,3 05 and
301. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 395-96.
302. See id. at 416-17.
303. See id. at 399.
304. See id. at 412; WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 84-85.
305. Madison shared with other Federalists the opinion that, in the postwar climate,
government on the state and local level (and there was during the Confederation period little
government on the national level) failed to protect the "worthy against the licentious." See
WOOD, supra note 113, at 471-75 (quoting JOHN DICKSON, THE LETTERS OF FABIUS IN 1788,
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION; AND IN 1797 ON THE PRESENT SITUATION OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS: WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES (1797), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 188 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1888)). Nowhere was this more apparent than in
western Massachusetts. The rebellious activities of the Shaysites consisted chiefly of preventing
creditors from collecting from debtors by mobbing courts, intimidating jurors and judges, and
preventing magistrates and sheriffs from executing judgments. See JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 33-34
(1996). Although the governor called out the militia to protect the integrity of the legal process,
western militia either failed to make muster, or switched sides and then assisted in seizure of the
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the concomitant ability to impose more order on the libertarian and
natural rights regimes of the states.
The stronger federal government favored by those who became
Federalists would necessitate a readjustment of American constitutional
theory and of the role of the military therein. In 1776, American
Revolutionaries widely considered themselves upholders of the
traditional mixed or English Constitution. °6 Under that system, a
theoretical balance and equilibrium derived from the tripartite division
of the political nation into monarch, lords, and commons, each allotted
their respective political competencies. °7 The requirement that military
funding flow from Parliament (in practice, after the Settlement of 1689,
through the annual Mutiny Acts), and the strong voice of stability and
aristocracy issuing from the Lords, served in this model to check the
magistracy's ability to turn a military establishment to corruption or
oppression of the exchequer or nation.308 The balanced Constitution
was a theory most prized by pamphleteers on both sides of the Atlantic.
It informed Revolutionary sensibilities and influenced the wave of state
constitutions enacted during the war.
Crucial, for our purposes, was the balanced Constitution's
dependence on a theoretical preference for militia. The alternative
standing army-either under control of the magistracy (as in late
colonial Massachusetts) or of the legislature (as during the English
Commonwealth) - fatally upset the constitutional balance by placing
unlimited authority with a single order of society. But theory, by the
late eighteenth century, little mirrored reality. In Britain, imperial
conflict with France necessitated a vast military establishment. The
deleterious effects of standing militarism were mitigated in the home
countries by placing chief reliance on the less dangerous navy and by
stationing the majority of the army overseas. In the North American
colonies, however, the antirepublican impact of garrisoning was
eventually received with full force. Meanwhile, in both Britain and in
the newly emerging American states, the tripartite structure of the old
mixed theory had lost much of its punch. Democratic impulses in
America severed constitutional theory from its basis in a traditional
Confederation's arsenal at Springfield. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 84. Therefore, as
Madison planned for the Philadelphia Convention, he was concerned not only with creating a
political system less likely to pass legislation granting debt relief, easy money, and painless
bankruptcy, but also with ensuring the very ability of the judicial system to function and
government to enforce the law. See RAKOVE, supra, at 34.
306. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 44-45.




class system, and during the Revolution, aristocratic and propertied
elements largely lacked sufficient clout to endow the upper houses of
the legislatures with powers consequent to the quasi-aristocratic
theoretical basis of their existence. In fact, many republicans and the
Pennsylvania Constitution had gone over to unicameralism, while the
upper houses that remained lacked the voting and office-holding
qualifications to make them effective reserves of aristocratic power.09
Thus by 1787, in the minds of soon-to-be Federalists, the traditional
mixed constitution had either fallen into hopeless disrepair or proven
ineffective in lending order to American political culture. To soon-to-
be Antifederalists on the other hand, the acknowledged disorder was
either desirable or remediable by a return to the civic virtue upon which
the old theory was premised.310
Gordon Wood's greatest contribution to our understanding of
early-American political thought emerges from his description of how
radically the constitutionalism of 1787 differed from that of 1776.311 The
difference rested most fundamentally on the Federalists' loss of faith in
the attainability, sustainability, and (in the case of Hamilton) even the
political desirability of civic virtue.312 Inevitably, this Federalist change
of heart provoked a profound reassessment of the role of the militia and
of that republican archetype, the citizen-soldier, in the newly unfolding
system. Unlike radical republican visionaries, Federalists were not
fundamentally opposed in all instances to vigorous government.313 A
clear case in point is that they would have found vigorous government
useful in suppressing the Shaysites. 3 4
To Federalists, the principal problem was, rather, that unchecked
authority was exercised too severely by the wrong sort of people for the
wrong sort of ends. Too powerful state legislatures had fallen under the
control of uneducated, unqualified, shortsighted, unprincipled men who
pursued easy money policies that served the immediate interests of
debtors, but undermined the long range interests in stability of the
leading social orders of the Revolutionary years.35 The science of
309. See id. at 226-37.
310. See id. at 471-75, 560-61. For a more paradigmatic perspective, see POCOCK, supra note
2, at 530-31.
311. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 593-615.
312. See id. at 474-75.
313. See id. at 506-19; see also RAKOVE, supra note 305, at 29-34; GARRY WILLS, A
NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 70-82 (1999).
314. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 84.
315. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 406-07; see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 270, 276.
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government, Federalists thought, must be practiced by experts whose
education, experience, and outlook fitted them for the job. They
increasingly rejected the Antifederalists' undifferentiated social theory
in favor of specialization.16 The specialization that explained the fitness
and qualifications for leadership of the traditional political class also
called into question the logic of an undifferentiated mass citizen-militia
of part-time soldiers, part-time ploughmen and mechanics, and part-
time politicians. In time of crisis especially, order required firmer
security than that provided by the decaying and undisciplined
archdemocratic militias.
Federalists did not abandon all the goals of civic humanism,
however. While the radical republican preference for a democratic and
unprofessional militia was at least partially subverted by new federal
military powers, other core values of the old ideology lived on in the
new constitutionalism, now protected by radically new instrumentalities
of balance. Although the Philadelphia Constitution did not reject
entirely the historical Anglo-American suspicion of standing military
establishments, it did concede the necessity of at least some professional
soldiering to secure external peace and internal stability. These
twinned, countervailing goals are reflected in the overall Madisonian
structure and in the Militia and Military Clauses of the organic
Constitution."'
3. Militia and Military Powers in the Constitution of 1787
Classical republicans feared unchecked power and, especially,
absolute unrepublican control over the military. In large measure, so
did the new Federalists. But at the Philadelphia Convention in the
summer of 1787, they devised novel safeguards against the ancient
abuses. Most significant was the two-tiered division of military
control between the executive and legislative federal branches, and
316. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 493-99.
317. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 (Army), 13 (Navy), 14 (Military Rules), 15 (Calling
Forth), 16 (Militia); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Commander in Chief). For an analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 323-26. See also Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
As Justice Stevens aptly wrote:
Two conflicting themes, developed at the Constitutional Convention and repeated in
debates over military policy during the next century, led to a compromise in the text of
the Constitution and in later statutory enactments. On the one hand, there was a
widespread fear that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat to
individual liberty and to the sovereignty of separate States, while, on the other hand,
there was a recognition of the danger of relying on inadequately trained soldiers as the
primary means of providing for the common defense. Thus, Congress was authorized




between the national and state authorities.
Separation of powers was not in itself a radical innovation. Judicial
independence had informed resistance to the Stuarts as early 1610 with
Lord Coke's famous opinion in Dr. Bonham's Case,318 and judicial
tenure upon good behavior was duly guaranteed in the Act of
Settlement of 1701.319 Perhaps still more fundamental to Common-
wealth philosophy, parliamentary independence from the monarchy
developed into a mainstay of English opposition ideology and was
enshrined into the Bill of Rights of 1689.320 Midway through the
eighteenth century, Baron de Montesquieu could look across the
Channel with envy and celebrate British separation of powers as the
most perfect of political systems.3 1  But the Madisonian model of
separation did mark a new departure from its European antecedents. It
did so primarily in its frank concession of the necessity, and indeed the
advantages, of blending; that is, allowing different branches to partially
exercise powers naturally inherent in another branch.3 2
American federalism also marked a novel departure. Unlike the
central authorities in the American or Swiss Confederations, or in the
Holy Roman Empire, the central government under the Constitution
was given authority to bind individuals, not merely member states.3 23
Like Madison's new system of separation of powers, the new federalism
emerged clearly in the Military and Militia Clauses adopted by the
318. 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610) ("And it appears in our
books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and
adjudge such Act to be void."). Of course, Coke is really asserting principles of judicial review
as opposed to judicial independence from the magistracy, which would come only with tenure
upon good behavior. But James I realized that in the context of resistance to his assertions of
royal prerogative, this amounted to much the same thing-a challenge to his putatively absolute
powers. As quoted by J.P. Sommerville, the king quipped that "if the Judges interprete the
lawes themselves and suffer none else to interprete, then they may easily make of the laws
shipmens hose." SOMMERVILLE, supra note 150, at 96. (Shipmens hose, it should be noted,
were loosely cut one-size-fits-all sailor pants.) Dr. Bonham's Case was not respected precedent
by the age of Mansfield, but it remained an icon of Whiggish sentiment.
319. See SCHWOERER, supra note 178, at 289. The Heads of Grievances of 1689 also
proposed to secure judicial tenure upon good behavior, but this was one of the radical Whig
measures requiring the creation of new law that was struck at the Lords' insistence before
passage of the Declaration of Rights. See id. at 22-33; supra notes 192-95 and accompanying
text.
320. See SMITH, supra note 151, at 305-06; supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
321. See CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESOUIEU, DE L'ESPIR1T DES
LOIS [THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS] bk. 11, ch. 6 (1748), translated in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 624 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
322. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 550-52; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson,
supra note 315, at 274-75.
323. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 315, at 271.
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Convention. Article I, Section 8 provided:
Congress shall have Power ....
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; [Clause 12]
To provide and maintain a Navy; [Clause 13]
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces; [Clause 14]
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; [Clause 15]
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; [Clause 16]
At the same time, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 provided:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into actual Service of the United States ....
Under the Constitution then, Congress was empowered to raise a
professional army, and once raised to keep it in the field, but not to
provide money for the army's continuance beyond the two-year term
for which the House of Representatives was itself elected. A
dangerously large army would presumably not be borne by the people
to whom the representatives were beholden. And since all funding
measures were to originate in the lower house, the question of the
army's continuance was never far removed from popular control.
Moreover, since any army raised by Congress was to take its orders
from the president, congressional control would be less than absolute
even during the two-year interval between elections. For his part, the
president would not, like the early Stuarts, depend directly on the
legislature's acquiescence to respond to military crises, for, assuming
Congress made such provision under Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, the
president would be empowered to call up the several state militia into
the service of the United States to "execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." The militia, in turn, unlike
its royalist Restoration counterpart, could be counted on to follow solid
local civic preferences, for its officers were subject to state
appointment.32 4
324. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 86-87.
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Thus, the dangers of standing armies, which in the republican
paradigm had been linked to fear of executive abuse and legislative
corruption, were now tempered by Madison's division of authority
among Congress, the president, and the states. Madison's solution to
the dilemma posed by the need for military power even in a democratic
republic was more elaborate, intricate, and structuralist than the British
approach of separating the funding and command functions between
Parliament and his majesty's cabinet in Parliament. With the
constitutional system itself now shorn of much of the former potential
for absolutist abuse, the individuals who made up the new legislature
and magistracy might safely possess less than perfectly virtuous personal
constitutions.
At the same time, the federalism and structuralism of the new
Constitution aimed to insure restoration of the right sort of people to
leading roles in national policy formation and political stewardship,
thereby providing another level of protection against the abusive
potential of the standing army.325  The electoral college, and the
staggered, filtered election of senators, served as sureties that
unqualified and vulgar populists would not operate direct control over
the military forces. This nod to the importance of public character was
not a purely civic humanist concession, for Madison envisioned more
than virtue as the hallmark of political fitness. Madison saw suitability
for public office as a product of education and outlook. With all the
optimism of the late Enlightenment, Madison believed qualifications for
public office could be studiously acquired, even as his classically
republican predecessors believed public character was fleeting and
forever subject to decay. 326
4. The Antifederalist Critique of the Federal Military Power and the
Crusade for a Bill of Rights
There was a minority who did not share Madison's modern,
optimistic outlook. Years ago, Cecelia Kenyon called them the men of
little faith.3 27 Classically republican until the last, they soon rallied
against the outline of government drafted by the Philadelphians.
Ultimately, the diligence of these Antifederalists bore fruit in the
recognition of the centrality of the militia in the Second Amendment.
In September 1787, the Philadelphia Convention submitted the
325. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 507-08.
326. See id. at 610-14.
327. See Kenyon, supra note 116.
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Constitution to Congress to pass on to the state conventions for
approval. Heated public debate concerning political theory and the
future of the Republic ensued soon after.328 At first, Antifederalists
objected both to the surrender of state powers to the national
government and to the scant specific securities for individual rights
provided in the proposed Constitution. As adoption became more and
more likely, however, opposition -principled and strategic alike-
focused on securing a bill of rights to set limits to federal powers.
Various themes were sounded as Federalists and Antifederalists
debated the desirability of providing concrete guaranties for rights and
struggled over which rights would merit such protection. Fear of
standing armies, and in particular of a centrally controlled standing
army, became a major-but not the leading-theme during the
ratification fight.3 29 Any putative individual right to possess arms
328. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 408, 409, 411 ("The Constitution proposed by the late
Convention engrosses almost the whole political attention of America."); Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 19, 1788), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 61, at 607, 608 ("The public here continues to be much agitated by the proposed federal
Constitution and to be attentive to little else.").
329. NRA President Charlton Heston has commented that the right to bear arms is the most
important of the rights secured in the first ten amendments. See Robert J. Spitzer, Door No. 1:
Muskets? Or Door No. 2: Free Speech?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 19, 1997, at 19. But as
an assessment of the considerations that led Madison and the other framers to pursue a Bill of
Rights, and as an evaluation of the implicit hierarchy among the liberties catalogued therein,
Heston's estimation badly misses the mark. If there is a dominant theme in the commentary
and the documents surrounding the creation of the Bill of Rights, it is almost certainly fear of
potential federal involvement with organized religion. See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 82 (1955); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT
RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 174-75 (1977). In
several states, the largest Antifederalist constituency comprised Presbyterians. Baptists, and
other sectarians who feared federal establishment, or taxes for religious purposes. But not only
sectarians lobbied for what we know as First Amendment freedoms. Madison himself, "Father
of the Constitution," leader of the pro-ratification movement in Virginia, and eventually
architect of the Bill of Rights, had made his reputation opposing the Virginia general
assessment and securing passage of Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. See
CURRY, supra note 200, at 142-48; MILLER, supra note 202, at 42-43. Professor Banning, for
one, has implied that Madison's sensitivity to the checking role of factions in a constitutional
system derived from his experience in Virginia politics, where the countervailing claims of
Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Baptists prevented dictation of a strong state policy on religion,
and ultimately facilitated separation of church and state. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED
FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 84-97
(1995). Madison's sympathies on issues of religion made him receptive to Antifederalist calls
for a bill of rights, notwithstanding his deep personal commitment to ratification of the
Constitution as initially written. Letters from his mentor, Jefferson, arguing that "a bill of rights
is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and
what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference," see Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison, supra note 68, at 440, helped convince Madison that the Constitution should
be fortified with guarantees of specific rights. More than any other principles, it was devotion to
disestablishment and free exercise that brought Madison around to Jefferson's view in favor of a
bill of rights. According to one Madison specialist, the future drafter of the Bill of Rights
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outside the context of collective defense remained a remote and
insignificant concern.330
The Antifederalist critique originated even before dissolution of
the Convention, when George Mason, whose vision of constitutionalism
had been disappointed at Philadelphia, noted his Objections.331 These
were published soon thereafter. Mason was especially concerned that
state bills of rights could not protect individuals against incursions by
the powerful federal government. He lamented the absence of any
federal declaration of rights and noted particularly the lack of
guarantees for freedom of the press, trial by jury in civil cases, and
security against standing armies in peacetime. He made no mention of
the desirability of protecting an individual right to arms. When the
Constitution arrived before Congress in New York, Virginia's Richard
Henry Lee, who had not been at the Philadelphia Convention,
endeavored unsuccessfully to attach a set of amendments similar in
substance to Mason's Objections. Lee proposed guaranteeing freedom
of religion, of the press, of assembly, and petition; trial by jury in civil
and criminal cases; the independence of judges; and free and frequent
elections. He proposed a ban on peacetime standing armies, on
excessive bail or fines, and on unreasonable searches and seizures. Like
Mason, Lee made no mention of securing to individuals the right to
possess weapons for private purposes.332 From the outset then, two of
the most prominent Antifederalist leaders articulated nearly all the
major principles that would eventually be written into the Bill of Rights,
but made no claim for a purely private right to arms.
A review of the ratification debate simply does not bear out the
individualist contention that a demand to secure a personal right to
arms was a driving force behind the Antifederalist movement and the
considered First Amendment freedoms and the right to jury trial as the most important liberties
embodied in the Virginia Bill of Rights, see RUTLAND, supra, at 208, while another
commentator, author of a classic Madison biography, calls freedom of religion "Madison's first
concern." See IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800,
at 268 (1950). Charlton Heston labels the right to bear arms the most important political
freedom, because in his mind only that right can guarantee the security of all rights. But to
James Madison, spiritual and intellectual freedoms rated at the apex of American liberties,
because only freedom of the mind rendered liberty meaningful and enduring.
330. See infra notes 333-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the comparatively
small number of demands for a purely private right to arms raised during the ratification
struggle.
331. See GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT,
reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637, 637-40 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 315, at
280.
332. See RUTLAND, supra note 329, at 121.
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wellspring of the Bill of Rights.3 3 Two leading historians of the
ratification process, Robert Allen Rutland334 and Bernard Schwartz,335
have noted only slight significance in the sporadic demands to secure an
individualistic right to arms. A third, Jack Rakove, argues in this
Symposium that private right readings of the Second Amendment fail to
come to grips with "the orthodox understanding of the extent of the
police powers of the state[s] .336
Many leading antifederal spokesmen during the critical period
belabored issues relating to security for the militia and preservation of
the body politic against the dangers of federal standing armies. One of
the more famous opponents of ratification was Luther Martin of
Maryland, who had refused to sign the Constitution at Philadelphia.
Declaiming on the proposed Constitution before the State Assembly at
Annapolis, Martin blasted the Militia Clauses as part and parcel of a
full-scale transfer of sovereignty from the states to the new central
government:
[It was urged [at the Constitutional Convention], that, if after
having retained to the general government the great powers
already granted, and among those, that of raising and keeping up
regular troops without limitations, the power over the militia should
be taken away from the States, and also given to the general
government, it ought to be considered as the last coup de grace to
the State governments; that it must be the most convincing proof,
the advocates of this system design the destruction of the State
governments, and that no professions to the contrary ought to be
trusted; and that every State in the Union ought to reject such a
system with indignation, since, if the general government should
attempt to oppress and enslave them, they could not have any
possible means of self-defense .... "I
Martin's concerns for state sovereignty were typical of Antifederalists.
His fears of the Militia Clauses and of the federal military powers were
expressed in a minority report by his own state convention, and echoed
in four of the six official state-ratifying-convention petitions in favor of a
bill of rights that eventually led Congress to pass the Second
333. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 7, at 222.
334. See, e.g., RUTLAND, supra note 329, at 82-91. Rutland rates freedom of religion the
most important issue in the eyes of the votaries of the day. See id. Freedom of religion has 38
entries in his table of contents, as opposed to two entries for the right to keep and bear arms.
335. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 105-11, 115-18, 156-59. Schwartz stresses the
Antifederalists' emphatic demands for an express reservation to the states of powers not
expressly delegated to the federal government, and for the erection of limitations on the
seemingly plenary federal authority to legislate within its delegated mandate.
336. Rakove, supra note 291, at 112.




While Martin's classically republican solicitude for the militia
characterized the antifederal mainstream, a small number of
Antifederalists supported a more personal right to arms than that
needed to provide institutional security for the states and people against
a too powerful federal military. These supporters of a constitutional
right to own weapons for private purposes were atypical even within the
Antifederalist movement and remained insignificant within the nation
as a whole. More importantly, as we shall see shortly, their voices,
unlike Luther Martin's, did not find their way into the Second
Amendment as adopted by Congress and ratified by the states. But
before we reach the text of the Amendment itself, let us pause briefly to
consider some expressions of the alternative, personal private right to
arms that were heard here and there while the controversy over the
Constitution raged.
New Hampshire stood out among those states whose conventions
appended petitions for a bill of rights to their measures ratifying the
Constitution. As we have noted, the Granite State's convention was the
only one to put forward a draft amendment that might be read to
support a federal personal right to arms outside the context of state or
federalized militia service. In addition to a suggested amendment
prohibiting the quartering of troops in private homes without the
owners' consent and barring maintenance of peacetime standing armies
absent approval of three-fourths of both houses of Congress,3 39 the New
Hampshire convention proposed that "Congress shall never disarm any
Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion. ' 340 To
whatever extent New Hampshire may have desired to create a popular
right to arms outside, or partially outside, the aegis of the state by
proposing this language, it sought to push the Republic further down
the road towards a private, extragovernmental right to arms than any of
its sister states desired to go. In neighboring Massachusetts, for
example, the ratification convention rejected an amendment proposed
by Samuel Adams that would have denied Congress power "to prevent
338. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND
ORIGINS 181-83 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. A
collective right to arms was endorsed by a minority of the official Maryland committee, by the
conventions of New York, Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Virginia, and by the so-called
Pennsylvania minority, which also (perhaps schizophrenically) endorsed a private individual
right to arms, which right was also recommended by New Hampshire and a Massachusetts
minority. See id.
339. See id. at 215.
340. Id. at 181.
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the people of the United States who are peaceable citizens from
keeping their own arms."341 The convention did so despite the Bay
Colony's charged history of arms confiscation in the early 1770s,
perhaps because delegates were swayed more by the recent Shaysite
uprising than by past royal abuses.
In back-country North Carolina, elements of the populist pro-
debtor Regulator movement likely supported a purely personal right to
arms, in part to facilitate resistance to taxation that the Regulators
deemed extralegal. 342  Yet even in the Tar Heel State's assembly,
dominated by antifederalist sentiment, advocates of a private right to
arms were unable to impress their vision on the state convention. North
Carolina adopted verbatim the proposed Virginia bill of rights,343 except
that North Carolina sent its recommendations to Congress with
instructions that amendments be adopted before the new Constitution
took effect. The North Carolina convention refused to ratify the
Constitution before federal adoption of a bill of rights, and North
Carolina did not join the new federal Union until the new Congress sent
the proposed bill of rights to the states in 1789. North Carolina's tactics
played a crucial role in bolstering momentum for amendments to the
Constitution,344 but the right to arms that North Carolina endorsed was
expressly linked to service in the militia.
In Pennsylvania, as several commentators have pointed out,345 an
address favoring a personal right to arms was circulated by a disaffected
341. See WELLS, supra note 69, at 267.
342. The heyday of the Carolina Regulators was the immediate prewar period. See, e.g.,
RICHARD MIDDLETON, COLONIAL AMERICA: A HISTORY 1585-1776, at 460-62 (1996). Yet in
western parts of the Carolinas and other states, groups calling themselves Regulators continued
to assert popular sovereignty in the face of seaboard governance up to and beyond the
establishment of federal authority. The Massachusetts "Shaysites" consciously styled
themselves Regulators to suggest an affinity with the western Carolina populists. See, e.g.,
WOOD, supra note 113, at 320-21, 325.
343. See discussion of the Virginia proposal infra notes 349-58 and accompanying text. In
the very words employed by Virginia, North Carolina proposed
[t]hat the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia
composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe
defence of a free State. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to
Liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection
of the community will admit; and that in all cases, the military should be under strict
subordination to, and governed by the Civil power.
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 338, at 182.
344. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 154-56.
345. See Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 59, 62-63 (1989); Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed
Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 650
n.35 (1995); Shalhope, supra note 98, at 609.
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"minority" after that state's convention concluded its affairs.3 46 Yet this
"minority report" turns out, on closer inspection, to reflect no more
than the ramblings of a single embittered eccentric who departed the
convention in disgust when he was unable to scuttle ratification.347 As
such, the failure of Pennsylvania's one man "minority" merely
accentuates the fact that opinion favoring a personal right to arms
independent of the militia remained highly marginal in state
conventions outside of New Hampshire.
More representative of national opinion than the unofficial address
of the Pennsylvania "minority" and the official New Hampshire
Petition-and more influential in the formation of the Bill of Rights-
were the debates and resolutions of the Virginia Ratifying Convention.
Eight states had already voted in favor of ratification by the time
delegates convened in Richmond in June of 1788, and another, New
Hampshire, voted to ratify before the Virginia convention adjourned,
thereby bringing up the minimum nine states required by Article VII
for the Constitution to enter into force among the ratifying states. But
support of Virginia, the largest and most populous state, remained
critical for the Constitution's ultimate success and for winning over the
remaining nonratifying states of New York, North Carolina, and Rhode
Island. Thus, the Old Dominion, where opponents of the Constitution
were well organized and well represented,3 48 afforded Antifederalists a
last, clear chance to impress their vision on the nation's design. After
long and thoughtful discussions, the Virginia convention, following the
lead of Massachusetts, appended a list of proposed amendments to its
resolution of ratification.349 These reflected substantial concessions to
the Antifederalists, and eventually formed the blueprint Madison used
in the First Congress to draft the Bill of Rights.
At the convention, George Mason, antifederal spokesman whose
Objections had sounded the opening salvo in the ratification struggle,
346. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents (Dec. 12, 1787), in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 291,
at 145, 151 (originally published in PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787). The
Address provided in part
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and their own
State, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be
passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals ....
Id.; see also EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 174
(1957).
347. See Wills, supra note 72, at 65-66.
348. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 328, at 409-10.
349. See RUTLAND, supra note 329, at 162-74.
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soon expanded the scope of his opposition to encompass the dangers of
federalizing the militia. He feared that Congress might use its power
over state forces as a pretext for disarming them. "Congress may
neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state
governments cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right to arm
them... "30 The flamboyant Patrick Henry echoed Mason's concerns.
"When this power is given up to Congress," he asked, "how will your
militia be armed?"35' Federalists Marshall and Madison countered
correctly that the federal power to arm was not exclusive, so that
Virginia might independently arm its militia if Congress declined to do
S0.352 In the context of this exchange, it is important to note that Mason
and Henry were actuated not by fears that the federal government
would disarm individuals and thereby prevent them from protecting
themselves, but by solicitude for the state militia's capacity to remain
armed in order to protect the community from insurrection and external
danger, and, by its very existence, from the political hazards of a large
federally controlled army.
The ninth, tenth, and eleventh proposed amendments to emerge
from the Virginia convention embodied the delegation's desire to
delineate more clearly the scope of respective federal and state military
authority. The ninth amendment would have required two-thirds
consent from both houses of Congress for maintaining a peacetime
standing army, and the tenth would have restricted peacetime
enlistments to a maximum of four years. The eleventh - a direct
concession to Mason and Henry-expressed each state's power to arm
and discipline its militia whenever Congress should neglect so to do, and
provided that federal martial law should govern the militia only when
duly called in to the service of the United States in time of war, invasion,
or rebellion. 3
More significantly, these proposed amendments built on
fundamental principles of government set forth in the declaration that
accompanied the Virginia ratification resolution. Three of the
principles proclaimed by the Virginia convention bore directly on the
future Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Most
important of these was the seventeenth, which held:
350. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 98, at 379.
351. Id. at 386.
352. See id. at 382-83, 421.
353. See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 663 (Gaillard Hunt &
James Brown Scott eds., int'l ed. 1920).
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That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well
regulated Militia composed of the body of the people trained to
arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State. That
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and
therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and
protection of the Community will admit; and that in all cases the
military should be under strict subordination to and governed by
the Civil power.
35 4
By these terms, the ratifying convention's concerns with the right to
arms were plainly directed towards the service of a collective purpose.
From the perspective of delegates in Richmond demanding greater
assurances vis-A-vis the new federal government, the people's security in
bearing arms went to the heart of political and public liberty, but did not
concern individual license.
The Virginians did express some concern for individual autonomy
in the military context, but this solicitude did not relate to any claimed
right to arm oneself for private purposes. What the delegation favored
was protecting householders from quartering of troops3 5  and guarding
the religiously scrupulous against coerced performance of military
duty.35 6 These principles were set down as the ninth and tenth articles in
the ratification declaration.3 57 Sanctity of the home and liberty of
conscience were fundamental values of eighteenth-century political
theory that pressed for accommodation with the government's demands
for military service. Whether republican society depended on
republican character or vice versa was then much debated,358 but in
either case, banning billeting and recognizing conscientious objection
made for reassuringly sound policy from the vantage point of either
republican or natural rights theory.
The concerns expressed in the Virginia debates-most particularly
the preference for militia over a standing army-echoed numerous
Antifederalist pamphlets from all corners of the new nation. Many of
these pursued a traditional republican vein, warning of the dangers of
354. Id. at 662.
355. Eventually constitutionalized as the Third Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
356. Madison's original draft of what we now know as the Second Amendment, introduced
in the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, contained a conscientious objector clause
echoing the Virginia convention's concerns. This clause survived floor debates in the House but
was later struck at the insistence of the Senate. See text accompanying notes 409-11.
357. See the eighteenth and nineteenth principles of the Virginia convention in MADISON,
supra note 353, at 662.
358. See DUNCAN J. MACLEOD, SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 65-69
(1974) (discussing this question with reference to the philosophy of Jeffersonian theorist John
Taylor of Caroline).
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standing armies under absolute control and enfeebled militias unable to
restore the political balance. Thus, in the City of Brotherly Love, the
pseudonymous "Philadelphiensis" proclaimed:
Who can deny but the president general will be a king to all intents
and purposes, and one of the most dangerous kind too; a king
elected to command a standing army? Thus our laws are to be
administered by this tyrant; for the whole, or at least the most
important part of the executive department is put in his hands.359
Another Pennsylvania editorialist, "Centinel,360 feared a
different tyrant. Centinel argued that federalization of state forces
through the Militia Clauses would usher in an era of congressional
domination of the states. The Militia Clauses, Centinel wrote, would
subject the citizens of these States to the most arbitrary military
discipline, even death may be inflicted on the disobedient; in the
character of militia, you may be dragged from your families and
homes to any part of the continent, and for any length of time, at
the discretion of the future Congress .... The militia of
Pennsylvania may be marched to Georgia or New-Hampshire,
however incompatible with their interests or consciences;-in short,
they may be made as mere machines as Prussian soldiers.361
Centinel's concerns were shared by the Bostonian pamphleteer
"John DeWitt" (read John the wit, meaning the prescient one, not the
jokester). "Let us enquire," he mused, "why they [Congress] have
assumed this power .... The nature of the demand... forces you to
believe that it is... for the purpose of consolidating and finally
destroying your strength, as your respective Governments are to be
destroyed. '362 Reflecting on the rising Federalist conspiracy, DeWitt
recalled his republican history. "It is asserted," he remembered, "by the
most respectable writers upon Government, that a well regulated
militia, composed of the yeomanry of the county have ever been
considered as the bulwark of a free people .... Tyrants have uniformly
depended upon [a standing army], at the expense of [a well-regulated
militia] "363
359. Essays of Philadelphiensis IX, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 291,
at 127, 128 (originally published in the INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Feb. 7, 1788).
360. Centinel has been identified as Samuel Bryan, the hasty compiler of Pennsylvania's
"minority report" discussed supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text. See 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 291, at 130, 135 n.3.
361. Letter from Centinel to the People of Pennsylvania (Nov. 5,1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 291, at 154, 159-60 (originally published in the INDEPENDENT
GAZETTEER, Nov. 8, 1787).
362. Letter from John DeWitt to the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(Dec. 3, 1787), in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 291, at 34, 36.
363. Id. at 36-37.
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Better remembered than even the most familiar antifederal
pamphlets are the federal opinions from the pen of Publius. The
Federalist is revealing because it takes issue with the Antifederalist
concerns that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay took most seriously-those
concerns that, therefore, had the greatest impact on the Federalists'
subsequent constitutional reforms. With the exception of Hamilton's
argument that a government of enumerated powers need not be feared,
the justifications that Publius offered to the opponents of the
Constitution would soon inform efforts in the First Congress to allay the
Antifederalists' most legitimate concerns by passing a bill of rights.
A favorite theme of Publius was the necessity of a standing army.
Like that of his mentor, Washington, Hamilton's war experience had
left him skeptical of the militia's fighting effectiveness. In The Federalist
Nos. 25, 27, 28, and 29 he argued that a professional army was the only
means to combat a professional army, and thus the only true guarantee
of national security and independence. An inefficient militia, on the
other hand, would be an extravagance without much military value.
Since a regular army was a necessity, Hamilton saw no way around
accepting its constitutional legitimacy. In his eyes it was far better to
provide for structural safeguards against military dictatorship than to
wish away the problem of military necessity. 364 Happily, the federal
system was well calculated to guard against military excess. "As far as
an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon," he reflected, "it
had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be
jealous [the federal government] than in those of which they are least
likely to be jealous [the state governments].365 Thus, vigilance, the
classical republican requisite for civil-military balance, would actually be
enhanced by the new system.
In The Federalist No. 46, Madison addressed head-on the radical
Antifederalist fear that the national army might serve a tyrant's designs
of conquest and empire. In so doing, he conceded frankly the checking
value of the general militia within the federal system. "Let a regular
army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed," he argued,
and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still
it would not be going too far to say that the State governments with
the people on their side would be able to repel the danger. The
highest number to which, according to the best computation, a
standing army can be carried in any country does not exceed one
hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth
364. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 25, 27, 28, 29 (Alexander Hamilton).
365. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 276, at 193.
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part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not
yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or
thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their
hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for
their common liberties and united and conducted by governments
possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted
whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by
such a proportion of regular troops. 366
Thus, while Hamilton thought the army necessary because the
militia was ineffective, Madison thought the general militia
sufficiently effective-if for no other reason than its size-to nullify
the threat of a professional army. To both writers, however, the
federal structure itself served to lessen the dangers historically
associated with standing armies. Madison in particular seemed to
engage open-heartedly the fears expressed in the antifederal
pamphlets. Clearly, to Antifederalists, the continued vitality of the
militia was the only means of rendering an army palatable. While
Madison likely still considered enumeration of powers sufficient
protection for the militia's constitutional status, he was quickly
coming round to an appreciation of the importance of validating the
militia in order to secure a consensus behind the new Constitution.
Hamilton, for his part, clung to the notion that a government of
enumerated powers was inherently undangerous until the very end of
The Federalist series. In No. 84, the New Yorker argued,
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in
their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects,
abridgements of prerogative in favour of privilege, reservations of
rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA CARTA,
obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were
the subsequent confirmations of that charter by subsequent princes.
Such was the Petition of Right assented to by Charles the First in
the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right
presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in
1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of Parliament
called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to
their primitive signification, they have no application to
constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people
and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. 367
But Antifederalists did not trust Hamilton's logic, and they
demanded express guarantees for their traditional rights. Beginning
with Massachusetts, five of the last six states to ratify did so with the
366. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 301 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
367. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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understanding that the First Congress would amend the Constitution to
include a federal bill of rights. That the First Congress proved willing to
do so was a direct concession to the strength and cogency of the
Antifederalist opposition, and particularly to the eloquence of Patrick
Henry and George Mason in the Virginia convention. 368 On the whole,
Antifederalists had agitated at least as strongly for the principles behind
what became the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments as they did for those behind the Second.3 69 Freedom from
religious establishment; free exercise of religion; a free press; free
expression; freedom to assemble; common law procedural rights; jury
trial (civil and criminal); the inability of the federal government to touch
other basic common law rights, such as the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and the integrity of the states as guarantors of
those rights had figured as prominently in Antifederalist
pamphleteering as the dangers of standing armies.370 The subject of
individual arms as source or substance of any right or principle other
than security against a standing army arose during the ratification
debates only sporadically and on the radical fringe.71 It is not surprising
then that Madison, when he directed his attentions to fulfilling the
36& See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 134-42.
369. See RUTLAND, supra note 329, at 28-29 (discussing the relative importance Americans
attached to various historical, political, and natural rights during the critical period). Rutland
labels the five "fundamental tenet[s] of civil liberty" as government according to laws approved
by the people, jury trial, the writ of habeas corpus, freedom of the press, and freedom of
religion. See id. at 29.
370. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 157-58. Schwartz provides a table listing the
references to various future provisions of the Bill of Rights occurring in the recommendations of
state ratifying conventions. In all, six state conventions (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia) submitted official recommendations. Of
these, the reports of Massachusetts and South Carolina were concerned chiefly with federalism,
and took only limited account of individual liberties. Schwartz's table also includes references
to the so-called report of the Pennsylvania minority, and the recommendations of both the
majority and the minority of the committee charged by the Maryland convention with
suggesting amendments. None of these last three sets of recommendations were adopted by
their respective states. In Schwartz's table, reserved powers appear the maximum eight times,
jury trial in civil cases seven times, and religious freedom six times. Next follow the right to bear
arms, a free press, the right against quartering of soldiers, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and jury trial in criminal cases, with five mentions each. However, only
the New Hampshire report and the so-called report of the Pennsylvania minority contemplated
a right to arms outside the militia context. If, as Garry Wills suggests, we discount the report of
the Pennsylvania minority as the rambling catch-all compendium of one man bent on scuttling
ratification, see Wills, supra note 72, at 65, we are left with a solitary endorsement of a right to
arms for private purposes. That renders the putative private right to arms the least popular of
the twenty-three rights suggested by the conventions, just behind the right against double
jeopardy, with two mentions-an official endorsement by New York and an unofficial
endorsement by the majority of the Maryland committee.
371. See CRESS, supra note 224, at 100-01, for an insightful discussion of the Antifederalists'
attitude toward the military and the militia, focusing on their hostility to centralization of
military power and their increasingly ambivalent and indeed accepting view of professionalism.
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Federalists' commitment to provide a bill of rights, did not endeavor to
write a guarantee to an unfettered personal right to arms into the
amended Constitution.
One further development during the ratification crisis merits
serious consideration in our endeavor to understand the mind of the
man who served as principal drafter of the Second Amendment. This is
Madison's correspondence with Jefferson concerning the desirability of
a bill of rights. Eight years Jefferson's junior, Madison had already
entered into the "Great Collaboration" '372 with the author of the
Declaration of Independence by the time Jefferson undertook his six-
year ministry to France in 1784. By 1787, when Madison joined the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Madison's
relationship with Jefferson had been cemented by the younger man's
successful stewardship of many of Jefferson's reform bills through the
House of Burgesses, including the great Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom.3 73  Yet Madison retained then and always a deferential
manner towards his political mentor.3 74 When Madison, aged thirty-one
and serving in the Congress at Philadelphia, fell hopelessly in love with
a fifteen-year-old girl and took to wasting great amounts of time and
money at the barbers, it was Jefferson who chastened him to return to
hard work in the service of his country.3 75 Later, Madison would seek
and obtain Jefferson's blessing of his marriage to a stunning young
widow, known to posterity as Dolley Madison.3 76
While Jefferson was in Paris, trans-Atlantic correspondence
between the two Virginians flowed steadily.3 77 Their letters were at
once eclectic and erudite. Madison valued Jefferson's encyclopedic
372. See generally ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT
COLLABORATION (1950).
373. See CURRY, supra note 200, at 141-48; MILLER, supra note 202, at 32-36, 74-75, 85-86.
374. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
277 (1997).
375. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 31, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 335-36; see also FAwN M. BRODIE, THOMAS
JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 174 (1974). Madison's infatuation with Kitty Floyd,
daughter of New York Representative William Floyd, with whom Madison shared a
Philadelphia rooming house, is discussed in greater detail in IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON:
THE NATIONALIST, 1780-1787, at 283-87 (1948). Madison began spending inordinately at the
barbers as soon as he took up lodgings with the Floyds at Mrs. House's famous establishment.
Id. at 17.
376. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF
LIBERTY 187 (1962) (discussing Jefferson's reaction to Madison's betrothal to Dolley Todd).
Madison did not marry until 1794, the year he turned forty-three. See id.
377. Between August 1784 and October 1789, when Jefferson was in Europe, he received at
least forty-six letters from Madison and sent Madison at least thirty-five in return. See generally
7-15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61.
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knowledge of political philosophy, and while some commentators would
rate Madison the weightier and more practical of the pair, the truth is
that he almost always yielded to Jefferson's political suggestions.378 The
advisability of a bill of rights in the federal Constitution is a case in
point. With due regard to the secrecy of the proceedings in
Philadelphia, Madison had kept Jefferson abreast of the developing
shape of the Constitution throughout the Convention summer of 1787.
In reply, Jefferson offered critical analysis and historical perspective.
He considered Madisonian federalism a stroke of genius. He was
especially pleased by the constitutional compromise between the claims
of large and small states, and was very favorably disposed towards
Madison's system of checks and balances. But, as Jefferson wrote in a
letter of December 20, 1787, he did not consider the Constitution to be
altogether perfect. "I will now add," the Minister to Paris said of the
Philadelphians' handiwork,
what I do not like. First the omission of a bill of rights providing
clearly and without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction
against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas
corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the
laws of the land and not by the law of Nations.379
Thus protection from standing armies-but not an individual
entitlement to arms-numbered among the rights for which Jefferson
sought express protection. Six weeks later Jefferson wrote to Madison
proposing a mechanism whereby a bill of rights might be secured. "I am
glad to hear that the new constitution is received with favor," he began,
referring to the prospects for ratification in the upcoming state
conventions.
I sincerely wish that the 9 first conventions may receive, and the 4.
last reject it. The former will secure it finally, while the latter will
oblige them to offer a declaration of rights in order to complete the
union. We shall thus have all it's good, and cure it's principal
defect.
3 8 0
Whether by coincidence, or by force of his wide American influence,38 '
Jefferson's prognostication approximated very nearly the future course
378. See MILLER, supra note 202, at 32, 34-35; BRODIE, supra note 375, at 177-78.
379. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 68, at 440.
380. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 6, 1788), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 568, 569-70.
381. Jefferson's letters to Madison advocating a bill of rights were not intended for public
distribution. However, they came into wide circulation at the height of the ratification debate
through the efforts of Uriah Forrest, an American who while traveling in Europe had
corresponded with Jefferson concerning the state of developments at home and had been
favored by Jefferson with replies enclosing copies of his letters to Madison commenting on the
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of ratification. The first nine state conventions ratified,3"2 and while only
two of the remaining states rejected the Constitution, it was their
rejection, and the amendments proposed by five of the last six ratifying
states-in particular those proposed by Virginia-that paved the way
for the Bill of Rights.
3 83
5. The Second Amendment: The Last Act of Classical Republican
Constitutionalism?
In April 1789, when the First Congress assembled in New York,
James Madison took his seat as a representative from Virginia. The
emergence of organized parties was still some years off, and there was
not in 1789 any equivalent to the majority leader of today, but Madison
soon established himself as one of the chief architects of legislation in
the House. His driving purpose during the spring and summer of 1789
course of ratification. The letters were much publicized by the Antifederalist press, and became
a godsend to advocates of amendments. See RAKOVE, supra note 179, at 153.
382. In late July 1788, Jefferson expected imminent arrival of the welcome news that
Virginia had assented to the Constitution and that the constitutional quorum of nine states had
been reached, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Rutledge (July 18, 1788), in 13 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 377, 378 (Jefferson had not yet learned that
New Hampshire had become the ninth state to ratify), and by the last day of the month,
Jefferson was able to congratulate Madison on the constitutional achievement. At the same
time, Jefferson reminded Madison of the desirability and demand for a bill of rights, and in
particular amplified his concerns about standing armies. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at
440. "It is a good canvas," Jefferson wrote of the Constitution,
on which some strokes only want retouching .... It seems pretty generally understood
that this should go to Juries, Habeas corpus, Standing armies, Printing, Religion and
Monopolies .... If no check can be found to keep the number of standing troops
within safe bounds, while they are tolerated as far as necessary, abandon them
altogether, discipline well the militia, and guard the magazines with them. More than
magazine-guards will be useless if few, and dangerous if many. No European nation
can ever send against us such a regular army as we need fear, and it is hard if our
militia are not equal to those of Canada or Florida.
Id. at 442-43. Given his recent experiences as a displaced wartime governor of an occupied
Virginia, Jefferson doubtless was engaging in wishful thinking about the feebleness of European
armies. And given the desperation of the former chief executive's pleas for Continental
assistance during that British invasion of Virginia, his confidence in the American militia's
ability to protect the nation also seems rather too optimistic. But more importantly for our
purposes, it is worth remarking that Jefferson once again made no references to any arms-
related rights other than the right of the people to be protected from standing armies. In this
light, Jefferson's letters from Paris advocating a bill of rights make an interesting contrast to his
letter to his young nephew describing the sporting benefits of shooting. Individualist
interpreters of the Second Amendment may be fond of citing such maxims in praise of sport
shooting as evidence that the framers favored a right to keep weapons for private purposes, but
as the just-quoted language reflects, in a political context relating to the establishment of legal
rights, such as the debate on whether to propose constitutional amendments, Jefferson's
discourse on arms remained focused firmly on the old Whig militia/army paradigm, and hence
directed squarely to the collective purpose of preservation of the militia.
383. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 134-59.
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was attainment of a bill of rights. Although originally somewhat
hesitant, Madison was by now firmly convinced that a series of
amendments would serve felicitously to round out the work begun at
Philadelphia. Several events explain his change of heart.
In the first place, his election to Congress had been hard-fought.
Arch-Antifederalist Patrick Henry had used his influence in the
Virginia General Assembly to thwart Madison's bid for the Senate, and
then backed the candidacy of James Monroe in Madison's congressional
district, all the while branding Madison a foe of amendments.
384
Madison owed his narrow victory in part to assurances he gave his
constituents that he would back amendments.3"5 More importantly, he
felt duty-bound to honor implicit guarantees to Antifederalists made by
the Virginia and other ratifying conventions that a bill of rights would
follow ratification.386 More fundamentally still, from the perspective of
political theory, his trans-Atlantic exchange of letters with Jefferson had
brought Madison around to principled belief in the desirability of a bill
of rights.87 And from the standpoint of political tactics, Madison was
eager to move forward on the amendments as quickly as possible,
fearing that delay would stir discontent among the late antifederal
opposition and lend credence to calls for a disruptive, and perhaps fatal,
second convention.
388
Thus, on May 4, 1789, Madison informed the House that he
intended "to bring on the subject of amendments to the constitution" on
May 25.389 This shrewd move stole much of the antifederal thunder and
sapped some of the urgency from Theodorick Bland's May 5
introduction of a Patrick Henry-engineered application by the Virginia
General Assembly for a second convention,390 and from a similar
application by New York read the following day.391 But on the whole,
Congress was more concerned with legislation setting up the new
government and righting the nation's finances than with securing a bill
of rights. Consequently, members devoted most of their time through
the first summer session to selecting a permanent seat of government,
establishing executive departments and the judiciary, and hammering
384. See id. at 161.
385. See id.
386. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-41 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789) (state-
ment of James Madison in the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789).
387. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 68, at 440.
388. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 163.
389. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 257 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
390. See id. at 258-60.
391. See id. at 282.
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out the schedule of tariff rates. As Congressman James Jackson from
Georgia reasoned, "Without we pass the collection bill we can get no
revenue, and without revenue the wheels of Government cannot
move."
3 92
Madison, however, kept a bill of rights firmly in view. With
Antifederalists outside Congress again mounting calls for a second
convention, Madison intervened decisively on June 8 to redirect
Congress's attentions to the amendments. "This day," he reminded the
House,
is the day assigned for taking into consideration the subject of
amendments to the Constitution. As I considered myself bound in
honor and in duty to do what I have done on this subject, I shall
proceed to bring the amendments before you as soon as possible,
and advocate them until they shall be finally adopted or rejected by
a constitutional majority of this House.3 93
Considerable effort was required for Madison to convince his colleagues
to lay aside other pressing business and consider constitutional
amendments. But Madison was a great persuader. As Chief Justice
Marshall recalled years later, if eloquence included the art of
"persuasion by convincing, then Mr. Madison was the most eloquent
man I ever heard.
'394
In this spirit, Madison reassured members that he was "sorry to be
accessory to the loss of a single moment of time by the House. '39 He
accommodated them by yielding his motion that Congress sit in a
Committee of the Whole to consider amendments. In its place, he
urged that "a select committee be appointed to consider and report such
amendments as are proper for Congress to propose to the Legislatures
of the several States, conformably to the fifth article of the
constitution. 3 96 And he pointed out that further delay would spark
suspicion that Congress was not acting in good faith. "It cannot be a
secret to the gentlemen in this House," he reminded members,
that, notwithstanding the ratification of this system of Govern-
ment ... yet still there is a great number of our constituents who
are dissatisfied with it .... We ought not to disregard their
inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to
392. Id. at 442; see also id. at 446-48 (comments of Congressman Vining during the debates
of June 8, 1789).
393. Id. at 441.
394. SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 162 (quoting John Marshall).




their wishes and expressly declare the great rights of man-
kind .... 397
Madison then read his proposed amendments into the record.3 98
These were based on his review of the long lists of suggested
amendments submitted from the state conventions, the bills of rights
embodied in the state constitutions, the English Bill of Rights of 1689,
and a stream of letters and reports from citizens and congressmen. He
also had access to a widely circulated pamphlet compiling the
amendments proposed by Virginia, North Carolina, and four other
states, to which he referred in a letter to Jefferson.3 99 But he relied most
heavily on the Virginia recommendations. 400 Madison contemplated at
this stage a series of clauses integrated into relevant portions of the
organic text of the Constitution, but Roger Sherman's well-thought
argument in favor of the separate catalogue we know today eventually
won out before the full House.
40 1
Madison's original draft of what we know as the Second
Amendment was incorporated along with (in order) the precursors of
the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendments in
a lengthy provision to be inserted into Article I, Section 9 between
Clauses 3 and 4, placing further express limitations on the powers of
Congress. It provided, "The right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the
best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.
'402
After renewed debate on the advisability and timing of
amendments, the House ignored Madison's tactical concession to form
a select committee and voted instead to go into Committee of the
Whole to consider amendments to the Constitution.40 3 This appeared
finally to short-circuit the drive for a second convention, but another six
weeks passed without members taking any action. On July 21, Madison
again "begged the House to indulge him in the further consideration of
amendments," and go into Committee of the Whole in accordance with
the motion of June 8.404 This time, the House voted instead to send
397. Id. at 449.
398. See id. at 450-53.
399. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 16, 18.
400. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 165.
401. See id. at 173.
402. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
403. See id. at 467-68.
404. Id. at 685.
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Madison's motion along with the amendments proposed by various
states to a Select Committee consisting of one member from each
state.401 Madison was named as the representative from Virginia, and he
exercised persuasive influence over the committee during its week-long
proceedings.
The Select Committee reported on July 28, but the report was
ordered to lie on the table.406 It followed Madison's scheme of weaving
amendments into the fabric of the seven articles of 1787, and in
substance remained essentially faithful to Madison's original June 8
proposal. The Select Committee did however alter the text of the
future Second Amendment in four respects. It reversed the order of the
militia and right to bear arms clauses, so that the ringing endorsement of
the "well regulated militia" moved to the beginning of the text, where it
remains in the version ratified by the states. The committee also
inserted a seven-word qualification of the militia, characterizing it as
"composed of the body of the people," and deleted Madison's
stipulation that the militia be "well armed." Most significantly, the
Select Committee substituted "State" for "country" as the referent of
the "best security" clause, so that the proposed amendment now
addressed more directly antifederal solicitude for state security. Finally,
the committee draft dropped the qualifier "in person," from the
conscientious objector provision, suggesting that religious pacifists
might well have a constitutional right not only to avoid militia duty, but
to avoid paying for a substitute as well.4°7
Not until August 13 did the House finally resolve itself into
Committee of the Whole to consider the Select Committee report.408
Congress parsed, refined, and partitioned the fifteen proposed
substantive amendments. Ultimately, twelve were approved by both
houses, and ten ratified by the states.4 0 On its course to passage, the
405. See id. at 690.
406. See id. at 699.
407. The Select Committee draft provided in full that "A well regulated militia, composed
of the body of the people, being the best security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed, but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to
bear arms." SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, app.B at 235-36.
408. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730-44 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
409. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 184, 186. The first of the proposed amendments,
requiring periodic congressional reapportionment to ensure small constituencies, failed to gain
the approval of three-fourths of the existing states. See id. The second proposed amendment,
preventing congressional pay raises from taking effect during the life of a sitting Congress, also
fell short originally. See id. But after lying dormant until the 1980s, the proposed amendment
was revived and finally ratified in 1992, becoming the Twenty-seventh Amendment 203 years
after submission to the states. Ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment owed much to
the efforts of Gregory Watson, a Texas college student who embarked upon a letter writing
20001 499
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
draft of the Second Amendment 410 emerged unscathed from debates in
the full House, but was pruned by the Senate, which deleted the
conscientious objector clause.411  Both chambers rejected other
proposed changes and, in the process, cast considerable light on the
Amendment's intended meaning.
On August 17, 1789, the full House opened debate on the Second
Amendment. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, a delegate to the
Philadelphia Convention who had refused to sign the Constitution,
objected immediately to the conscientious objector clause Madison had
drafted.412 Gerry's hostility arose not from any contempt for those of
tender conscience-in fact he proposed replacing the draft language
with a clause more narrowly tailored to protect exclusively those
belonging to religious sects scrupulous of bearing arms-but from his
arch-antifederal and republican principles. Gerry feared that the
proposed clause would empower the federal government to declare per
se rules as to conscientious ineligibility, thereby excluding whole groups
from military service and effectively disarming the militia. "I am
apprehensive," Gerry told the House, "that this clause would give an
opportunity to the people in power to destroy the constitution itself.
They can declare who are the religiously scrupulous, and prevent them
from bearing arms.
'413
"What, sir, is the use of a militia?" he next asked the Speaker. "It
is," Gerry continued in answer to his own question,
to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty.
Now, it must be evident, that, under this provision, together with
their other powers, Congress could take such measures with respect
to a militia, as to make a standing army necessary. Whenever
Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of the people,
they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an army
upon their ruins. This was actually done by Great Britain at the
commencement of the late Revolution.... The Assembly of
campaign on behalf of the proposed amendment in 1981, and in due course persuaded enough
governors and state legislators of the amendment's merits to secure its passage. See RAKOVE,
supra note 179, at 192 n.12.
410. The familiar Second Amendment was the fifth of seventeen amendments submitted by
the House to the Senate, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, app.C at 238-40, and the fourth of the
twelve amendments proposed by Congress for ratification, see id. app.D at 242-44. It appeared
second among the catalogue of ten amendments ratified in 1791 because the two proposals atop
the list submitted to the states in 1789 failed to attain ratification along with the rest of the Bill
of Rights. See supra note 409 and accompanying text. For the sake of convenience, we shall
refer to the proposed amendment as the draft of the Second Amendment throughout the
remainder of this paper.
411. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 183.
412. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
413. Id.
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Massachusetts, seeing the rapid progress that administration were
making to divest them of their inherent privileges, endeavored to
counteract them by the organization of the militia; but they were
always defeated by the influence of the Crown.
414
At this point, Gerry's monologue on political theory was
interrupted by Mr. Seney of Maryland, who "wished to know what
question there was before the committee, in order to ascertain the point
upon which the gentleman was speaking. '415 Gerry soon cut to the
chase. "Now, if we give a discretionary power to exclude those from
militia duty who have religious scruples, we may as well make no
provision on this head [i.e., for preserving the militia from federal
destruction.] ' '416 Discretionary authority to declare whole segments of
the population ineligible for service would vitiate the militia, or at the
very least sap its republican character. Gerry wished, therefore, "the
words to be altered so as to be confined to persons belonging to a
religious sect scrupulous of bearing arms. ''417 The motion lost by two
votes in the House,418 which carried the Amendment as reported. Later,
at the Senate's insistence, the conscientious objector clause was struck
in its entirety by the House-Senate conference, and it formed no part of
the Amendment eventually submitted for ratification.
4 9
The whole tenor of the House debates indicates clearly that the
framers sought to protect the constitutional status of the militia rather
than a personal liberty to carry arms for private purposes. Consider the
example of Congressman Benson of New York, who objected to the
conscientious objector clause for reasons quite distinct from those
articulated by Gerry. "No man can claim this indulgence of right,"
Benson maintained. "It may be a religious persuasion, but it is no
natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the
Government. '420  Benson, like Madison, was concerned that the
Constitution not become cluttered with guarantees of rights that were
not fundamental to political liberty, and which would therefore
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 779. Gerry's specter of selective disarmament under the guise of coerced
conscientious objection remained plausible in late-eighteenth-century America, in part because
religious tests for office excluding Catholics (and in some instances certain sectarians) from
government posts persisted in various states and in England. See MILLER, supra note 202, at
108.
417. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
418. See id. at 780.





routinely require balancing against other rights and the demands of
sound government. "If this stands part of the constitution," Benson
continued, "it will be a question before the Judiciary42 on every
regulation you make with respect to the organization of the militia,
whether it comports with this declaration or not. It is extremely
injudicious to intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals.' '422 If the
rights of conscientious objectors were not constitutionalized in part
because they were not considered fundamental, then certainly the
putative right to arm oneself for private purposes--which, although
favored by a few radicals outside Congress, 4 23 was not even reported by
the House Select Committee -remained beyond the scope of the
Second Amendment passed by both houses and sent to the states for
ratification.
A second failed motion by Elbridge Gerry affords additional
evidence of the framers' military understanding of the Second
Amendment. Gerry thought the first part of the Amendment phrased
ambiguously, and feared that "[a] well regulated militia being the best
security of a free State, admitted an idea that a standing army was a
secondary one. '424 This motion, however, was not seconded. Probably,
less radical members considered Article I, Section 10, Clause 342  an
421. Note that fourteen years before Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
Benson takes for granted judicial review and the invalidation of "regulations" (i.e., statutes) that
violate the proposed amendment. The case that judicial review of state and federal legislation
was envisioned by the framers in 1787, and that Justice Marshall did not, therefore, create the
mechanism from whole cloth in 1803, is argued in detail by Jack N. Rakove in The Origins of
Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1038, 1040-41, 1047-48, 1050
(1997).
422. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789). It must be
emphasized that Benson, like Gerry, was not hostile to conscientious objectors, but rather
believed their rights ill suited to constitutional protection. Thus, Benson continued on from the
passage quoted above to inform the House that "I have no reason to believe but the Legislature
will always possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so
desirous of; but they ought to be left to their discretion." Id.
423. A private right to possess weapons for purposes broader than military service
numbered among the amendments proposed by the New Hampshire Ratifying Convention, see
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 338, at 181, and a one man "minority" of the
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, see Wills, supra note 72, at 65-66; see also supra notes 345-47
and accompanying text. Samuel Adams moved the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention to
propose a broadly based, private right to arms amendment to Congress, but Adams's motion
was rejected. See WELLS, supra note 69, at 267.
424. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
425. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. It is interesting that "troops"
so evidently referred to standing armies only and not to militia, and that Antifederalists made
no effort to seize on the just-quoted constitutional language as evidence of a conspiracy to
disarm the states and set up a national army of dangerous proportions. That "troops" implied
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ample guarantee against states maintaining independent standing
armies. It may also be that Gerry's reference to a standing army as a
secondary source of "State" security invoked in members' eyes a federal
rather than a provincial regular force, serving ostensibly to secure either
individual member states or the whole Union. If Gerry did mean to
imply that neither states nor the Union should have the protection of
any federal regulars whatsoever, this was further than any of his
colleagues wished to push the anti-army issue. That principal, at least as
a matter of absolutes, had already been settled in favor of the
Federalists by ratification of the Philadelphia Constitution. For
antifederal members of the First Congress, the real military question on
both the constitutional and policy level now centered on ensuring a
significant role for the historic militia so as to minimize the dangers of
the army. And in this light, Gerry's failed amendment-whether it
referred to state or federal armies-only enhances the impression that
the issue before Congress was the protection of political liberties from
the baneful effects of a military establishment.
Another indication that the House considered the Second
Amendment a public surety against the abuses of a large standing army
rather than a private allowance to keep weapons for personal purposes
emerges from the debate to amend its text to require two-thirds consent
by both houses for setting up a standing army during peacetime. While
Gerry received no floor support for his thinly veiled suggestion that the
Constitution be amended to bar standing armies entirely, Erasmus
Burke of South Carolina felt bold enough to essay a slightly less radical
proviso. Burke proposed that
[any] standing army of regular troops in time of peace is dangerous
to public liberty, and such shall not be raised or kept up in time of
peace but from necessity, and for the security of the people, nor
then without the consent of two-thirds of the members present of
both Houses; and in all cases the military shall be subordinate to
the civil authority. 426
standing, kept, paid soldiers as opposed to civilian militia can be seen in Hamilton's usage in
The Federalist No. 25:
The Bill of Rights of that State [Pennsylvania] declares that standing armies are
dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania,
nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in
one or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability
will keep them up as long as there is an appearance of danger to the public peace.
THE FEDERALIST No. 25, supra note 276, at 195.
426. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
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This amendment to the Amendment failed by a margin of thirteen
votes, 427 but no one disagreed with Burke's implied point that the militia
served as a hedge against the army establishment. Instead, Hartley of
Pennsylvania objected that super-majority provisions were
undemocratic,428  and Vining of Delaware protested that the
Amendment had just been approved and thus was no longer subject to
debate.
429
Notwithstanding the fact that the House had already voted to
approve the Select Committee version of the proposed Amendment,
debate was rejoined concerning the conscientious objector clause on
August 20, 1789. The speeches of two members, Thomas Scott of
Pennsylvania and Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, are memorialized in
the Annals. Boudinot favored retaining the conscientious objector
provision on grounds of religious liberty and out of concern that
unwilling citizens not be compelled to go to war.430 Scott, meanwhile,
returned to the theme sounded three days earlier by Gerry and
expressed fears that under the proposed clause, conscientious objectors
could "neither be called upon for their services, nor [could] an
equivalent be demanded.
'431
427. See id. at 781.
428. See id. at 780.
429. See id. The draft sent by the House to the Senate on August 24, 1789, read in full:
ARTICLE THE FIFTH. A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the
People, being the best security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear
arms, shall not be infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be
compelled to render military service in person.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, app.C at 239. The phrase "composed of the body of the People,"
like the conscientious objector clause, was pruned by the Senate. Generally, the upper house
tightened and consolidated the text of the amendments, and it may have considered the "body
of the People" clause a redundant reference to the militia. Alternatively, the Senate may not
have wished to trample on the power of the states to determine who would be born on the
militia rolls, although Congress ultimately took steps in that direction by specifying age
requirements for service in the Militia Act of 1792, acting, presumably, under its Article I power
to organize the Militia. It seems worth noting that the plainest meaning, and the most
neglected, of the right entitlement under the Second Amendment may well go directly to the
issue of who may be born, or to put it more clearly, who may be excluded, from the militia rolls.
In other words, the right to keep and bear arms, taken seriously, to use Professor Van Alstyne's
phrase, could well have much more to do with whether gays are constitutionally entitled to serve
in the National Guard or even the Reserves without fear of status-based federal disqualification
than with whether good ole boys may stockpile AK-47s in the barn without interference by the
ATF. This dimension of the Second Amendment, for all its amenability to the "rights talk" and
rights-based jurisprudence more typical of the other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights,
is not discussed by other commentators, and to our knowledge has never been raised in court,
for which reasons it is not part of the debate of this Symposium, and for which reasons we
neglect to say more about it here.
430. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
431. Id.
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Under such circumstances, Scott warned, "a militia can never be
depended upon. This would lead to the violation of another article in
the constitution, which secures to the people the right of keeping arms,
and in this case recourse must be had to a standing army. '432 Now, if
"the right of keeping arms," as Scott calls it, referred to a right of
keeping weapons for purposes other than serving in the militia, it is
difficult to see how that right could be violated by exempting Quakers
and other professing pacifistic sectarians from the right and obligation
of militia service. Quite the contrary, excusing objectors from militia
duty would have no impact whatsoever on any individualistic and
private right to weapons possession for personal purposes. At the same
time, it is not at all clear that violating a right to weapons possession for
private, nonmilitary purposes would so weaken the militia's manpower
pool as to require creation of a large standing army to defend the
nation. Scott, clearly, must have had militia service in mind when he
spoke of the "right of keeping arms."
To be sure, a single legislator's comments cannot define the elusive
contours of a legislature's intent.433 But placing Scott's comments in
their proper context is enlightening precisely because Scott's remarks
have been cited glibly for the proposition that there is "another article
in the constitution, which secures to the people the right of keeping
arms," in order to suggest that the militia-focused right enshrined in the
Second Amendment can be divorced from an entirely distinct, private
right to arms.434 On closer inspection, this turns out to be a highly
contrived construction. Scott differentiates not between separate
constitutional protections for rights to arms for public and private
purposes, but between the right to arms for public purposes and the
proposed right of conscientious objection. His concern was that
constitutional protection for objector status would undermine the sense
of public duty and obligation that alone rendered the right to arms
meaningful. As Scott explained, he did not consider conscientious
objection a constitutional right at all, but rather a question of policy for
state legislatures:
I conceive it ... to be a legislative right altogether. There are many
sects I know, who are religiously scrupulous in this respect; I do not
mean to deprive them of any indulgence the law affords; my design
is to guard against those who are of no religion. It has been urged
432. Id.
433. For a classic statement of the argument that legislative intent is generally unascer-
tainable, see SCALIA, supra note 110, at 32, passim.
434. See, e.g., Shalhope, supra note 98, at 611.
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that religion is on the decline; if so, the argument is more strong in
my favor, for when the time comes that religion should be
discarded, the generality of persons shall have recourse to these
pretexts to get excused from bearing arms. 435
Again, one is hard-pressed to imagine godless pacifists or shirkers
feigning Quakerism in hopes of being excused from the exercise of their
constitutional right to keep weapons for hunting or shooting burglars.
Indeed, a review of the House debates makes clear that no issues
relating to self-defense or hunting were contemplated in the context of
the future Second Amendment. Twelve members spoke,436 airing their
differences over a variety of topics, principally the advisability of
affording constitutional protection to religious objection. No one spoke
for the unleavened virtue of standing armies, or for a right to arms for
private purposes, or for a right to carry arms for any purpose other than
service in the state militia or in the federalized militia called up into
national service.
Our knowledge of proceedings in the Senate is far more sketchy,
because the Senate's affairs were conducted behind closed doors until
1794, and no official record of Senate debates was kept until thereafter.
Even Senator William Maclay's journal, generally a source of useful
information and lively opinion on Senate debates during the First
Congress, falls silent on the Bill of Rights, as the Pennsylvanian spent
much of September 1789 in his sickbed lambasting the Federalists and
bewailing the Quaker State's fading chances of becoming the
permanent seat of government.437 We do know from the bare-bones
account in the Senate Journal438 that the Senate joined the House in
rejecting a motion to restrict the powers of Congress to maintain a
standing army during time of peace, and that the Senate parted
company with the House in rejecting the conscientious objector
provision that had engendered so much debate among the
representatives. 439  In addition, the Senate struck the "body of the
people" tag that the House Select Committee had appended to its
435. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
436. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, Egbert Benson of
New York, Thomas Hartley and Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey,
John Vining of Delaware, Joshua Seney and Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland, William Smith
and Aedanus Burke of South Carolina, and James Jackson of Georgia. See id. at 778-80, 796.
437. See THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY, reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 143-55 (Kenneth R.
Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988).
438. The Senate Journal coverage of proceedings related to the Bill of Rights is reprinted in
2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 419, at 1147-57.
439. See id. at 1146.
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description of the militia as the "best security of a free state," 440 which
description the Senate then recast as "necessary to the security of a free
state. "441
But the Senate also took up at least one proposed change not
considered in the other house. The Senate considered a motion to
insert "for the common defence" between "bear arms" and "shall not"
in the bear arms clause. 42  Had this motion carried, the Amendment
would have read in full: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms for
the common defence shall not be infringed." The motion to insert this
four-word qualifier failed,443 however, and interpreters favoring a
private right reading of the Second Amendment are much inclined to
argue that the Senate's decision not to include this "common defence"
provision suggests that the drafters had private, personal defense in
mind.44
There are, however, at least two other explanations for the Senate's
decision to reject the proposed insertion, and they more nearly reflect
what we know about the Senate's general approach to the Bill of Rights
and the antifederal mandate for amendments than does the
individualists' model. First, the Senate's revision of the House draft of
the Bill of Rights focused on efficiency. According to the editor of the
Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, "the Senate performed the
important job of tightening up the language of the House version,
striking out surplus wording and provisions." 445  Indeed, the Senate
trimmed the Bill of Rights from seventeen to twelve amendments, and
in the process cut its overall length by some thirty percent.446  This
440. See id. at 1122, 1149. The deletion of the "body of the People" clause is discussed supra
note 429.
441. See id. at 1154.
442. See id. at 1153-54.
443. See id. at 1154.
444. See Wills, supra note 72, at 63-64. As Wills explains:
The Standard Modelers draw on an argument made by Steven Halbrook, an argument
often cited by the NRA: "The Senate specifically rejected a proposal to add 'for the
common defense' after 'to keep and bear arms,' thereby precluding any construction
that the right was restricted to militia purposes and to common defense against foreign
aggression or domestic tyranny."
Id. (citing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984)).
445. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 419, at 1145.
446. Cf SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, app.C at 238-41 (Amendments Passed by House of
Representatives, Aug. 24, 1789); id. app.D at 242-44 (Amendments Passed by Senate, Sept. 9,
1789). It must be acknowledged, however, that the Senate trimmed not merely with a view to
efficiency (although this was its overriding purpose). House-reported substantive provisions,
among them the conscientious objector clause, see id. app.C at 239, and an amendment binding
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concern to prune away excess verbiage from the House-reported bill of
rights hardly suggests that senators would have wished to burden the
pending Second Amendment with surplusage of their own creation,
given that invocation of arms bearing in the militia already clearly
proclaimed a common purpose to eighteenth-century ears. By saying
that the right protected in the proposed Amendment was that of bearing
arms, the drafters invoked terms of art with an unambiguously
collective reference, and had no need to repeat themselves by saying the
Amendment targeted the common defense.447
Quite apart from these considerations of efficiency and
redundancy, inserting a reference to the "common defence" would have
introduced an element of inconsistency into a provision already linked
in its first clause to the "security" of a "free State." There is little doubt
that militia service in units assigned to stand against invading troops or
hostile Indian tribes would be constitutionally protected by language
guarding "the right to bear arms for the common defence." But what of
service with militia units under governors' orders to suppress
insurrection, quell a riot, or remain trained so that army expansion need
not become necessary? Bearing arms in these instances would be
constitutionally sanctioned by language describing the militia as a
requisite of state "security," but if arms bearing were qualified as
necessary only to the "common defence," the very concerns at the heart
of the Antifederalist crusade would be no better off than before the Bill
of Rights. The Antifederalist mandate, after all, focused on the militia
precisely because it served as a protective force on the state level, 448 and
localism remained a close corollary of anti-army principles to the more
Whiggish members of the First Congress.
Without a record of the Senate debates, any analysis of Senate
intent must remain part speculation. Still, it is well to keep in mind that
senators-then far more than now-considered theirs the states' rather
than the peoples' chamber, and in that regard, senators perceived their
primary responsibility as protection of state rather than popular
the states to respect what have become known as "First Amendment freedoms" and the right to
jury trial in criminal cases, see id. app.C at 240, were also deleted.
447. See Wills, supra note 72, at 64, 68, passim; see also discussion infra pp. 593-94 (discussing
the phrase "bear arms" as a term of legal art with a pointed military reference).
448. See, e.g., Gerry's Convention-floor indictment of proposed federal militia powers: "This
power in the [United States] as explained is making the States drill-sergeants. [I] had as lief let
the Citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed, as to take the command from the States, and subject
them to the Genl Legislature. It would be regarded as a system of Despotism." 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 331, at 385.
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interests. 419 The Senate, after all, was revising an amendment aimed at
least in part at preserving a degree of state authority over the militia, or,
at the very least, at ensuring that state militia should not be left
unarmed unless the states severally chose to leave them so. In this
context, senators could not have forgotten that in provisions of the
Articles of Confederation relating to the militia, the terms "common
defence" had been used to mean joint state action under federal control
to defend collectively the Unites States. 450 With this background in
view, a state-militia-focused reading of the Senate's rejection of the
"common defence" insertion is reinforced by reference to the above-
mentioned substitution of "State" for "country" in the House Select
Committee draft of the Second Amendment. 4 1 When the militia was
labeled the best security of a free "country," it seemed to have an
exclusively national purpose, but when redefined as the best security of
a free "State," its local purpose was clearly preserved. The Senate, of
course, rearranged the clause to read "necessary to the security of a free
State," thereby retaining, and emphasizing, the pointed local reference.
Linked to the House switch from "country" to "State," the Senate's
rejection of the "common defence" clause thus reflects an Amendment
concerned with federalism, and the preservation of states' capacities to
defend themselves against disorder, insurrection, and invasion
whenever the national government should refrain from acting or find
itself unable to act under the federal military or militia powers.
Much of this Article has been devoted to exploration of the
original meaning and context of the terms of the Second Amendment.
"Bearing arms" and "Militia," in particular, were freighted in the late
eighteenth century with significance not perhaps apparent at a first
casual examination in our own time.452  In large measure, this
significance becomes understandable only in the light of detailed
examination of the rich, textured intellectual history in which those
terms existed. Yet, in the end, only the language written into the final
version of the Amendment -passed by both houses and ratified by the
states-remains binding. While little discussion of eighteenth-century
context and theory will be entirely off point, many of the ideas long
associated with arms or the militia did not work their way into the
words finally expressing the right to bear arms that comes down to us
449. Cf. RAKOVE, supra note 305, at 57-70.
450. See Wills, supra note 72, at 64.
451. See supra text accompanying notes 402-07.
452. See Wills, supra note 72, at 65-67.
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today. And notwithstanding citations by "standard modelers 453 to
English game-law cases 454 and the Address and Reasons of Dissent of
the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania,455 one of these related
constructs not codified into the Second Amendment was the right to
keep arms for private purposes.
Some radicals out of Congress, such as Samuel Adams in the
Massachusetts convention, had sought to join that very issue.456
Formulations that would have constitutionalized such a right were
readily available. 457 Yet they were not only rejected by the drafters,458
they were not even raised in the House debates. We are left instead
with the single sentence of Madison's-rearranged, 459 culled, 460 and, in
two instances, altered461 -giving us the familiar Second Amendment
ratified in 1791. Understanding its terms, and its terms only, in the light
of then-familiar usage and theory, a right serving a collective, essentially
453. Champions of an unfettered constitutional right to weapons possession, although
actually insurgent revisionists, and most typically not affiliated with academic institutions or
with any other organ of orthodox constitutional history, quite uniformly label their
interpretation of the Second Amendment the "standard model." For an insightful discussion of
this phenomenon, see id. at 62.
454. See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note 99, at 309-13.
455. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Introduction to Gun Control and the Constitution, in 1 GUN
CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND
AMENDMENT, at ix, xvi (Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1993). The Address and Reasons of Dissent of
the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents is discussed supra notes
345-47 and accompanying text.
456. Adams proposed denying Congress the power to prevent "the people of the United
States who are peaceable citizens from keeping their own arms." WELLS, supra note 69, at 267.
457. See, for example, the proposal of the New Hampshire Ratifying Convention that
"Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion."
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 338, at 181.
458. Nearly one hundred different substantive provisions were suggested by the eight state
ratifying conventions to submit official and/or unofficial minority proposals. See SCHWARTZ,
supra note 329, at 157. As Professor Schwartz has emphasized:
Madison's job as draftsman of the Federal Bill of Rights was [not] that of [a] mere
compiler. On the contrary... Madison was able to play a most important creative
role. He had to choose from the myriad of state proposals those which were worthy of
being raised to the federal constitutional level. He also had to refine their language, so
that the Federal Bill of Rights would be, at the same time, both an eloquent inventory
of basic rights and a legally enforceable safeguard of those rights.
Id. at 159. And in the case of the right to arms for nonmilitary purposes proposed by New
Hampshire and in the Address of the (one man?) Pennsylvania minority, Madison and the
Congress pointedly opted against inclusion.
459. The House Select Committee reversed the order of the militia and bear arms clauses.
See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
460. The House Select Committee deleted the qualification that the militia be "well armed,"
see supra note 407 and accompanying text, while the Senate struck the conscientious objector
clause, see supra text accompanying note 419.
461. The House Select Committee replaced "free country" with "free State," see supra note
407 and accompanying text, while the Senate rephrased "being the best security of" as "being
necessary to the security of," see SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 242.
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republican purpose emerges: a right of the people of the states and of
the Union to keep and bear arms in the militia-for federal purposes
when duly required under the Constitution, and for state purposes when
federal demands fall silent. The Amendment's introductory clause,
meanwhile, leaves us with a wish, expressed in precatory words, by
which our constitutional testators implored their heirs to rely, to the
extent possible, on the citizen militia rather than on a corruptible
standing army, and by which they defined expressly the context that
gives meaning to the right the Amendment secures.
II. FROM MILITIA TO NATIONAL GUARD
We have argued that the text of the Second Amendment and the
historical context in which that text was articulated point decisively to
the conclusion that, to the framers, the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms depended on maintenance of a viable militia. We
now turn to the history of the American militia during the two
centuries following ratification. Our objective is to ascertain whether
the militia contemplated by the framers has changed so
fundamentally as to alter the contemporary legal significance of the
constitutional provision designed to protect that militia from undue
federal encroachment. We should emphasize that we do not say that
change-change in the meaning of referents of words or in the social
context of their utterance-necessarily undermines meaning or saps
an expressed precept of force or effect in the altered circumstances.
As we develop more fully in Part III below, we mean to say only that
when the purpose of a constitutional right is expressed directly in the
Constitution, there may come a point in the evolution of an object or
institution where the original edict can no longer be applied without
fundamental rewriting and unacceptable divergence from the
contemplated purpose. Our mission here is to examine the institution
of "the militia" to determine whether it has evolved so far that the
eighteenth-century term can no longer be applied to the modern
version without a fatal distortion of meaning. Crucial to our
understanding of this evolution of the militia is a comparison of the
context in which the militia functioned at the framing and that in
which it operates now.
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A. The Decay of the Old Militia, 1789-1840
1. Federalism and the Militia: Attempts at National Revival under
Federalists and Jeffersonians
In the years 1789-91, the operational role of the militia reflected
the military dualism of the founders, who envisioned both a smallish
standing army and a serviceably effective militia, each held in check by
the federal structure. Writing for a unanimous Court in Perpich v.
Department of Defense,461 Justice Stevens aptly summarized the
ideological bipolarity at the heart of the nation's early constitutional and
statutory military law:
Two conflicting themes, developed at the Constitutional
Convention and repeated in debates over military policy during the
next century, led to a compromise in the text of the Constitution
and in later statutory enactments. On the one hand, there was a
widespread fear that a national standing Army posed an intolerable
threat to individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate
States, while, on the other hand, there was a recognition of the
danger of relying on inadequately trained soldiers as the primary
means of providing for the common defense.4 63
As developed above, the constitutional compromise described by
Justice Stevens authorized a federal army under executive command
but dependent on Congress for biannual appropriations, and
simultaneously established federal authority to prescribe militia training
and equipment and to call the militia into federal service for limited
purposes.4 64 Two years later, the Second Amendment reflected its
framers' aspirations that the nation rely on militia for the national
defense, and made clear that the federal government lacked the power
to disarm the state militia.465  In deference to the passion of the
Antifederalists, the Second Amendment, like other elements of the Bill
of Rights, prohibited the federal government from exercising a power
never expressed or delegated in the original seven articles of 1787.
The dualistic military theory embodied in the Constitution proved
harder to implement than to expound. As Justice Stevens noted,
"Congress was authorized both to raise and support a national Army
and also to organize 'the Militia' ... [but] [i]n the early years of the
Republic, Congress did neither.' '466 The failure to organize either citizen
462. 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990).
463. Id. (footnotes omitted).
464. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 12; id. art. II, § 2; discussion supra Part I.B.3.
465. See discussion supra pp. 500-09.
466. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 342.
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or regular soldiery resulted not from inattention or dereliction, but from
unbridgeable differences of principle between the administration and
Congress, and from culturally entrenched antimilitarism within the
public at large.
The Washington administration inherited a regular establishment
of 672 men from the Confederation. 467 With such a small regular force
available, the western frontier appeared highly vulnerable to native
attack and to British incursion from forts along the Great Lakes, which
remained in royal hands despite clear provisions of the Treaty of Paris
demanding their prompt evacuation.468 But even with strengthened
federal powers in place under the new Constitution, the nation's
Revolutionary-era republicanism lived on to speak loudly for reliance
on the common militia. In a climate of pervasive suspicion towards all
aspects of potential central military power, the Congress of 1789
confronted the dual tasks of providing for the standing army
Washington desired (if on a much smaller scale than the chief executive
thought wise) and at the same time organizing the nation's militia
pursuant to the Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the historic
expectations of the states.
469
But the first president and the First Congress were not writing
military policy on a clean slate. Throughout the Confederation period,
Washington had vainly pressed the old Congress to increase the size of
the army.470 The Confederation Congress lacked the authority to
impose the general's desires on the states, but it had resisted
Washington's suggestions for reasons of ideology as well as
impotence.47 1 Given the scope of antifederal hostility to a potentially
vigorous federal military establishment, Washington understood that
the new Congress was not likely to legislate a substantially larger army,
even if the legislature was now endowed with authority to do more than
merely ask the states for troops as its predecessor had done. Beyond
the new powers to establish and maintain an army directly, Congress
now also had the novel authority to organize the state militia for
national purposes. Here Washington hoped to encounter less
congressional resistance, and he personally urged Congress to act to
467. The Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 95, 95-96, legalizing the army inherited
from the Confederation government, confirmed an earlier act authorizing a force of 840, but
only 672 were actually in service at this time. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 89.
468. See 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON ET AL., THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
235-36 (7th ed. 1980).
469. Cf. CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 43-48, 182-84; WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 88-91.
470. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 79-80, 85-86; see also supra Part I.B.1.
471. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 81-82; see also supra Part I.B.1.
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organize the militia in August 1789.472
Congress, we have seen, was preoccupied during its first session
with establishing the revenue system and the basic administrative and
judicial machinery. 473 When Congress did take up systematization of the
militia at the opening of its second session in January 1790, members
became embroiled in controversy over "selection" or "classification.
'474
On behalf of the administration, War Secretary Knox presented to
Congress a bill to establish a select, classified national militia, grouping
the eligible population by age and requiring substantial service and
training from the youngest cadre.4 75 The administration hoped to effect
benefits equivalent to those of a sizable standing army without arousing
antifederal suspicions, but Knox's proposal quickly spawned resistance
focused on the very issues that had generated the standing army dispute
during the ratification struggle and animated the debates over the future
Second Amendment in the previous congressional session.
A select-as opposed to a common or general-militia had been a
favorite notion of Washington, War Secretary Knox, and Treasury
Secretary Hamilton since they first addressed the permanent
organization of the nation's military immediately after independence.
47 6
All three were dissatisfied with the performance of amateur soldiers
during the war and favored the creation of a substantial professional
army, but had come to realize that this goal was not politically
attainable. They therefore embraced the select militia as the next best
option. To create an effective militia, Washington and his cabinet
urged, militia soldiers required more training and discipline than could
possibly be instilled by the states mustering their entire adult male
population for a single or at best a few days each year. To bring a
better-trained militia into existence, the administration favored
classifying the nation's male population into three age-based groups
subject to differing levels of service and preparation. Under the militia
plan that Knox proposed to Congress,47  young men aged eighteen to
472. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 182-83.
473. See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
474. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 182-83.
475. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 89.
476. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 180-83; id. at 45-48 (analyzing THE FEDERALIST NOS.
24-26 (Alexander Hamilton)).
477. Henry Knox, A Plan for the General Arrangement of the Militia of the United States
(1790), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 6-13 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew
Clarke eds., 1832) [hereinafter Knox Plan]. The Knox Plan can also be found in 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. app. at 2141-61 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1790). The Knox Plan largely
traced Knox's 1786 proposal to the Confederation Congress. See WIEGLEY, supra note 8, at 89;
CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 182-84; supra discussion accompanying notes 295-99. Knox read his
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twenty were to form an "advanced corps" and train up to thirty days a
year under regular army supervision. Men from twenty-one to forty-
five would form the "main corps" and train four days a year, while men
from forty-six to sixty would form a "reserved corps.
47 8
Knox hoped to fashion a federal defense system capable of meeting
all crises, "whether arising from internal or external causes. '479 This
severe federal implement was needed, according to Knox, because
"convulsive events, generated by the inordinate pursuit of riches or
ambition, require[d] that the government should possess a strong
corrective arm. '480 Knox could not have chosen more incendiary
language. If classifying men according to age and selecting only the
youngest group for training and active service made sense in military
and economic terms, it also entailed formation of fighting bands less
firmly rooted to their communities by family and property than the
historic common militia.411 While this scheme would have mitigated the
plan aloud to Congress and lobbied hard for its adoption. During Washington's first
administration, cabinet officers followed the British practice of appearing in person before the
legislature to advocate legislation and answer questions. This practice was abandoned after the
president himself decided it would be improper to appear in person before Congress to debate
the merits of pending legislation.
478. Knox Plan, supra note 477, at 8-10.
479. Id. at 6.
480. Id.
481. A telling criticism of plans to base the nation's defense policy on a revitalized militia
focused on the economic and social dislocation associated with militia members' extended
absences from home and family. Consider Alexander Hamilton's reservations expressed in
Federalist No. 29:
To oblige the great body of the yeomanry and of the other classes of citizens to be
under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often
as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to
the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people and a
serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the
productive labor of the country to an amount which calculating upon the present
numbers of the people, would not fall far short of a million pounds. To attempt a thing
which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent would
be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long
be endured.
THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 209-10 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Knox's
classification scheme would have minimized the adverse social and economic effects of militia
duty by restricting service in the "advanced corps" to young men between 18 and 20 years of
age. At a time when 90% of the population still engaged in agricultural pursuits, men this
young were unlikely to be proprietors of their own farms or bear responsibilities for providing
for wives and children. Particularly in land-scarce New England, men often had to wait until
their late twenties before they were in a position to purchase or inherit a farm, or acquire a
parcel of land as part of a marriage settlement. See WILLIAM PENCAK, WAR, POLITICS &
REVOLUTION IN PROVINCIAL MASSACHUSETTS 201-03 (1981). Land shortage, large families
(averaging five and six children), and long-lived parents contributed to a sense of restlessness
among young New Englanders, to which circumstance several scholars have attributed
Massachusetts's leading role in the Revolution. See id. at 201. With the frontier opened for
settlement after independence in 1783, New England men streamed westwards and laid out the
new communities of western New York State and the Old Northwest. Other sons of the old
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economic disruption associated with sending heads of families and
proprietors of farms on extended training assignments or campaigns, it
also would have vested each state's military power in the group of
citizens most susceptible to demagoguery and most likely to support a
Caesarist conspiracy. Thus, classification may not have implied that the
nation would rely on a regular military establishment, but it did imply
that the militia would be less than optimally republican.
For more than two years Congress wrestled with the Knox bill and
its successors,482 but the Militia Act that finally passed into law on May
8, 1792483 embodied no meaningful resolution of the selection issue,
lacked any mechanism for federal enforcement, and therefore relied on
the states to implement a largely hortatory organizational scheme. The
Act also abandoned provisions for separation of the militia-of-the-
whole into age groups, for federally standardized training, and for
federally supervised exercises. Instead, Congress simply laid out the
organizational form of the nation's militia, dividing the force into
divisions and battalions that were in turn subdivided into regiments and
companies to match the structure of the regular force, leaving to the
states the question of what citizens would fill out these units. In
addition, the Act limited the president's power to call forth the militia
so that no one man would be called to serve for more than a maximum
of three months in any one year, and no single individual would be
burdened any more "than in due rotation with every other able-bodied
man of the same rank. '484 More importantly for our purposes, the Act
provided that citizens, for whom militia service was required, furnish
their own standard arms and equipment. The command that citizens
appear for militia duty fully armed and equipped could scarcely have
been more explicit. The Act stated
That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months
thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a
sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a
pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four
New England went to sea in trading ships and carried the Stars and Stripes to China and the far
reaches of the Globe. Within a generation, as her sons fled westwards and took to the seas,
Massachusetts was blessed with a superabundance of young women. See BOORSTIN, supra note
1, at 28-29. Leaving their parents' farms at 14 or 15, these "Lowell" girls often worked a term in
the new factory towns, where life was regimented but not unwholesome by later industrial
standards, and where the workers acquired attributes and skills deemed useful for later family
life. See id. at 29.
482. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 183.
483. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271, repealed by Dick Act, ch. 196,
32 Stat. 775 (1903).
484. Id.
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cartridges, suited to the bore of the musket or firelock, each
cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a
good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls
suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder;
and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called
out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on
company days to exercise only, he may appear without a
knapsack.
485
Similar clauses set forth standards by which officers should arm
themselves.4
Thus the Second Congress amplified the vision of the militia as the
time-honored "constitutional army''487 that had informed the First
Congress's drafting of the Second Amendment less than three years
before. The Second Amendment guaranteed the right to keep and bear
arms in the militia; the Militia Act laid down a detailed description of
the weapons militiamen must keep and bear when called to serve.
These were pointedly and unequivocally military arms ("a sufficient
bayonet and belt,... a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than
twenty-four cartridges,... each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of
powder and ball"): arms necessary for meeting the security needs of the
nation, arms falling within certain standards and regular limits defined
by Congress, and arms that were not necessarily also weapons
corresponding to each individual's sense of convenience or perceived
need to defend himself and family independent of military obligation.4
485. Id. We have already excerpted from this critical provision, see supra text accompanying
note 71, but because of the importance of this language to our argument-and because of the
number of intervening pages-it seemed convenient to quote the statute again at this stage.
486. See id.
487. See POCOCK, supra note 2, at 414, 416-17 (discussing the sacrosanct status of the
historic English county militia under the "ancient" constitution venerated by the Real Whigs);
WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 101 (describing the federalized militia President Washington led out
against the Whiskey Rebellion as the "Army of the Constitution").
488. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271, repealed by Dick Act, ch. 196,
32 Stat. 775 (1903). While the rifles described in the Act of 1792 were useful for private
purposes as well as military ones, the muskets-less expensive to acquire and far more common
than rifles among both regulars and militiamen-had little utility outside a military context
because of their notorious inaccuracy. A company arrayed along a firing line two or three tiers
deep became effective in the military parlance of the day because of "volume of fire." See
WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 21. In a crack eighteenth-century regiment, soldiers were expected
to load and fire three times per minute, but were not instructed to aim at a particular target. As
an enemy formation closed within range, it could thus expect to meet a hail of musket balls, with
one rank of a three-tiered formation firing every ten seconds. See generally PARKER, supra note
141, at 147-48. But even a good shot could not consistently hit a barn door with a musket fired
at sixty paces. Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 436. Thus, while militarily useful, a musket was not a
practical tool by late-eighteenth-century standards for hunting or even for pursuing a fleeing
felon. See id. at 439; WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 21. "Fowling pieces," more accurate but
unwieldy and less powerful than muskets, were better tools for shooting birds but fall outside
the terms of the Militia Act. See generally Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 431 n.13, 435. Likewise
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If the Militia Act of 1792 was preceptive in form, in operation it
remained little more than a catalogue of congressional exhortations to
the states. While some of the states enacted early measures seeking to
bring into effect the Act's provisions, all states had abandoned any
pretence of compliance long before the Civil War.489 The Act stayed on
the books until 1903.490  For 111 years it represented not simply the
cornerstone, but virtually the entire edifice of federal militia law,4 91 long
outlasting the military utility of the muskets, firelocks, and spare flints it
called on citizens to hold ready for the service of their states and
country. Throughout that long period, all efforts of presidents,
secretaries of war, and congressional leaders to flesh out the federal
government's regulatory oversight of the myriad state militias stalled
short of legislative fruition. Ultimately, from Knox's proposed
classification scheme, through Secretary John C. Calhoun's attempt at
centralizing reform after the repeated debacles of the War of 1812,492
the antiquated blunderbuss, which, if still in working order, remained a marginally suitable tool
for shooting an intruder in the bedroom or a would-be highway man aside one's Conestoga
wagon, if, that is, one spotted the malefactor in time to lift and fire the cumbersome trumpet
shaped relic. See generally id. at 434, 441.
489. The states were required to furnish the secretary of war with an annual report on their
militia. According to Cunliffe, "[elven from the outset the reports were scrappy, in some cases
nonexistent." CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 185. Jefferson, in his final State of the Union
address delivered on November 8, 1808, remarked to Congress, "[it is ... incumbent on us, at
every meeting, to revise the condition of the militia .... Some of the States have paid a laudable
attention to this object; but every degree of neglect is to be found among others." 9 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213, 223 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898). Delaware and
Mississippi (following its admission in 1817) routinely failed to file reports; by the 1830s, only
Massachusetts and Connecticut were reporting some semblance of an organized general militia.
See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 211. Delaware did away with fines for nonattendance at militia
musters in 1814; most states that revised their constitutions during the Jacksonian period
incorporated abolition of imprisonment for nonpayment of fines for nonattendance as part of
their new fundamental law. See id. Compulsory militia service was abolished by law in
Massachusetts in 1840; in Maine, Vermont, and Ohio in 1844; in Connecticut and New York in
1846; in Missouri in 1847; and in New Hampshire in 1851. See id.
490. See Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903).
491. The Uniform Militia Act of 1792 was supplemented by the Calling Forth Act of 1795,
which provided in part:
That whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of
invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of
the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the state, or states, most
convenient to the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to
repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose, to such officer or officers
of the militia, as he shall think proper.
Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424, 424.
492. The uncharacteristically large regular army of the War of 1812, which swelled to about
35,000 by 1814 and would have numbered over 60,000 if recruited to authorized strength, was
quickly demobilized following the Treaty of Ghent. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 120-21.
Congress scaled back the regular force to 6,000 men by 1821. Id. at 139-40. Monroe's young,
then ardently nationalistic, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun proposed a variety of precocious
reforms to render the streamlined force effective, including a peacetime general staff and a
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down to the ambitious and highly controversial selection plan proposed
by Secretary Joel R. Poinsett during Martin Van Buren's
administration,493 the same intractable dilemma thwarted every effort to
make the historic militia into a serviceable defender of American
national security: although a disorganized, undifferentiated militia that
made few financial or personal demands on the people was militarily
useless, anything more was unpalatable to voters. While some voters
remained committed to republican rhetoric, for many, the value of a
republican militia now took second place to the value of private
pursuits.494  By the time the federal government finally assumed
meaningful and effective supervision of the militia in 1903,4 91 the ancient
War Department dream of achieving effective national security through
reform or reorganization of the common militia had long been
abandoned by even the most zealous critics of a vigorous military
establishment.
496
Notwithstanding these subsequent developments, loyalty to the
common militia ideal behind the Second Amendment-and
concomitantly aversion to the establishment of an effective military,
whether professional or "selectively" amateur- remained powerful
during the early national period. Militarism seemed in those early days
anything but a chimerical danger. Numerous episodes between 1783
and 1798 highlight the stark reality behind classically republican-
inspired fears that a military coup could be directed to the subversion of
the infant republic. These incidents serve to highlight the pivotal
stabilizing function of the legitimate militia envisioned by the framers of
system of expansibility to absorb trained reserves into regular units in the event of emergency.
See id. at 141-43. Congress ignored the secretary's proposals. See id. at 142. The reforms
Calhoun envisioned were not implemented until the eve of World War I. See id. at 142-43.
493. Poinsett's plan would have divided the country into eight militia districts, each with a
force of 12,500 in active service and another 12,500 in ready reserve, giving the nation an
enormous organized militia of 200,000. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 197. Congress rejected
it out of hand. See id. at 197-99. The unpopularity of Poinsett's proposal contributed
substantially to Van Buren's defeat by William Henry Harrison in the presidential election of
1840. See id. at 198-99. Antimilitary rhetoric, broadsheets, and pamphlets-still classically
republican in tone-took a prominent place in the first stump and whistle stop campaign. See
id.
494. See id. at 184.
495. See Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903); see also detailed discussion infra notes 556-57
and accompanying text.
496. Opponents of America's expansion overseas and emergence as a colonial/military
power during the Spanish-American War generally preferred to rely on America's geographic
isolation, coastal artillery, the navy, or simply naive pacifism for security. While arguments that
citizen-soldiers were better suited to defend a democracy than career professionals were
commonplace at the turn of the twentieth century, no one then seriously argued that soldiers as





Late in the winter of 1783, the war was over. But no peace had
been ratified, and the Continental army had neither disbanded nor
received its pay. This presented a situation all too similar to that
existing at the close of the (first) English Civil War.497 A group of
disgruntled officers circulated the so-called Newburgh Addresses
through the Continental camps, threatening that the army would take
matters into its own hands if Congress did not act to rectify pressing
back pay and pension demands. Only Washington's timely address to
the officers on March 15 of that year (this was the famous "I have not
only grown gray, but almost blind in the service of my country" or
"spectacles" speech) diffused the situation short of a march on
Philadelphia.498 Later that spring, Hamilton openly suggested that the
army intervene in government, and, much to the alarm of a then ultra-
Whiggish nation, General von Steuben chose the same juncture to
announce the founding of the Society of Cincinnati, a secretive and
hereditary association of veteran officers of the Revolution that
appeared to republicans a conspiratorial first step towards the
establishment of a titled, privileged military aristocracy on the
European model.499 In June, after news of the Treaty of Paris reached
America, new recruits in Philadelphia deserted, and barricaded
Congress in the State House demanding pay and bonuses. Happily, this
mob simply dispersed when Congress bravely adjourned for the night
without acting on the soldiers' threats.5°° But before it disbanded, the
Continental army seemed poised on the brink of intervention in civil
politics and a ready tool for any aspirant dictator desiring to cow the
legislature. For precisely these reasons, newly independent Americans
feared armies and preferred entrusting their security to the less
dangerous hands of the citizen militia.
Three years after the Continental army finally decamped, Shays's
497. Cf. HILL, supra note 165, at 85-86. As Hill explains:
Parliament ... resolved on 18 February [1647] to disband the Army without making
any provision for payment of arrears or pensions for widows and orphans of those
killed in Parliament's service, or even for indemnity for illegal actions committed
under orders during the fighting. The troops might be permitted to re-enlist for service
in Ireland ... [but would receive no other compensation]. The rank and file of the
Army were at once up in arms. During March ... regiments ... appointed Agitators
or delegates to represent them.
Id. The consequent politicization of the English army (along with the intransigence of king and
Presbyterians in Parliament and revolts in the provinces) led within a year to the second civil
war. See id. at 88-97.
498. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 77-78.
499. See id. at 77; BOORSTIN, supra note 225, at 371.
500. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 78.
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Rebellion was put down (haltingly) by Massachusetts militia. But the
progress of that insurrection was facilitated when discontented
members of western county militia crossed over to the rebels and
assisted in the seizure of the Continental arsenal at Springfield. 50 This
evidence of the militia's unreliability sparked the Federalist movement
that led to the Constitutional Convention and ultimately to the rise of
the Federalist Party.52 But if suspicions of the archdemocratic militia
gave rise to Hamiltonian federalism in the 1780s, so too suspicions of a
Caesarist federal military helped usher in Jeffersonian Republicanism in
the 1790s.5 0 3 Washington himself led the federalized militia that put
down the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, but he was visibly worn and aged,
and the prospect of his lieutenant Hamilton at the head of the 13,000
strong "constitutional army" 5°4 marching through Pennsylvania alarmed
even moderates.5 05
In 1798, President Adams called on Pennsylvania militia and 500
regulars to put down another tax revolt, this time instigated by
Revolutionary veteran John Fries who led western Pennsylvania's
resistance to revenue officers' attempts to collect a "window tax"
designed to finance an enormous army to fight the quasi-war with
France. Adams showed great and characteristic moderation in
pardoning Fries.506 While he is rightly celebrated as the father of the
navy, the second president remained at heart a Whiggish and historicist
common lawyer, distrustful of over-large standing armies and
committed to constitutional rule, no matter how much he resented the
principles and tactics of the opposition. We cannot say the same of his
erstwhile colleague Hamilton. The former treasury secretary had been
disgraced by sex scandal and departed from government, but as the
leader of the "High Federalists" he was the real moving force behind
the proposed army.07  Indeed, it was Hamilton's plans for an
ideologically purged army of 60,000 to fight a nonexistent war that most
agitated the republican opposition. Rumors abounded that Hamilton
intended to use the army to prevent Jefferson from taking power as the
501. See id. at 84.
502. See id.; WOOD, supra note 113, at 465,498.
503. Cf POCOCK, supra note 2, at 528.
504. See supra note 487 and accompanying text; SCHWOERER, supra note 134, at 13.
505. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 100-02.
506. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 48-49 (1992).
507. For a detailed (if somewhat hostile) account of Hamilton's scandals, resignation, and
continued influence, see generally MALONE, supra note 376, at 325-34.
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election of 1800 approached, 0 8  and republican governors in
Pennsylvania and Virginia made secret plans to countermarch their
militias on Washington. 09  Happily-although fully funded by
Congress-the enormous phantom army never assembled, and when
Adams was defeated and the electoral college convened, Hamilton
showed his better nature by endorsing the republican leader Jefferson
as a lesser evil than the "Cataline" Burr.510 As Richard Hofstadter
pointed out, this marked the first time in modern history that power
passed peacefully from one elected party to another,511 but it was
perhaps a much closer call between civil war and peaceful transition
than is generally acknowledged.
2. The Last Years of the Militia-of-the-Whole: Popular Discontent
and Government Inertia
Notwithstanding the prominence of real and imaginary regular
armies in the political crises of the 1780s and '90s, and the related
persistence of republican rhetoric focusing on the constitutional
importance of the militia, and despite the hortatory intentions
embodied in the Militia Act of 1792, compulsory universal militia
service disintegrated during the early years of the Republic. In state
after state, the militia-of-the-whole fell into disfavor and disrepute.1 2 In
the years after the Revolution, fewer and fewer men made muster on
militia days.513 One reason was the increasing number of exceptions to
the universal service obligation enacted by various state legislatures,
who by the early nineteenth century had excused from military
508. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 101-03.
509. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT, FIRST
TERM, 1801-1805, at 6-7, 10-11 (1970). There is documentary evidence that 20,000 Pennsylvania
militia were held ready to intervene in the winter of 1801, but only in the event that the electoral
college chose someone other than Jefferson or Burr as president, thereby effectively staging a
coup. See Letter from Thomas McKean to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 21, 1801), discussed in
MALONE, supra, at 10-11.
510. Hamilton, it turns out, was prophetic. A year after fatally wounding Hamilton in a duel
in Weehawken, New Jersey, former Vice President Burr did conspire to commit treason against
the Republic by handing over the old Southwest to Spain and setting himself up as a sort of
military Vice-Royal in New Orleans. He was acquitted of treason in a highly politicized trial
presided over by Chief Justice Marshall in Richmond, in part because the scheme he
orchestrated with General Wilkinson was poorly planned and ill conceived and thus not clearly
documented, but there can be little doubt as to Burr's treacherous intent. For a comprehensive
(if pro-Jeffersonian) account of the Burr treason affair, see DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND
HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT, SECOND TERM, 1805-1809, at 215-346 (1974).
511. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF
LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 128 (1969).
512. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 202-12.
513. See Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 425.
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obligation not only clergy and conscientious objectors, but such
characters as school and university teachers, students, jurors, mariners,
and ferrymen.114  While the rest of the military-aged, white male
population generally remained obligated to serve, in practice, more and
more people simply could not or did not wish to interrupt their
everyday economic activities in an increasingly bustling, productive, and
differentiated society in order to appear armed and accoutered on the
appointed muster day. In general, nonattendees not entitled to an
exemption were subject to fines on the order of ten dollars. 15 These
penalties were enforced sporadically and selectively."6 Adding to the
growing resentment many felt at the seemingly irrelevant and obsolete
service obligation was the fact that those better off could readily afford
to pay the fine for nonattendance as a sort of tax, while for the average
farmer or farmer's son, ten dollars remained a formidable burden.5"7
Class antagonism grew stronger still as the Northeast industrialized in
the first decades of the nineteenth century, and state legislatures added
factory owners and foremen to the list of exempted citizens.5' 8
Several developments during the War of 1812 hastened the demise
of the old militia. In the first place, many New Englanders resented war
with Britain and Canada. New Englanders did not hasten to make
muster with a view to invading Canada, as indeed they had hesitated to
bear arms for the purpose of enforcing first Jefferson's Embargo and
then Madison's Non-Importation Order against British trade. The
unpopularity of service in "Mr. Madison's War" helped sap the vitality
of the militia in its New England heartland, where the institution
remained more vigorous than in other parts of the nation."9 Then too,
the governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New
Hampshire, and Vermont, who had been reluctant to order their militia
to enforce the Embargo and Non-Importation Acts against Britain prior
to the war, now refused to muster their troops for an invasion of Canada
as commanded by the president.5 20 To be sure, the Constitution did not
contemplate the president ordering the militia to serve outside U.S.
borders, 21 and the president lacked clear statutory authorization for so
514. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 206-07.
515. See id. at 205. The fine is roughly equivalent to $1,000 today.
516. See id. at 205-06.
517. See id. at 205.
518. See id. at 207.
519. See id. at 202-03.
520. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 125.
521. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that "The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
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doing;5 22 but in disobeying the commander in chief instead of seeking
judicial relief, New England's chief executives flirted with treason.1
23
The constitutional crisis over gubernatorial consent to presidential call-
ups was not resolved in favor of the federal executive until the Supreme
Court's decision in Martin v. Mot524 twelve years after the war's end,
and the narrower question concerning withholding of gubernatorial
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." But the president's
powers as commander in chief of the militia remain circumscribed by the scope of Congress's
power to call the militia into federal service in the first place. Article I, Section 8, Clause 15
provides "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." The clearest exposition of
the territorial limitations of this power is Attorney General Wickersham's in his 1912 opinion
discussed infra. There, the attorney general wrote,
The plain and certain meaning and effect of this constitutional provision is to confer
upon Congress the power to call out the militia "to execute the laws of the Union"
within our own borders where, and where only, they exist, have any force, or can be
executed by any one. This confers no power to send the militia into a foreign country
to execute our laws which have no existence or force there and can not be there
executed.
29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322, 327 (1912).
522. The Calling Forth Act of 1795 (really a series of amendments to the Uniform Militia
Act of 1792) authorized the president to call up the militia when the country faced "imminent
danger of invasion." Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424, 424. According to Professor
Weigley, Governor Roger Griswold of Connecticut
asserted that militia could not lawfully be offered since the state officials knew of no
declaration by the President that an invasion had taken place. Secretary (of War)
Eustis replied that the President declared that an imminent danger of invasion existed.
Governor Griswold in turn argued that war was not invasion and the presence of a
hostile fleet off the coast represented only a "slight danger of invasion, which the
Constitution could not contemplate."
WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 125.
523. See id.
524. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). Jacob E. Mott, a private in the New York militia,
refused to obey President Madison's August 1814 order to make muster under federal
command in New York City to fight against British forces. See id. at 21-22. At a subsequent
court martial, Mott was fined $96, which he refused to pay. See id. at 36. Mott was then
sentenced to one year's imprisonment, while Martin, a U.S. Marshal, executed a forfeiture of
Mott's personal property to satisfy the fine. See id. at 23. A New York court allowed Mott to
replevin his goods from Martin, who, after an unavailing appeal to the New York Senate, which
then sat as that state's highest court of appeals, sought relief from the U.S. Supreme Court. See
id. at 28. In reversing the replevin judgment, Justice Story passed on the Calling Forth Act of
1795 and on the question of ultimate command authority over the militia. He rejected out of
hand Mott's constitutional argument that the president's judgment as to whether the danger of
invasion warranted calling forth the militia was subject to the review of state officers and
militiamen. See id. at 32-33. Executive authority, Justice Story held, could not practically be
fettered by an implied license for de novo review at each subordinate level. Presidential
authority under the Calling Forth Act was supreme, and must not be checked by the second-
guessing of any soldier or officer, including the governor of a state. See id. at 33. Thus, twelve
years after the end of the War of 1812, it was firmly settled that the New England governors had
acted unconstitutionally in refusing to follow Madison's orders to deploy their states' militia
across state lines, and that supreme command of any militia called into federal service rested
squarely with the president. See id. at 31-32. Story did not reach the question of whether the
governors might constitutionally withhold consent for presidentially ordered militia service in
foreign territory, which itself appeared facially unconstitutional.
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consent to militia service in foreign countries was not finally settled until
the Perpich case in 1990.121 More generally, the issue of the
constitutionality of militia service outside U.S. borders remained a thorn
in the side of presidents during the Mexican, Spanish, and First World
Wars as well, and continues to inform National Guard policy to this
day. 26 Over the course of the nineteenth century, uncertainty regarding
the president's ability to rely on the militia for extraterritorial service
became yet another factor contributing to the old militia's demise.
Yet no development of the second war with Britain bode less well
for the old militia than the emergence of the regulars. With a few
exceptions, the common militia acquitted itself dishonorably during the
War of 1812. Militia serving in a mixed federal/state command under
General Dearborn refused to cross the international border at Lake
Champlain preparatory to an attack against Montreal, forcing
abandonment of the American offensive in the first year of the war.127
Militia ineptitude was also a key factor in the August 1814 sacking of
Washington, as British regulars marched through a patchwork army of
seamen, handfuls of organized militia, and multitudes of untrained
common militia arrayed across the Bladensburg Road, and straight into
the capital. This spectacle, marking the low point of national
humiliation, unfolded within eyesight of a hapless and helpless
Commanding General of the Army and president of the United States,
while Secretary of State James Monroe rode about frantically giving
confusing orders.5 28  But while the British expeditionary force was
ravaging the Chesapeake, American fortunes were beginning to turn in
the far north. Along the Niagara Falls, Winfield Scott's heavily drilled
525. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 354 (1990).
526. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 183, 297, 324-25, 337-38, 340, 348-49, 401-02.
527. See id. at 120.
528. See id. at 122. Admiral Morison offers the following revealing account:
For five days the British army marched along the banks of the Patuxent, approaching
the capital of the United States without seeing an enemy or firing a shot. In the
meantime, Washington was in a feverish state of preparation. About 7000 militia, all
that turned out of 95,000 summoned, were placed under an unusually incompetent
general [Brigadier John Armstrong, Jr.] and hurried to a strong position behind the
village of Bladensburg, athwart the road over which the invaders must advance.
President Madison and some of the cabinet came out to see the fight. After the militia
had suffered only 66 casualties they broke and ran, and [General Robert] Ross
[commander of the British land forces], delayed a few hours by the bravery of marines
and naval gunners, pressed on to Washington that evening (24 August 1814). Some
officers arrived in time to eat a dinner at the White House that had been prepared for
the President and Mrs. Madison.
1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON ET AL., THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 377 (6th ed.
1969). One wonders whether Madison took this occasion to reflect on his famous comment in
The Federalist about the invincibility of a nation boasting a militia of 500,000. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 366, at 301.
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U.S. infantry regiments fought the British to a standstill at Chippewa on
July 2, and again at Lundy's Lane on July 25. With Scott's success,
America finally appeared capable of defending itself on the ground,
even of mounting a ground-based offensive. Crucially for our purposes,
the infantry's valor in the Great Lakes campaigns of 1814
"contributed ... much to the prestige of the Regular Army and its
acceptance as the necessary axis of American defense. 5 29 Thereafter,
no prominent statesman would argue seriously, as Jefferson and Knox
had once done, that a classified militia could wholly replace the U.S.
Army. Throughout the nineteenth century, the regular army remained
small, numbering between 6,000 and 27,000 in peacetime, slightly more
during war.530 But it, and not the militia, was henceforth acknowledged
as the backbone of the nation's security.
As enthusiasm for militia service continued to decline after the
War of 1812, so too did the ability of the average citizen to appear
armed in compliance with the Militia Act of 1792 or applicable state
regulations. In the early years of the nineteenth century, it was
commonplace for militia captains to complain that more and more
members of their companies appeared with no weapon at all, or with
such poor makeshifts for guns as umbrellas, broomsticks, farm tools,
and garden implements.531 And as citizens came to lack the desire and
equipment needed for militia service, so too they began to ridicule and
burlesque the very concept of the citizen army. Two New England
cartoons depicting typical musters of the 1820s and '30s are illustrative
(see opposing page).
529. WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 131.
530. See id. at 597-98.
531. See Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 430 (on the declining percentage of militia members
possessing firearms (1803: 235,000 of 524,000; 1810: 308,000 of 678,000; 1820: 400,000 of 837,000;
1830: 359,000 of 1,129,000)). Also consider the 1855 comments of New York's Adjutant
General J. Watts de Peyester regarding his own troops: "We always associate the term militia
with the rag-tag and bob-tail assemblages armed with broomsticks, cornstalks and umbrellas."
Id. at 433; see also CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 205.
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In this print of 1829, the "Nation's Bulwark" can contrive only a ragged muster. Still, the
majority have been able to produce weapons of a sort. A decade or two later, even this
much evidence of martial spirit was lacking.
(From SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE MARTIAL SPIRIT IN AMERICA, 1775-1865, by Marcus Cunliffe.
Copyright © 1968 by Marcus Cunliffe. Published by Little, Brown and Company (Inc.).)
A militia muster is the subject of this lithograph by David Claypoole Johnston,
ca. 1836. The scene is somewhere in New England, perhaps Boston. The ragged lineup
could have been seen almost anywhere in the United States. The only man in uniform is the
officer on the right; and he has overdone his finery.
(From SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE MARTIAL SPIRIT IN AMERICA, 1775-1865, by Marcus Cunliffe.
Copyright I 1968 by Marcus Cunliffe. Published by Little, Brown and Company (Inc.).)
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So are Abraham Lincoln's recollections of his youthful experiences
of "militia trainings" in the West, where the militia lacked even that
fading status that its deep historical roots and the nostalgic memories of
aging Revolutionary-era veterans preserved for to the eastwards:
We remember one of these parades ourselves here, at the head of
which, on horse-back, figured our old friend Gordon Adams, with a
pine wood sword, about nine feet long, and a paste-board cocked
hat, from front to rear about the length of an ox yoke, and very
much the shape of one turned bottom upwards; and with spurs
having rowels as large as the bottom of a teacup, and shanks a foot
and a half long. That was the last militia muster here. Among the
rules and regulations, no man is to wear more that five pounds of
cod-fish for epaulets, or more than thirty yards of bologna sausages
for a sash; and no two men are to dress alike, and if any two should
dress alike the one that dresses most alike is to be fined, (I forget
how much). Flags they had too, with devices and mottoes, one of
which latter is, "We'll fight till we run, and we'll run till we die. 5 32
B. The Era of the Volunteers, 1840-1903
1. The Rise of the Volunteer Guards
In Jacksonian America, citizens retained little interest in compelled
service in the old universal militia codified by the Militia Act of 1792
and extolled in the Second Amendment. Neither was service with the
small regular army widely esteemed by citizenry or Congress, and the
regulars continued to bear the brunt of all the familiar republican
critiques, notwithstanding the grudging acceptance accorded the army
by the nation and the legislature following its vindication during the
War of 1812. But even as an increasingly democratic and individualistic
nation walked away from the common militia, and even as
antimilitarism burgeoned into standard fare of the democratic press
during the 1830s and '40s, a new generation of citizen-soldiers embraced
the part-time martial ideal by joining volunteer militia companies.
These volunteer companies differed fundamentally from the common
militia. As the name implies, the units comprised willing volunteers, not
coerced members of the public. The volunteer units were selective and
even elite in their membership, and consciously distanced themselves
from the contemptible militia-of-the-whole. Volunteers trained more
frequently and more regularly than the common militia had done, and
many units took pride in staging target shoots, military displays, and
532. Speech to the Springfield Scott Club (Aug. 14, 1852), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 135, 149-50 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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parades. They wore showy, ornate uniforms fashioned after famous
European units of the day. And while volunteer units were increasingly
licensed and recognized by the states in which they were based, and
incorporated into their states' military organizations,133 the units were
not typically (at least in peacetime) formed under state auspices, but
through private initiative.
As the cities grew and the economy boomed, busted, and boomed
again in the Jacksonian years, volunteer militia companies became
commonplace on the urban landscapes. Typically, these new militias
served as social clubs as well as military organizations, putting on balls
and exhibitions in addition to engaging in military exercises. Many of
the companies were affiliated with, or even coextensive with, volunteer
urban fire brigades. Rivalries between companies in the same cities
were not uncommon, and brawling between native Protestant and Irish
Catholic militia units was common sport at midcentury.534 While some
volunteer companies specialized in socializing and preening in fine
uniforms, a number of elite units aspired to a genuine measure of
military skill. Jefferson Davis's own Mississippi Rifles distinguished
themselves in the Mexican War, and generally the organized volunteer
units fought far better in Mexico than the bands of unorganized
Southwestern militia who hastened across the border notwithstanding
the constitutional prohibition against foreign service. When the Civil
War came, it was the presence of established volunteer companies-
often fantastically uniformed like Elmer Ellsworth's New York
Zouaves-that enabled Winfield Scott to put an army in the field to
defend Washington while the government organized recruitment and
gathered the regulars. 35
Before the Civil War, volunteers acquired their arms, equipment,
and elaborate uniforms wholly by their own means.536 In this respect,
too, they differed from the common militia. The Militia Act required
that citizens enrolled in their states' militia provide themselves with
standard arms and equipment, but soon after the Act's passage, states
not already budgeting for militia arms typically set aside money for
muskets for citizens unable to afford their own arms, or even contracted
533. On the eve of the Civil War, many states' adjutants general listed only volunteer units
in their organizational charts. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 220-22.
534. See id. at 88-95, 227, 230.
535. See id. at 203 on Jefferson Davis's Mississippi Rifles; id. at 252-54 on the role of established,
elite Volunteer units during the initial defense of Washington in 1861; id. at 5-7 on the Zouaves and
other gaily uniformed Volunteers at First Bull Run.
536. Some companies even maintained their own armories under state license, or rented
neglected arsenals from their local government. See id. at 219-20; cf id. at 227.
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to purchase muskets directly.537 And in the hopes of counteracting the
lax approach of many states to military affairs, in 1808 Congress first
appropriated federal funds for the militia, passing a statute that set aside
$200,000 annually that the states could claim to purchase arms. 38 This
marked Congress's initial halting step down a long road leading, in the
early twentieth century, to the federal government's full-scale
assumption of the responsibility for arming the militia that the Militia
Act of 1792 had lodged with the individual, able-bodied man.539 For
many years, most of the money set aside annually under the 1808 law
went unclaimed, attesting to the growing apathy with which state
governments and citizens alike viewed service in the "constitutional
army. 5 40 Not until bloodletting in Kansas and the Dred Scott decision
heightened sectional tensions in 1857 did some of the Southern states
begin to tap the federal well for militia moneys with a view to
replenishing armories, which, like those of their sister states throughout
the country, had been neglected for many years. 41
2. A Nation of Volunteers: The Grand Army of the Republic
Secession brought an end to Southern claims for federal funds, and
Congress did not raise the militia appropriation during the Civil War.
Instead, the War Department quickly assumed the task of directly
arming the vastly expanded forces required to suppress the Southern
insurrection.542  The Civil War marked the first time the nation
537. On the states' role in providing arms for militia members prior to 1792, see Bellesiles,
supra note 198, at 581, 585 (regarding Virginia and Connecticut, respectively). On federal
dissatisfaction with state efforts to arm the militia to come into compliance with the 1792 Act,
see Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 429-35; CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 192-203, 209-12.
538. Act of Apr. 23, 1808, ch. 55, § 1, 2 Stat. 490, 490, analyzed in CUNLIFFE, supra note 75,
at 193. The law remained on the books until 1887, when Congress increased the annual militia
appropriation to $400,000. See infra discussion accompanying note 554.
539. See Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271, repealed by Dick Act, ch.
196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). For an analysis of the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, see supra discussion
accompanying notes 482-88; CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 184; WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 93-94.
540. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 193, 209-11.
541. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 195 (discussing Southern rearmament after Kansas);
CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 209-12 (discussing prior nationwide indifference).
542. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 201-04. As of December 31, 1860, the Union retained
intact the regular army of 15,000, which the Thirty-sixth Congress, just before dissolving,
increased by nine regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery. See id. at 199-200.
About 40% of the officers defected to the Confederacy, but Lincoln could later boast that not
one enlisted man abandoned his post. See id. at 199. Prior to Lincoln's assumption of office,
President Buchanan did absolutely nothing to counter the insurrection. When Lincoln took
office on April 15, 1861, he called on the states for 75,000 volunteers for three months' service
under the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 to put down rebellious combinations in seven states. See
id. at 198. 91,816 men answered the call. See id. at 200. On May 3, 1861, without congressional
authorization, Lincoln increased the size of the regular army by 22,714, and called for 40
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confronted the need for mass mobilization under the Constitution, and
the war was fought largely by citizen-soldiers, but not by the common
militia. Rather, the Union army was made up overwhelmingly of
Volunteers (capitalized in Civil War parlance) who rallied to the federal
flag. They arrived in units raised by the states in response to calls by
Congress or the president, and enlisted directly into the service of the
United States before embarkation to the front.5 43  And after
considerable initial confusion regarding the bounds of state and federal
authority, all arms used by the 2,666,999 soldiers who served in the
Union armies544 were procured and issued by the federal government.145
Over ninety percent of these men were Volunteers. These citizen-
soldiers assumed a role more closely akin to that of the federalized
National Guard units in the twentieth-century world wars than to the
early-nineteenth-century, part-time volunteer regiments. They served
under federal command, wore standard-issue federal uniforms, and
received federal pay (supplemented by state and federal enlistment
bounties). Civil War recruitment amounted to a Napoleonic leve en
masse, and while the overwhelming majority of Union soldiers were
regiments, or 40,000 men, to serve as three-year Volunteers. See id. By July 1, over 200,000 had
enlisted. See id.
The Thirty-seventh Congress convened on July 4, 1861, and voted an additional 500,000
three-year Volunteers, and another 500,000 Volunteers for the duration of the war. See id. The
latter actually enlisted as three-year men. See id. By December 3, the federal recruiting service
replaced the separate state recruiters, and although it was suspended on January 15, 1862, when
Stanton replaced Cameron as secretary of war, by June 6, 1862, the federal service was back in
operation and continued to handle all recruitment for the rest of the war. See id. at 206. On
July 2, 1862, Lincoln called on the states for 300,000 more Volunteers. See id. On July 17, 1862,
Congress amended the Militia Act, delegating to the president the authority to specify a period
of service for up to nine months whenever he called up the militia, and granting him plenary
power to make all necessary rules and regulations for states lacking adequate laws to govern
their militia. See id. at 207. Pursuant to his newly acquired authority, on August 4, 1862, the
president called for 300,000 nine-month militia. See id. Congress acted decisively on March 3,
1863, passing the Enrollment Act, which bypassed the militia powers altogether and for the first
time availed itself of the power to "raise and support armies." Id. at 208. The Act imposed
military duty on all able-bodied male citizens between 20 and 45 years of age. See id.
Controversially, the Act permitted substitution and commutation for $300. See id. at 209. That
summer, tens of thousands of irate, chiefly Irish New Yorkers, took to the streets, burning,
looting, and lynching to protest the class aspects of the draft law. See CUNLIFFE, supra note 75,
at 94. The riot was not controlled until federal troops arrived via train fresh from the
battlefields of Gettysburg. See FONER, supra note 30, at 33. Resistance and riots
notwithstanding, or perhaps because of those very factors, only six percent of soldiers to serve in
the Union army were draftees. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 210. 1863 also witnessed the
beginning of black recruitment, and by the war's end nearly 200,000 men had served with the
U.S. Colored Volunteers and U.S. Colored Troops. See id. at 211-12. On July 18, 1864, Lincoln
called for 500,000 federal Volunteers, and on December 18 he called for 300,000 more, the last
recruits to see action in the war. See id. at 215.
543. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 204; Wiener, supra note 8, at 191.
544. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 246.
545. Id. at 203-04.
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enlistees rather than draftees, the Grand Army of the Republic partook
of the universality of the old common militia, even as it acquired the
training and professionalism characteristic of the regulars.
3. Revitalization and Professionalism
At the end of the Civil War, the two-million-plus wartime
Volunteers were swiftly demobilized, the regulars dispatched to police
the occupied South and the Indian frontier, and the few prewar
volunteer companies that survived the war as fighting units decamped
and went home. Prewar-style volunteer companies, old and new,
remained part of the Northern social scene, but for a time, as the nation
tried to heal its wounds, the volunteers' passion for martial exercises
seemed to wane. However, the outpouring of patriotism that
accompanied the Centennial sparked renewed interest in volunteer
soldiering, and when industrial turmoil swept the nation in 1877, state
governors called on organized state volunteers to put down riots.
Indeed, industrial unrest prompted state legislatures to renew interest in
their state forces. Legislators made no pretence of reviving the long-
defunct militia-of-the-whole, but did all they could to foster the
respectable part of society's interest in joining organized and newly
forming volunteer units, which pointedly kept their distance from the
unorganized militias memorialized in the ancient laws.5 46 In part to
distinguish themselves from the disreputable unorganized militia,
organized volunteer companies styled themselves guards or national
guards. The revitalization of state national guards coincided with a
passion for reform and improvement then sweeping all the professions,
and national guard officers aggressively pursued recognition and
accreditation for themselves and their organizations.5 47  Organized
militia officers from across the country joined forces in 1878 to form the
National Guard Association ("NGA") with the objective of obtaining
funding and recognition from state legislatures and Congress.5 48 As
state legislatures quickly acted to revive their militia codes and
acknowledge the organized militia as their states' official National
Guards,5 49 the Supreme Court resolved the important issue of standing
to raise Second or Fourteenth Amendment claims asserting a right to
546. See DERTHICK, supra note 81, at 13; ScoTr SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 104-05
(1982).
547. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 546, at 92-95.
548. See id. at 93.
549. See id. at 104-05.
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arms, stating in Presser v. Illinois that only arms bearing in the legally
recognized, state-licensed militia was entitled to constitutional
protection. 50
Formation of the NGA reflected the professional aspirations of
many late-nineteenth-century militia officers and a desire on their part
to keep pace with the increasing technical complexity of officership in
an industrial age. The National Rifle Association also dates from these
years, and it had its origins in some of the same concerns that animated
the new NGA.551 The Rifle Association aimed not at aspiring officers,
but at young men (particularly the wholesome, rural, native-born, non-
unionized type) who might be called upon to fill out the rank and file of
a rapidly mobilized, mass army of citizen-soldiers. Civilian America,
according to both the NGA and the NRA, would benefit by acquiring a
modicum of military knowledge-not simply because this fostered such
Victorian values as self-improvement, sport, and outdoorsmanship - but
because military preparedness was a patriotic duty. National
respectability as well as national security invoked the volunteer martial
spirit, as America seemed less and less isolated on an increasingly
imperialistic and competitive world stage. Compared with the millions
of full-time soldiers and trained reserves assembled by the powers of
continental Europe, America's tiny Indian constabulary army of some
30,000 seemed insignificant indeed 5 2 Only isolated military reformers
like Emory Upton urged America to keep pace with the Europeans,
and the overwhelming majority of voters remained antimilitarist in
outlook. Still, no one doubted that a war with a major power would
require mobilization on a scale surpassing even the Civil War. If
America were to avoid humiliation, its prospective citizen-soldiers must
have prior training, and to this end, the NRA saw itself fulfilling a vital
purpose by fostering marksmanship and firearms skill in the military
eligible population.553
While the NRA staged target shoots and formed rifle clubs, the
NGA organized seminars and retreats, circulated periodicals, and
550. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886). Presser is discussed in detail supra
notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
551. See generally Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 453 (citing Russell Stanley Gilmore,
Crackshots and Patriots: The National Rifle Association and America's Military-Sporting
Tradition, 1871-1929 (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin) (on file
with the University of Wisconsin Library); AMERICANS AND THEIR GUNS: THE NATIONAL
RIFLE ASSOCIATION STORY THROUGH NEARLY A CENTURY OF SERVICE TO THE NATION
(James B. Trefethen compiler & James E. Serven ed., 1967)).
552. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 546, at 85.
553. See Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 435.
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lobbied state and federal officials. As the nineteenth century drew to a
close, Congress began to take notice of the state guards and the NGA
alike. Washington increased the annual militia appropriation for the
first time in 1887, doubling funding under the 1808 law to $400,000 per
annum. Congress acted again in 1900, increasing appropriations to
$1,000,000 annually.55 4 When Congress next increased federal militia
funding in 1903, it simultaneously replaced the minimalist and
hopelessly obsolete federal militia rules laid down in the Acts of 1792
and 1795 with comprehensive National Guard legislation embodied in
the Militia Act of 1903 (the "Dick Act"). From that time onwards,
increases in federal funding for the guard entailed ever-greater army
and War/Defense Department supervision of the constitutionally
recognized militia.
C. The United States Army and the United States Army National
Guard in the Twentieth Century
1. Birth of the Modern National Guard
At the close of the nineteenth century, mobilization of state
guard units to fight in the Spanish-American War was characterized
by scandal and disorder. The disastrous preparation for war was duly
recorded by the busy yellow press, who made the most of the
stupidity of politicians, brass, and high command, as well as of the
misfortunes experienced by regulars and civilian soldiers alike. Prior
to the invasion of Cuba, regular army and volunteers spent months
awaiting transport out of Tampa, or stranded on sidings stretching
back to South Carolina hoping for passage along the single rail line
leading into the west Florida port. The soldiers' equipment was
neither standardized, serviceable, appropriate, nor up to date.
Guardsmen in particular went into combat wearing woolen uniforms
too sweaty for the Tropics, and carrying smoky, single-shot rifles far
inferior to the models borne by their Spanish adversaries. The most
notorious reports of organizational ineptitude dwelled on servicemen
suffering through spoiled canned beef and succumbing to epidemics
at a time when advances in technology had made refrigeration readily
available and inoculation against typhoid fever practicable. Few
observers doubted that a more formidable adversary than Spain
would have bested the logistically challenged Americans.55
554. See DERTHICK, supra note 81, at 22.
555. See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 298-305. It should perhaps be added that,
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In 1903, following further debacles involving mobilization of state
guard units to police the newly won empire and put down the Philippine
insurrection, Congress finally acted under pressure from President
Roosevelt to subdivide the militia-of-the-whole-by then entirely
fictitious-into an active militia (the National Guard) and an
unorganized militia (the nonenrolled male population between eighteen
and forty-five).56  At the same time, the federal government
standardized state units and equipment, and, in return for massive
increases in federal funding, the states accepted vastly enhanced federal
supervision of militia training.557
Congress acted again in 1908 to make the National Guard the
country's first-line reserve, providing that as the Organized Militia, the
National Guard would be called forth before the raising of new federal
volunteers 5 8 More fundamentally, Congress waived existing territorial
limitations on National Guard call-ups, thereby attempting to bypass
the issue of the constitutionality of militia service outside the United
States, which had plagued the president and War Department in the
Wars of 1812-15, 1846-48, and 1898-1901. Within a few years,
however, both the attorney general and the judge advocate general of
the army had written reports finding this use of the militia to be
unconstitutional,5 59 presenting Congress anew with the problem of
legally deploying American reservists overseas. 56°
This controversy came to a head during the preparedness
movement that proceeded American entry into the First World War.
With war raging in Europe, American pacifists, socialists, and
isolationists opposed any military expansion at all, while states-rights-
conscious Southern Democrats (and many Midwestern Republicans)
thanks to America's vast naval and industrial superiority, the outcome of this war was never in
doubt.
556. See Dick Act, ch. 196, § 1, 32 Stat. 775, 775 (1903). For analyses of the Dick Act, see
Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 342 (1990); DERTHICK, supra note 81, at 26-27;
WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 320-22; Wiener, supra note 8, at 193-96. The Act provided in
relevant part:
That the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States,
Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every able-bodied male of foreign birth
who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less
than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classes-the organized militia,
to be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, or by
such other designations as may be given them by the laws of the respective States or
Territories, and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia.
Dick Act, ch. 196, § 1, 32 Stat. 775, 775 (1903) (emphasis added).
557. See Dick Act, ch. 196, § 3, 32 Stat. 775, 775-76 (1903).
558. See Militia Reform Act of 1908, ch. 204, § 1, 35 Stat. 399, 399.
559. See 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 322 (1912).
560. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 324-25.
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typically favored no more than incremental augmentation of the
National Guard (notwithstanding the constitutional problems
associated with foreign deployment). Meanwhile, the newly minted
general staff and many pro-British Eastern progressives pushed for
conscription, establishment of a reserve component wholly independent
of the states, and the aggressive expansion of the regular army.561 The
bitterly contested National Defense Act of 1916 "federalized" the
Organized Militia, thenceforth known only as the National Guard, and
integrated it into the command structure of the War Department and
the regular army.5 6 The Act specified the guard units the states were to
maintain, set standards for guard officers, and made provision for
federal drill pay to guardsmen. 63 New enlistees swore an oath to obey
the president and uphold the U.S. Constitution. 64 Upon congressional
authorization, the president was empowered to draft guard members
into federal service for the duration of the emergency specified in the
authorization bill. In the years before World War I, then, the state
militias were integrated into a federally supervised U.S. Army National
Guard and supplied with standardized, congressionally prescribed arms
purchased with federal funds and kept in state arsenals, which were
themselves increasingly financed by the national government. During
the same period, the states acknowledged delegation of the provision of
security against invasion to the U.S. Army and the Organized Reserves,
laying the framework of state-federal relations that allowed the massive
mobilization of citizens into soldiers in both world wars.5 65
2. Continued Evolution of the Guard and Reserves during the Age
of Statism
Expansion of the armed forces to wartime strength during World
War I departed markedly from the systems of recruitment and
mobilization established during either the Civil War or the Spanish-
American conflict, when militia entered federal service in response to
presidential calls to the states. Spanish-American War policy allowed
individual guard members to volunteer for duty overseas and
maintained intact each state unit from which three-quarters of
personnel enlisted for federal service. By 1917, organized state
volunteer units had been federalized and standardized under the rubric
561. See generally id at 344-47.
562. See National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, § 1, 39 Stat. 166, 166.
563. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 348.
564. See id.
565. See id. at 344-50.
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of the National Guard, and many guard members had been training
regularly with their regiments since the beginning of the preparedness
campaign during the early years of the European war. But General
Pershing was convinced, perhaps rightly, that engagement against
battle-hardened German veterans required not only further training of
guard members under the auspices of the U.S. Army, but breakup of
the guard units and integration of the state soldiers into components of
the U.S. Army.56 6  Fully sixty-seven percent of the 3.68 million
Americans serving with the army by Armistice Day were drafted
directly into the U.S. Army under the Selective Service Act of 1917.567
Still, hundreds of thousands of guard members saw active duty during
the Great War. Their units, however, did not, as state components
disappeared from War Department organizational charts and entered
into virtual suspension as America prepared to fight the war in
Europe.5 68
Guard officers resented not only the disappearance of their units,
but also the time-honored hauteur regular officers displayed towards
their civilian-soldier colleagues.5 69 In the aftermath of demobilization,
the NGA was determined to resurrect the old state units and to
preserve the guard's role as the nation's primary reserve in the face of
heavy opposition from reform-minded centrists in the War Department,
who favored development of a purely federal reserve component of the
army.7 0 The guard's aims coincided perfectly with the popular rejection
of reform and centralization that marked postwar reaction and the
return to normalcy and isolationism. The NGA had not yet built up the
Capitol Hill lobbying machine that Generals John McAuley Palmer and
Milton A. Reckord commanded during and after the Second World
War, but thanks to the anticentrist leanings of many rural
representatives, the NGA managed to stave off a War Department
campaign to oust the guard in favor of federal reserves and even
secured, at least initially, an increased level of federal funding.571
Under the National Defense Act of 1920, the National Guard was
confirmed as the nation's first-line reserve, but the president was
authorized to call out the guard only when greater troop strength than
566. See id. at 375-76.
567. See id. at 356-58.
568. See id. at 386-87.
569. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 546, at 244; WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 397-400.
570. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 395-400.
571. See DERTHICK, supra note 81, at 44-47, 49; id. at 93-107 (regarding the NGA's lobbying
machine of the forties and fifties). On the lobbying effectiveness of Palmer, Reckord, and the
NGA during the interwar years, see id. at 94.
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that provided by the regulars was required.5 72  Still, Congress relied
forthrightly on citizen-soldiers to provide the bulk of the nation's
resources in the event of war and called for 435,000 guard members to
be maintained in federally funded state units.573 At the same time, the
Defense Act restored to the guard a greater degree of control over its
own affairs, with the Militia Bureau in the War Department coming
under the direction of a guard general. Training the guard was to be
part of the army's responsibility, but as more ROTC graduates became
available, citizen-soldiers were expected to take a larger role in
instructing their own brigades. For all of the National Guard's success
on the Hill during the waning days of Wilson's presidency, during the
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations the guard suffered from
the same fiscal austerity that then plagued other federally supported
programs, and rarely were guard formations recruited to their full
strength during these years of retrenchment.
74
The course towards federal integration and consolidation of
America's citizen-soldiery resumed with vigor during the Hundred Days
of the New Deal. But the NGA was able to ensure that rationalization
and reform preserved more than merely a dignitary role for the states
and the state adjutant generals' offices in the nation's federally
supervised citizen reserve. Steering a compromise course between the
claims of the War Department and the guard, Congress amended the
Defense Act of 1916 to ensure that state units would continue intact
when mobilized for overseas wars. More fundamentally, Congress gave
express recognition to the dual status of the guard. Henceforth, guard
units were to have twinned identities, being at once the militia of the
states and a permanent reserve component of the U.S. Army. As a
result of the 1933 amendments, the states accepted the dual enlistment
system that continues to this day, whereby guard members take
simultaneous oaths to serve in their state units and in the regular army
when called up to national duty.575 For the first time, the National
572. Eventually, in 1952, Congress abandoned the requirement of an emergency and gave
the president essentially discretionary authority to call up National Guard units with
gubernatorial consent. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 346 (1990).
573. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 401.
574. See id.
575. The dual enlistment system continues in force to this day. In the words of Justice
Stevens,
Since 1933 all persons who have enlisted in a State National Guard unit have
simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the United States.... [U]nder the
"dual enlistment" provisions of the statute that have been in effect since 1933, a
member of the Guard who is ordered to active duty in the federal service is thereby
relieved of his or her status in the State Guard for the entire period of federal service.
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Guard became part of the army structure during peacetime as well as
war, and the guard's federal administration was justified not under the
Militia Clauses, but under the Army Clause of the Constitution. 76 In
the process, lawmakers "eliminated the word 'Militia' from the War
Department organization by changing the name of the supervisory
agency to National Guard Bureau.
'5 77
Notwithstanding a heightened level of army-guard integration,
regulars retained their suspicions of guard members as America poised
for entry into World War II. But the progress the guard achieved
during the interwar years of army-supervised training left the nation far
better prepared in 1941 than it had been in 1917. By the time Nazi
divisions swept across the Polish frontier, 200,000 American guard
members were on active-duty status under six-year enlistments, training
forty nights a year and performing an additional two weeks of field
exercises each summer.5 78 This citizen army seemed paltry compared to
the German, Japanese, Soviet, or French establishments, but the
availability of semiexperienced guard components was of vital
importance in freeing up regulars for the important job of training
draftees and recruits as the army expanded to wartime strength.
5 79
Guard units remained together under their familiar regimental
designations during World War II and contributed much to the overall
success of America's civilian army against the more thoroughly
professional and regimented German and Japanese forces. As the War
Department anticipated victory and partial demobilization, it
envisioned a continued role for the guard. The government's
commitment to allow civilian soldiers to return home was now
tempered by an appreciation for the demands of America's much
expanded military role abroad. 8°  Doctrinaire hostility to
nonprofessional soldiers was finally fading among top defense
strategists, but some regular officers retained concerns over the guard's
joint state-federal loyalties,""l concerns partially born out by Southern
Perpich, 496 U.S. at 345-46.
576. See Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153.
577. Wiener, supra note 8, at 209. Wiener adds, "the 1933 Act proved conclusively that a
well-regulated militia is impossible of attainment under the militia clause, and can be organized
only by resort to the plenary and untrammeled powers under the army clause." Id.
578. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 420.
579. See id. at 436.
580. See id. at 486.
581. See id.
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governors' mobilization of guard units to resist federally mandated
racial integration in the 1950s and '60s. 82
From the earliest days of the Republic, the preoccupation of the
army's thought in peacetime has been the question of manpower, that
is, how to muster from an historically civilian people adequate numbers
of competent soldiers in the event of a major war. 83 For much of our
history, good fortune and isolation rendered this an abstract rather than
a practical question. During the two wars with Britain, the enemy
lacked both the political will and a coherent strategy for bringing its
superior military resources to bear effectively against what was then still
a highly diffuse country.5 84 In 1846, Mexico's military establishment was
no larger than our own and outclassed by the professionalism, gunnery,
and engineering skills of the tiny cadre of West Pointers at the head of
the invading army. 85 During the Civil War, the South was, pretensions
at chivalry notwithstanding, no more militaristic or war-ready than the
North, and the Union's lack of military preparedness placed it at no
disadvantage. 86 In 1898, Spain was an exhausted imperial power,
utterly lacking in the industrial and manpower resources required to
repel simultaneous invasions of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines
by a top flight naval and industrial power, no matter how disorganized
the attacker's military planning. 87
More than good luck, economic power, and optimism were
required to fight and win the twentieth-century world wars. Victory
582. Prominent cases of governors ordering state militia to defy federal court orders relating
to desegregation include actions by John Patterson of Alabama in 1956 (Autherine Lucy case),
Orval Faubus of Arkansas in 1957 (high school integration), and Ross Barnett of Mississippi in
1962 (state university integration). In each instance, the state militia was subsequently
federalized by order of the president (i.e., called up into National Guard duty), and ordered to
enforce federal law. The most famous case is that of Alabama Governor George Wallace in
1963. Wallace responded to a federal injunction preventing state troopers from obstructing
integration by replacing the troopers with militia. President Kennedy federalized the
guardsmen, who reluctantly ordered the governor to stand aside from a schoolhouse door he
had ostentatiously obstructed. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE 113, 154 (1995);
CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 33-34 (1985). Interestingly, Wallace toyed after his election in 1962
with the idea of forming an irregular state militia apart from the National Guard, which would
not have been subject to presidential command and thus could have conscientiously followed
the governor's orders to enforce segregation. See CARTER, supra, at 113.
583. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 497.
584. See generally MIDDLEKAUFF, supra note 244, at 575-81 (regarding the Revolutionary
War); 1 MORISON ET AL., supra note 468, at 384-85 (regarding the War of 1812).
585. See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 184-85.
586. On the similarity of Northern and Southern militia and military cultures in the antebellum
years and the insubstantiality of the Southern chivalric myth, see CUNLIFFE, supra note 75, at 337-
384.
587. See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 305,307, 309.
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over the Central Powers and the Axis required mobilization of the
manpower of the entire nation. In both instances, millions of American
civilians were organized and trained into armies capable of standing up
to the most professional soldiers from the most militaristic countries,
and far more quickly than conservative strategists in the regular
establishment thought prudent or possible. Success in the world wars
therefore weakened the case for the old general staff/War Department
argument that American security required permanent militarization of
the population on the Prussian model. 88  Yet no strategist could
underestimate the value of training or preparedness, and no one failed
to credit the professional officer and noncommissioned corps for their
remarkable ability to impart knowledge, system, and skill to millions of
their compatriots as the army set itself on a wartime footing. Thus,
rejection of Continental-style militarism did not amount to a rejection
of professionalism, or augur a reversion to the inchoate amateurism of
the colonial militias. Quite the contrary, the wartime experience
pointed to the necessity of maintaining a thoroughly professional, if not
over large, regular army, but with sufficient links to civilian society to
prevent both debilitating hostility of the general populace towards the
army and dangerous contempt for the people by the soldiers. The
National Guard was ideally suited to play a prominent role in this
system of security. 8
Military strategists, of course, have a pronounced tendency to plan
to fight the last war rather than the next one. The vision just described
was in fact a vision premised on preparedness for mass mobilization of
the civilian population to fight a prolonged ground war on several
foreign fronts against formidable military adversaries similarly arrayed.
It was therefore premised in part on the ideal of universal military
training ("UMT"), which was to enable the democratic/civilian societies,
led by the United States, to mobilize their civilian populations with
maximum speed and efficiency, while the regular army responded to the
initial aggressions of a hostile, totalitarian coalition.59 This vision was
also obsolete before it was reduced to statute. On August 6, 1945, the
U.S. Air Force dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, all but
ending the Second World War and ushering in a radically different
strategic age. The advent of the American nuclear monopoly changed
military planning almost overnight.591
588. See generally id. at 497.
589. See generally id. at 486-87, 497.
590. See id. at 498.
591. See id. at 500.
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At the dawn of the atomic age, the air force, newly separated from
the army, became the glamour wing of the armed services and the
favorite of strategists and planners in the Defense Department and on
Capitol Hill. Army and NGA lobbyists struggled to justify continued
funding for the oldest and most traditional military arm, for it was
widely assumed that no potential antagonist would be possessed of
sufficient folly to challenge American nuclear might. Ground forces
retained a constabulary style function in the occupied Axis countries,
and as the cold war developed, forward positioning of troops provided a
visible check against communist expansion. But a showdown, if it came,
was expected to be quick, nuclear, and dispositive. No one seriously
considered the possibility that America might ever again be compelled
to mobilize the entire nation in the manner characteristic of the major
wars from Napoleon's day to Hitler's. The historic role of the guard, as
the strategic, trained personnel reserve of the nation, seemed relegated
to irrelevancy, and plans for UMT were left to gather dust in Pentagon
archives.
As it turns out, advance notice of the guard's impending demise
was greatly exaggerated. When the Soviet Union shocked the world by
testing atomic and then hydrogen bombs long years before the
intelligence community thought feasible, America's first response was
the doctrine of massive retaliation, or mutual assured destruction.
592
Nuclear attack against America or its allies would be met by an
overwhelming nuclear counterstrike, calculated to destroy the Soviet
Union and likely to bring an end to life on earth. But the nuclear
brinkmanship of the Dulles era soon wore thin, and more flexible, less
apocalyptic policies were fashioned for the benefit of frazzled nerves on
both sides of the Iron Curtain. Neither of the principal regional wars of
the cold war era-the Korean nor the Vietnam War-led to nuclear
confrontation or escalated into worldwide conflict. In both instances,
America's global commitments-and, principally, the forward
positioning of NATO troops in Germany-so burdened the regular
army that military expansion proved necessary to meet the
requirements of war raging in Asia. 93 At the same time, conventional
preparedness strategy dictated that trained reserves be maintained to
facilitate further, rapid expansion in the event open hostilities should
erupt in Europe or elsewhere around the globe while substantial
592. See id. at 525-26, 535-36.
593. See id. at 533-34.
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American strength was committed to fighting on the Pacific Rim. 94
Vastly exaggerated reports of Soviet army strength militated in favor of
a sizeable, professionally trained reserve.9  All this said, fighting
substantial but limited Asian wars, even in a global security context, did
not require mobilization of the entire nation.96 Short of feeding and
paying them, the army would not have known what to do with ten or
twenty million soldiers. This need for one or two million more
personnel than during peacetime-but no more than that-presented
grave ethical and political difficulties for the Selective Service, the
Defense Department, and the government. 97 Compelling wartime
service of some-but not all-Americans generated bitter anger and
resentment as the U.S. death tolls climbed to fifty and fifty-eight
thousand in the respective Asian wars.
598
All of these factors combined to redefine and solidify a mission for
the National Guard in the later years of the twentieth century. The
Vietnam War proved, in myriad ways, a political disaster, and neither
the defense community nor the larger nation was ever quite the same
after America suffered its first military defeat. Perhaps the least
popular aspect of the war was the draft, and in 1972 Congress repealed
the Selective Service Act in favor of the volunteer principle.5 9 The
army's reversion to the recruitment system redoubled its reliance on the
guard and, by now, a substantial separate army reserve arm to meet
future requirements for expansion and mobilization. This had the effect
of cementing the mutual dependency and linkage between army and
guard. With mutual assured destruction and the draft both discredited,
the guard's future in the closing decades of the twentieth century
seemed far more certain than in the immediate postwar years. But the
ever more federal, wholly army-trained, all volunteer National Guard of
the Reagan years bore no familial resemblance to the old, independent,
universal state militia.'
As far removed as the cold war National Guard was from the
militia described in the Second Amendment and the Militia Act of 1792,
twentieth-century America never completely forgot the civic republican
fears that once animated Antifederalist advocates of a constitutional
594. See id.
595. See id. at 508.
596. See id.
597. See id.
598. See generally id. at 509-10, 534-35.
599. See id. at 558.
600. See generally id. at 578-92.
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right to keep and bear arms. In his farewell broadcast of January 17,
1961, President Eisenhower warned of the growing power of the
military-industrial complex.6°1 The bloated defense budgets, procure-
ment scandals, and defense industry lobbyists that left the former
Commanding General of the Army so uneasy had their counterparts in
the standing (i.e., inactive and useless) armies, salaried placemen, and
overburdened exchequers of Elbridge Gerry's or James Harrington's
day. True, by Eisenhower's time, few Americans feared a military coup.
But there had always been more to the republican anti-army ideology
than the worry that janissaries might seize the palace or oust legislators
from their seats. Much more insidious was the threat that the imperial
army would burden the body politic with enervating debt and burden
policymakers with improper dependencies and obligations. In this
respect, republican misgivings hardly seem relics of a forgotten time.
Happily however, the republicans' most gothic fears of a polity
corrupted by an army have not materialized in the democratic Republic
they helped to found. Civilian control of the military has never been
challenged - a remarkable fact in a constitutional system now two
hundred eleven years old. Most of our great generals who became
presidents -Washington, Grant, Eisenhower-proved decidedly anti-
Caesarist in the Oval Office (perhaps this is somewhat less true of
Jackson). Indeed, throughout our history, professional military officers
have demonstrated a notable commitment to civic values and respect
for the democratic process. The anti-army prejudices of the nineteenth
century have steadily faded, and today the army is truly perceived as an
instrument of the people, and not as a threatening alien organ.
Localism endures in and on behalf of the National Guard, but as a
species of provincial politicking and state-level patronage rather than as
a genuine military counterweight to federal power. Away from the
peripheral fringe, even the nation's most ardent anticentrists are now
devotees of the army. More often than not, the military is the only
aspect of federal power for which our modern antifederalists have any
affection at all.
601. In Eisenhower's words:
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is
new in the American experience.... We recognize the imperative need for this
development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications.... In the
councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 73 (Tony Augarde ed., 1991).
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Quite apart from reflecting on the contemporary relevance or
irrelevance (or persistence or disappearance) of the ancient republican
paradigm, our thesis ultimately turns on the evolution of the militia.
And by the late twentieth century, that institution had developed into a
creature all but unrecognizable from the perspective of the Second
Amendment. In the years since World War II, the role of a mass
reserve in assuring national security has seriously diminished in
consideration of the technical complexity of equipment and tasks
required of a thoroughly professional modern army, and because
nuclear deterrence has made a mass war drawing all the personnel
reserve of the country unlikely. The need for a whole nation in arms
has-in all likelihood, permanently-disappeared. At the same time,
conscription has become so unpopular as to border on being politically
unfeasible.6°2  In this climate, the volunteer principle has again
supplanted the draft as the recruiting mechanism for fighting the limited
wars that characterize the nuclear age, leaving no shadow of the old
militia's universality or compulsion about today's National Guard. 6 3
It is not only the volunteer recruitment principle that distinguishes
the early-twenty-first-century organized militia from the common
militia of 1789. The issue of the militia's necessity to the security of the
states and nation has been fundamentally recast. In 1789, the regular
army numbered 681 men; the common militia, Madison boasted,
numbered nearly half a million. Today, the regular United States
military establishment numbers some 1.4 million soldiers, sailors, air
personnel, and officers, while the U.S. Army National Guard (i.e., the




With the help of lobbying by the NGA, Congress has judged and
continues to judge the National Guard necessary to the nation's security
and funds it handsomely in every federal budget ($6.4 billion in fiscal
year 1999-10% of the army budget and 2.4% of the defense budget).
In the most recent budget, Congress adjudged the guard worthy of 2.3%
of the total of $282 billion it deemed necessary to secure the defense of
602. See WEIGLEY, supra note 8, at 509-10, 534-35, 558.
603. See id. at 505-06.
604. In addition to the 357,000 National Guard personnel, our citizen defense force includes
1,064,912 army reserves, of whom 395,038 are ready reserves, 684 standby reserves, and 669,190
retired reserves. See Situation Report (visited Nov. 11, 2000) <http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/
jan2000/pdfs/sitrepl.pdf>; U.S. Army Reserve: End Strength (visited Nov. 11, 2000) <http://
www.army.mil/usar/briefings/civilian/sldOO5.htm>. The regular establishment comprises 491,707
active duty army; 381,203 active duty navy; 363,479 active duty air force; and 172,632 active duty
marine personnel. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1999, at 204 (Robert
Famighetti et al. eds.).
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the United States.65 The states too fund their guards-or at least some
of them do-albeit very much less generously than the federal
government. In fact, according to Justice Stevens, "[t]he Federal
Government provides virtually all of the funding, the materiel, and the
leadership for the State Guard units." 6 6 In contrast to the National
Guard, the unorganized militia-the shadow of the common militia so
extolled by the framers of the Second Amendment-has not been
funded by Congress since at least 1903. It is unclear that any state
appropriated any of the funds Congress set aside for the common militia
after Reconstruction, or that any state provided funds for the
unorganized militia after 1877, or even after 1850. And by walking
away from the muster points and parade grounds en masse during the
first half of the nineteenth century, the American people themselves
voted in the most direct way that their security, whether national or
state, had nothing to do with the common militia. The old militia had
died a natural death long before anyone now living was born. Indeed, it
would be difficult to conceive of any institution less necessary to the
security of the fifty free states in the year 2000 than the vanished
common militia.
One more vital difference remains between the organized militia of
today and the militia of 1789/91. It is the most striking of all. The
Militia Act of 1792 required citizens to acquire specified arms and keep
them in their homes, ready to bear on muster day and when called up in
emergencies. No matter that noncompliance was the rule-that less
than ten percent of households actually contained firearms, let alone
functioning, regulation arms.607 The Militia Act embodied the norms
envisioned in the Second Amendment. And those were that militiamen
keep their required, regulation arms in their own homes. This was then
the most practical approach. Armories contained some small arms as
well as field pieces and powder, but the delays and inefficiencies
occasioned by first reporting to a state armory, perhaps many miles
distant, and then rallying to meet one's fellows where public danger
loomed, would have been intolerable given the limits of eighteenth-
century transportation and communication. Moreover, arms then
required constant oiling and repair, meaning they could be better
605. See Situation Report (visited Nov. 11, 2000) <http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/jan2000/pdfs/
sitrepl.pdf>; Situation Report (visited Nov. 11, 2000) <http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/jan2000/pdfs/
sitrep3.pdf>; Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2000, at 158 (visited Nov. 11,
2000) <http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2000/pdf/budget.pdf>.
606. Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1990).
607. See Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 428.
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maintained in the home, assuming householders were diligent in their
charge. 8 Perhaps more fundamentally still, balls, cartridges, and shot
did not begin to be standardized until Eli Whitney, after long delays,
delivered on his 1798 contract to furnish the War Department with ten
thousand mass-production muskets assembled on the interchangeable
parts principle. 609 Prior to the rise of standard-issue arms, each gun was
an individual tool, almost a piece of art, cartridges for which were best
assembled by the hands of the proprietor rather than in a factory under
government contract.
Today, standard, mass-produced U.S. Army automatic rifles are
issued to the National Guard by the army and kept safe in armories.
The very same pieces are used by both the army and the guard,
maintained according to the same manuals, and sometimes returned to
the same armories, where they are stored under lock and guard until
next issued to reservists, regulars, or guard members for exercise or
duty. If repairs are necessary, army specialists perform them.
Ammunition and firing pins are the subjects of meticulous record
keeping and are issued separately from the weapon at the beginning of
exercises.610 Congress, the Department of Defense, the secretary of the
army, and the state adjutants general have decided national and state
security is best served by this system, under which identical,
interchangeable equipment centrally stored can be issued to guard
members and soldiers as training and military necessity demand. For
reasons of efficiency and public safety, it is implausible that any member
of Congress or official in the Department of Defense, army, or state
adjutant general's office should advocate a return to the policy of
keeping the arms used by the organized militia in guard members'
homes. Most fundamentally of all, the arms once purchased by the
militiamen themselves are now government property and require the
safekeeping accorded any other U.S. property-and especially
dangerous property at that. In the year 2000, the militia world
contemplated by the Second Amendment no longer exists, and no
plausible analogy to that nexus can be reconstructed.
608. See id. at 434.
609. See BOORSTIN, supra note 1, at 31-33. Whitney executed the contract during the third
year of John Adams's presidency and did not make delivery of the last of the 10,000 muskets
until Jefferson was preparing to leave office in January 1809. See id. at 32-33.
610. The statements concerning modem administrative practice relating to arms issuance in the
guard reflect Mr. Merkel's personal experience and observations as a reservist training with the U.S.
Army and Maryland National Guard while an ROTC cadet at Johns Hopkins University in the
1980s.
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III. THE MEANING OF MEANING
A. Text and Context
The main clause of the Second Amendment recognizes-perhaps
even grants-a right of access to arms. The question before the house
is: how does one derive the meaning of that right. Whenever an
authoritative but incomplete or ambiguous text is examined for
meaning, difficult questions arise concerning the appropriate sources for
elucidation. And when centuries have passed since its inscription, the
complexity of those questions enters a new dimension. We have no
intention of entering the lists in the ancient and ongoing scholarly
joust 611 on the superiority of unreconstructed textualism, any of the
varieties of intent-flavored originalism, or unashamed, policy-activated
noninterpretivism.611 Professor Boris I. Bittker has ably demonstrated
that none of these sources of illumination casts better than a weak and
flickering beam.613 However, we do associate ourselves with those who
insist that the text of the Constitution has meaning for us today beyond
the invitation to improvise on the suggested theme in a manner pleasing
to modem sensibilities.64 We do not believe that the meaning of the
611. Professor H. Jefferson Powell informs us that as early as 1796, Congressman William
Vans Murray of Maryland, during debate on the constitutionality of a resolution calling on
President Washington to transmit to the House files of John Jay's negotiation of a treaty with
Great Britain, expressed surprise that James Madison and others present at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia had not shared with the House their recollections of the intentions
of the draftsmen. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 920 (1985). Vans Murray's reference to actual original understanding met
with a rebuke the following day from Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania. See id. As Professor
Powell recounts it, Gallatin maintained that "[e]ven if it were proper to use the views expressed
in the debates of a legislative body in interpreting that body's acts-a proposition Gallatin
doubted-the opinions of the Philadelphia framers were as irrelevant as those of the legislative
clerk who penned a statute." Id.
612. A Westlaw search produces 126 articles and book reviews published over the last
decade (since January 1, 1990) with some form of the word "originalism" in the title. We
mention here only a few of the most recent entrants: Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative
and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997);
Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove's Rendition of Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619 (1997); Jack N.
Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 159
(1996).
613. See Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers
Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9 (1995).
614. By way of qualification, we must add that there are some provisions of the Bill of
Rights that seem to invite just such perpetual reconstitution. Nothing in the linguistic or social
context of the term "cruel and unusual" in the Eighth Amendment suggests just what
punishments are prohibited, nor does the Fourth, by language or by social convention, decree
what searches and seizures are to be deemed "unreasonable." For these, we suppose, it would
be a mistake to define them according to ancient uses. Rather the intent of the framers appears
to have been to delegate to future generations the construction of the terms according to
evolving notions of cruelty or reasonableness.
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text is "fluid," perpetually rewriting itself to keep up with the changing
times. 615 The words and phrasing, carefully chosen, count. And if the
document is worthy of respect, the message embedded in the text must
be sought as conscientiously as a string quartet seeks to know what
Beethoven had in mind as he wrote the great Opus 59.
So, in searching for that meaning today, we find ourselves among
those who take account of the original understanding of the text in the
context of the contemporary uses and assumptions of eighteenth-
century society.616 It seems obvious to us that the meaning of the words
employed in the text of the Second Amendment are inflected by a
complex set of understandings, conventions, and assumptions peculiar
to the times and shared among like-minded prisoners of the culture in
which the text was created. It is for the sake of textual integrity that we
insist that the drastic change in the position of the militia in the array of
protections against the overreaching of the central government does not
entitle us simply to cut adrift the first phrase of the Second Amendment
and enforce the remaining clause to the hilt. The framers thought the
right to arms to be closely associated with the military security of the
free state, they wrote it thus in the charter, the ratifiers so understood it,
and the linkage endures.
It might be worthwhile to unpack this bundle of shared
assumptions and extrinsic referents to sort out those that are so critical
to the interpretation of the text that, upon a change of context, the
significance of the text changes. Or evaporates entirely.
1. Linguistic Context
In the instance of the Second Amendment, the unadorned
linguistics are themselves informative. The right to arms is declared by
the verbs, "keep and bear," a phrase selected in preference to
615. But see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT,
supra note 110, at 23. See generally Morton J. Horowitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 116 (1993) ("The central
problem of modern constitutionalism is how to reconcile the idea of fundamental law with the
modernist insight that meanings are fluid and historically changing.").
616. In this we are in accord with Professor Lawrence Lessig, who takes "text" to mean "any
artifact created at least in part to convey meaning," and "context" to be "the collection of
understandings within which such texts make sense.... Text and context make meaning," he
says, and "[f]idelity is the aim to preserve meaning." Lessig, supra note 96, at 402. Fidelity
requires understanding of the context of creation and the context of application. As H.
Jefferson Powell states: "We can understand the original meaning of the Constitution ... only
by 'plunging [ourselves] into the systems of communication in which [the Constitution] acquired
meaning."' H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 675 (1987)
(alterations in original).
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alternatives such as "have," "own," "carry," or "possess." Scholars have
informed us that the chosen terms have a distinctly military
connotation, especially the verb "to bear," which would not have been
used in the eighteenth century-as it would not be today-to connote
purely private use of arms. You do not bear a shotgun to go duck
hunting. But we need not rely entirely on that language in the
announcement of the right in the main clause. We have, as we have
emphasized throughout this paper, a clear and unequivocal expression
of the linguistic context of the primary right in the introductory phrase
that accompanies it. The mere presence of the militia phrase sharing a
single sentence with the arms clause has, as we have argued throughout,
inescapable significance.
In addition, the way the two parts of the provision are expressed
amplifies the significance of their conjunction. The critical introductory
language does not aver the relationship of the militia to a free state in a
simple declarative clause-a form that might have established two
severable propositions: 617 the importance of a militia and the right to
arms. Rather, in the first part, the verbal vehicle elected for the verb
"to be" is a participle, yielding a phrase known to grammarians as an
"ablative absolute construction. ' 618 This construction characterizes a
phrase modifying the substance of the main clause as an adjective would
modify a noun, often expressing the condition or circumstances of the
assertion of the main clause. It creates an indissoluble link between the
two parts of the sentence and grammatically subjects the right to arms
to the rule of the militia modifier. As a simple matter of grammar, the
participle modifier is essential for the declarative clause to occur. Had
the two statements -regarding the importance of a militia and the right
to arms-not been linked in this manner, it might have been possible to
617. The two clauses of the Fourth Amendment provide a good example of joined but
independent entitlements:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
618. Fowler (in his second edition) defines the absolute construction thus: "it consists in
English of a noun or pronoun that is not the subject or object of any verb or the object of any
preposition but is attached to a participle or an infinitive, e.g. The play being over, we went
home." H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 4 (2d ed. 1965). As
another example, "Let us toss for it, loser to pay." Id. An eminent grammarian has this to add:
The absolute phrase has a great potential of polished economy.... [b]ut the ablative
absolute.., is removed from the main clause, borrowing tense and modifying only by
proximity .... And it is actually more common than you may suppose....
The ... pattern (noun plus participle) marks the ablative absolute ....
SHERIDAN BAKER, THE PRACTICAL STYLIST 51-52 (4th ed. 1977).
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argue that even if the first declaration ceases to be true, the second is
undiminished. And it seems to us significant that the drafters chose the
structure they did. The linguistics were certainly understood to the
framing generation (who were more likely to know the niceties of
Latinate grammar than we are). Taken together then-as they must
be-these two components of the provision grant the people such right
to arms as will preserve or empower the militia to assure the security of
the community. The question then becomes, has the term "militia"
been so eroded by history that in today's social context the concept
behind the right expressed retains none of its original meaning?
2. Social Context
We are aware that interpretation -particularly interpretation in
the light of changed social context-is a problematic undertaking. As
Professor H. Jefferson Powell has reminded us, interpretation of any
sort was once thought anathema by the literalist Protestants and
republicans who feared that legislative or judicial reconstruction of text
would lead to despotism.619 Over the many years of our long-lived
Constitution, however, many terms of the original text have been
reconstructed to accommodate changes in the social context of the
document, adjustments that most of us have come to accept as crucial to
the endurance of the constitutional regime. To Madison and the other
founders, the term "papers and effects" meant handwritten documents
and other personal possessions. It did not mean spoken words or body
fluids (though both were known to the founding generation) -much
less electronically stored data (which, of course, was not). Security
against unreasonable acquisition of conversations or body chemistry
was not included in the Fourth Amendment because contemporary
technology had not presented the citizen with the danger of such
intrusions. When private conversations could be audited with no
human eavesdropper lurking nearby, when blood and urine became the
source of incriminating evidence, the social context shifted materially.
Faithful to the concept of "security," faithful to the interpretive
delineation of privacy that the term "security" implied, we were able to
construe the language of the Fourth Amendment to apply to oral
communication, body chemistry, and electronic data. And few today
believe that the art of construction to accommodate changed
circumstances and understandings paved the way to tyranny.
619. See Powell, supra note 611, at 885.
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B. The Metamorphosis of the Concept of a Militia
These comfortable accommodations to alterations of context
cannot be made in every instance where linguistic or social development
has changed the meaning or reference of the original text. In some
instances, the reinterpretation of the provision simply departs too far
from the original concept, faithful only on the most attenuated level of
abstraction. As Professor Henry Monaghan has explained, the crux of
the matter is the level of abstraction at which the language of the
Constitution can bear. While a certain amount of generality is
inevitable-and tolerable-in the modem application of any ancient
precept, generalization can dilute meaning to the point that the pretense
of fidelity becomes illusory.620 Faithful reading of authoritative text
requires both the distillation of the essence of the provision and
sensitivity to the hazards of overaccommodation of the altered
circumstances of its application.
The concept of the militia embedded in the Second Amendment
has so radically changed over the centuries since its adoption that the
right to arms, constructed to serve it, is fundamentally deactivated.
Changes in the concept expressed by the word militia have been
gradual, and their impact on the meaning of the arms clause has been
progressive, as we have shown. Certainly, the word continues to
connote a trained and organized military force. At the same time, it is
difficult for twenty-first-century ears to discern the echoes of the
overtones that two centuries before were characteristic of the term.
More critically, the social context of today-the society served by the
militia and the nature of the militia's service to society-no longer
resembles the social context of the militia in 1789. So, although the
word "militia" retains meaning, the word "militia" as written in the
Second Amendment has no referent and hence no application in the
United States today.
As we have recounted-and as all scholars agree-the founding
generation of Americans conceived of a militia as a group composed of
all free white males between age eighteen and forty-four621 (except for
620. As Professor Monaghan puts it, "[tihey [academic lawyers] have sought to sterilize the
concept [of original intent], most typically, by conceptualizing original intent at a level of
abstraction that, in effect, removes it as an interpretive constraint." Henry P. Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 378 (1981).
621. The ages at which men were required to render militia service varied from time to time,
colony to colony, and state to state before 1792, often set between 16 and 45, or even at 16 until
death. See Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 428; Bellesiles, supra note 198, at 582. Under the Uniform
Militia Act of 1792, which remained in force until 1903, men aged 18 through 44 were carried on
the rolls.
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the conscientious objectors and others entitled to an exemption),
responding as needed for the common defense, at the call of local
authority, and, above all, as a viable alternative to the feared standing
army. This renaissance republican conception was soon recognized as
the romance of revived classicism, and the militia gradually lost their
characteristic charisma. By the early twentieth century, they were
called by, trained by (1903), commanded by, armed by (1903), and
deployed by federal authority. Losing all distinction from the regular
army (1933), they were, by the middle of the twentieth century, nothing
but a shadow of the founders' dream. Even their image as the
personification of civic virtue had been fouled by disgraceful episodes
and disastrous campaigns dating back to the days when the sainted
George Washington was their commanding general. 62
This seems to us such a drastic change in the context of the term
that we are led to conclude that there is no contemporary, evolved
descendant of the eighteenth-century "militia" on today's landscape.
Although the present day National Guard units (successors to the
militia) still receive a sizable chunk of the federal defense budget 623 and
generally take their training and patriotism seriously, they are hardly of
the same genus as the militia as understood in the eighteenth century.
To cite only the most glaring distinction, they are part of the standing
army rather than an alternative to it. And if today's National Guard
fails to fit the concept of a militia, the notion is little short of ludicrous
that the constitutional term applies to the scattered, small, unregulated
bands of fatigue-clad, gun-loving, self-appointed libertarians taking
secret target practice in the woods.
In modem usage, then, the word "militia" -insofar as it is heard at
all-describes no organization genetically related to the ennobled
assembly identified by the term as originally written in the Constitution.
Therefore, the introductory clause of the Second Amendment is today
devoid of meaning, an empty vessel from which time and history have
sucked every trace of the considerable substance it once had. And the
right standing upon it-as the right memorialized in the second clause
does -collapses for lack of footing.
622. Regarding disgraceful performances by the militia during the Revolution, and
Washington's reactions thereto, see supra Washington's comments accompanying notes 272-75.
623. In 1999, 10% of the army allocation went to the guard, which amounted to 2.4% of the
total defense budget. See supra discussion accompanying notes 604-05.
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C. Generic Fidelity
The key to the distinction between those provisions that can and
cannot accommodate contextual shifts is generic fidelity. The test
question is whether the text in issue refers to a generic classification that
survives the contextual modification such that the provision of text can
be applied in the altered context without loss of fidelity to the original
conception. To us, this means that the critical term of text has a core
meaning that is readily applicable to new things or events that fall
within the clearly defined genus of the original term. Thus,
technological evolution produces changes in applications, but not of
generic meaning. And "arms" means exactly what it did, generically, in
the eighteenth century, though the actual weapons are much different.
So too, social context can affect application.
Had our military establishment evolved into a complex
organization that included a well-organized local contingent resembling
the Israeli or Swiss model of universal military service by citizens for
whom soldiering is not their primary vocation, its lineal descendant
might be alive today. The supposition is rather far-fetched, especially if
we include the factor of personal responsibility for providing the
weaponry. But, speculation aside, the right to arms acknowledged by
the Second Amendment has lost meaning today because it does not
have a generic application. Our militia has not evolved within its
original genus; it has, rather, become extinct. And the right cannot be
reinterpreted to mean a right to arms for sport or personal defense
without abandoning the imperative of fidelity. Such uses of weapons
are simply not of the same class or character as support for a well-
organized military corps that the framers envisioned. Hence, the
change of social context that saw the disappearance of the genus militia
deprived the right associated with it of meaning.
D. The Second Amendment Today
Proponents of a viable and vigorous Second Amendment like to
affiliate the rights expressed therein with the eternally youthful First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. 614  This active and
vigorous subset has survived all sorts of changes: linguistic, social, and
624. Levinson hints at this argument in the context of his metaphor regarding the New
Yorker-style map of the Bill of Rights, with the neo-rightist version of the map featuring the
Second Amendment in the foreground and the First Amendment vanishing into the Pacific. See
Levinson, supra note 7, at 637.
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technological-indeed, many have been reborn and came into their
prime in the latter half of the twentieth century. Of the lot, only one
might someday qualify as a parallel to the Second: the Eighth
Amendment right not to be held in excessive bail. One can imagine an
era when every defendant (save those truly dangerous people held in
custody under a pretrial preventive detention law like the federal Bail
Reform Act of 1984)625 will be automatically released for the pretrial
wait with some sort of electronic monitoring device to deter flight. This
sort of arrangement would make much sense and, let us suppose, it
totally replaces monetary bail as the means for securing future
attendance in court. It would thereby instantly render the excessive bail
provision of the Eighth Amendment obsolete. Monetary bail itself
would be anachronistic. The right not to be held awaiting trial on bail
that is too high, then, would become a meaningless entitlement and
would join the Second Amendment in a graceful (and indolent)
retirement.
AH the other rights embodied in the Bill of Rights, as we read
them, are distinguishable from the right granted by the Second
Amendment. A minor distinction might first be drawn between rights
granted as assurances against experienced or imagined government
abuses on the one hand and, on the other, rights granted as enabling
entitlements. The disappearance of an abuse that motivated the
adoption of the text does not render inactive the right proclaimed. If we
were fortunate enough to live in a time when confessions were no
longer coerced (and setting aside for the moment the Miranda decision
which may or may not be derived from the Fifth Amendment), the right
not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself would not lapse. So
too we might say that, even without threat of unwelcome soldiers
claiming a bed in our houses, we all still enjoy the right accorded by the
Third Amendment to be free of the visit.
The same sort of reasoning cannot be employed to preserve the
viability of the right granted by the Second Amendment. No abuse, real
or potential, motivated the adoption of that provision-unless you
count the perceived (though not firmly rejected) threat of a standing
army. The right granted was an enabling provision, providing the
means for the maintenance of an effective militia, rather than a
625. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-51. The provision was validated by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), against a challenge under the excessive bail
provision of the Eighth Amendment, among other grounds. The Court clearly held that the
Constitution does not limit the grounds for pretrial detentions to the prevention of flight, nor
does it entitle every defendant to a conditional release. See id. at 741.
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proscriptive one. The change in social context is not the removal of the
threat, real or imagined, but rather the disappearance of the enabled
institution. A right-ascending to the abstract, perhaps-remains
viable so long as the threatened activity may recur. It is a negative
entitlement: the right not to have an abuse imposed upon you. A
negative entitlement is, by nature, somewhat abstract. The affirmative
right to guns, by contrast, is active only insofar as it serves the social
purpose for which it was awarded. Because it is meaningless to enable a
defunct institution, the right decays with the decay of the institution it
serves.
The primary distinction between the Second Amendment and its
companions can be traced to a subtle shift in the intellectual framework
of American "rights talk" over the last half of the eighteenth century.
The Anglo-Americans discovered few, if any, new abstract rights during
the years surrounding or following the Revolution. Indeed, the rights
enumerated in the first ten amendments would have been familiar to
Locke or even Cromwell as aspects of constitutionalist doctrine. (This
is not to say that all the rights in the American Bill of Rights had
enforceable antecedents in actual English practice.) What had changed
so markedly by 1791 was not so much the content of Whig rights and
liberties, but the context in which those long familiar rights were
articulated and the theoretical foundations upon which they were now
constructed.
For most of the seventeenth century, English liberties were
explained, invoked, and grounded by reference to the ancient, mixed,
balanced constitution. They were considered important because they
preserved order and balance in a corporatist society. The constitution
(often called ancient or gothic) balanced the interests of three social and
political orders: the one (monarch), the few (lords), and the many
(commons). When the king, or the judiciary acting at his bidding,
disregarded ancient constituted liberties of subjects by imprisoning
them without charge or indictment, by refusing the writ of habeas
corpus, or by denying trial by jury, the magistracy endangered the
political equilibrium among the orders of society and, hence, imperiled
the mixed constitution.
626
Under the old way of thinking, liberties served to protect the
constitution. Rights were deemed just because they were (or were
claimed to be) ancient and established -that is to say, constituted.
When Charles I arrested the parliamentary leader John Pym and
626. See generally POCOCK, POLITICS, supra note 116, at 80-103.
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imprisoned him without sufficient, legally cognizable cause or adequate
procedure, parliamentarians were concerned not so much because
Pym's individual freedoms had been violated, but because his privileges
as a subject and parliamentarian were constituted safeguards against an
overreaching monarch, and the Crown's disregard for these safeguards
threatened imbalance. Pym's champions asserted his rights from a
corporatist perspective. They looked to preservation of the political
equilibrium among the social orders; their ultimate goal was
preservation of the balanced constitution by enforcing constituted
liberties.627
Nearly half a century later, John Locke was perfectly at home in
the political universe just described. As a 1680s Whig, he remained a
1640s Commonwealthman at heart. But he was also a great figure of
the Enlightenment, and he supplemented his Commonwealth
understanding of rights and liberties with a radical new set of
arguments. 628 In addition to being ancient, provident, constituted-and
therefore just and reasonable-the familiar catalogue of rights became,
in Locke's mind, rational. They were justified on the grounds that it was
logical and progressive that they should be respected. Rights became to
Locke not just cherished instrumental heirlooms, but fundamental
logical postulates of just political society.
Locke's political influence on pre-Revolutionary America was
more as a representative old Whig than as an apostle of reason, and in
this capacity his status fell short of Cato's or the Whig martyr Algernon
Sydney's. 629  But Locke had an enormous impact on American
philosophical sensibilities as the author of the Letter Concerning
Toleration as an epistemologist, as a moralist, and as a vision theorist.630
And this enlightened philosophy, so pervasive in the eighteenth century,
gradually reshaped the world in which the old Whiggish rights existed.
When twenty-two-year-old Madison returned from Princeton and saw
Baptist preachers imprisoned in Orange County, Virginia, he was
troubled not only for the instrumental reason that it was politically and
constitutionally destabilizing for the state to presume to exclude or
punish discourse or belief, but also because this imprisonment lacked
rational justification and therefore was unjust.631
627. See generally SOMMERVILLE, supra note 150, at 163-83.
628. On Locke's contributions to the development of political thought, moral theory, and
rationalism, see generally JOHN DUNN, LOCKE passim (1984).
629. See WILLS, supra note 119, at 170.
630. See id.
631. Cf MILLER, supra note 202, at 95-96.
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Jefferson, like Locke, was as Whiggish as any Commonwealthman.
But in his both brilliant and representative mind, the Whig foundations
for the rights of Englishmen were supplemented by thoroughly
enlightened, rationalistic, and theoretical justifications. In A Summary
View of the Rights of British America (1774),62 Jefferson justified
colonial rights against parliamentary abuse by masterfully blending the
Whiggish and the rational. By 1776, in the Declaration of
Independence, Jefferson postulated American and universal rights on
wholly rational grounds and, in so doing, created the Enlightenment's
quintessential natural rights theory-based political manifesto.
Thirteen years later, the American Bill of Rights marked a new
departure in "rights-talk" every bit as fundamental as the much
discussed and more abrupt departure in structuralism established by the
Constitution.633 In 1789, all of the elements of the Bill of Rights were in
a sense "bilingual," partaking of both the new natural rights learning
and their Whiggish English heritage; but the new discourse was clearly
ascendant-except in one (or maybe two) instances: the right to keep
and bear arms (and maybe the right against quartering). The right to
keep and bear arms was simply too wedded to balanced, corporatist,
historically rooted constitutionalism, and too steeped in the English
political experience to transition into a wholly rational, enlightened, and
abstract discourse about the fundamental postulates necessary to
elevate a just political order out of the state of nature. While the
procedural rights that once served to check the monarchy and preserve
the balance among orders easily became bulwarks of individual liberty,
the right not to be excluded from militia duty did not. An individual
liberty to participate in collective service to the commonweal was simply
a non sequitur.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, individualists like John
Stuart Mill cultivated a notion of rights essentially linked to the desire to
be left alone by the state. In this context, the right not to be charged
without grand jury indictment, so useful in preventing Charles I from
establishing an intimidatory absolutist state that would have undone the
corporatist balance, was just as useful for an individual who simply
wanted to be ignored by the trial courts unless the authorities had very
good cause. However, the right not to be prevented by the Crown from
doing militia duty so that the Crown could not justify the existence of a
632. JEFFERSON, supra note 221.
633. The classic interpretation of the new structuralist departure of Madison's Constitution
is of course WOOD, supra note 113, at 593-615.
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bullying standing army was not much use at all if one simply wanted to
wander in solitude about Walden Pond.
As Professor Powell and others have noted, the Second
Amendment and the Constitution as a whole descended from a
republican system of beliefs that featured a strong dose of
communitarian responsibility.6 34 But while, as Powell suggests, the
Second Amendment must be understood as a republican provision, the
rest of the Bill of Rights reflects more closely a rational, enlightened,
even liberal conception of individual rights; a conception shaped by
James Madison's tutelage in the classic writings of the Scottish, English,
and French Enlightenment under the eminent Scottish theologian and
philosopher James Witherspoon at Princeton,635 and sharpened and
refined fifteen years later by his correspondence with Jefferson and
immersion in the crates of eighteenth-century texts on political theory
his friend sent from Paris. 636 These other rights announced in 1789-
understood later as entitlements even against the majority of the people
or the communal interest-are in a sense antithetical to the ideals of
selfless service for the public weal that characterize the republican
model and the Second Amendment. While it is possible to view the
freedom of speech and press-even of religion-as serving
communitarian objectives, it seems much more comfortable today to
think of them as personal entitlements. The founding generation, while
still beholden to an older corporatist learning, was the first to conceive
of rights broadly according to this new paradigm. Jefferson and
Madison could readily offer historical, instrumental, and collective
justifications for the intellectual and procedural liberties they cherished,
but the nonmilitary rights ratified in 1791 no longer required the old
Whiggish props. They could stand, naturally, on their own footing.
It is largely in this then novel, natural, and individualistic guise that
the majority of the rights secured in 1791 have been transmitted to us
634. Speaking of constitutional text, Professor Powell writes:
[T]o the extent that the interpreter needs or wishes historical illumination on their
meaning, he is obligated as a historian to place them in a complex and unfamiliar
setting: classical-republican thought about the autonomous and virtuous citizen, the
British Country ideology that was developed in opposition to the Court
administrations of the early 1700's, notions ultimately derived from ancient Greece
concerning the inevitably redistributive tendencies of democracies, common law and
Whig ideas about traditional English liberties, and so on.
Powell, supra note 616, at 675.
635. See MILLER, supra note 202, at 88-91.
636. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 460; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Aug. 2, 1787), in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 662.
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today. Considering for instance the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
there seems little social purpose in prohibiting the search of private
spaces for inculpatory evidence, or even proscribing the enlistment of
an unwilling defendant in his own prosecution. These rights resonate
not because they serve the collective welfare, but because they protect
individuals (and all of us individuals) against abuse. Like the rights of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the basic trial rights detailed in the
Sixth Amendment might be said to enhance the social fabric by
establishing a "fair" system of criminal justice. But it is a stretch, even if
we could come to a universal understanding of "fair." The trial rights of
the Sixth and the guarantees of fair bail and punishment expressed in
the Eighth Amendment are, in essence, personal rights of a liberal
democracy. The Second Amendment right to bear arms in the militia is
typologically different. It does not speak to individual liberty, and it is
neither procedural nor intellectual in character. It is not even,
ahistorically speaking at least, political. It is social and instrumental.
Perhaps the founders linked it to a stated collective purpose because it
seemed intuitively unable to stand on its own as an unqualified assertion
of an individual's sovereign immunity against state interference. In fact,
to have meaning, the Second Amendment right required state
activation, or even, according to its own terms, "regulation."
Thus, we conclude as we began: the personal right to possess arms
constitutionalized in the Second Amendment must be understood in the
context in which it was written, as a grant to the individual constituents
of a communal military organization the means of making the militia
effective. The Amendment established an individual right serving a
collective, republican purpose. It was a grant of instrumental, enabling
power to individuals. No more. And for such an enabling right,
responsive to no threat of abuse of personal freedom, a change in the
underlying social assumptions so radically alters the context of the
enactment that the meaning must be rediscovered in the new context.
History has clearly written the conclusion: Today, no remnant of the
original context of the Second Amendment language survives. Without
those referents, linguistic and social, the meaning of the provision has
been lost and the right must be deemed to be in suspension.
This conclusion, we recognize, will be unpalatable to those who
claim that the threat of enforced disarmament posed today by
comprehensive gun control is just the sort of threatened abuse of
personal liberties that all the rights in the 1791 bill were designed to
preclude. It is no solace to them that the framers perceived no threat of
abuse of liberties in the restriction of weapons owned for purely private
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ends. It is enough for them that they perceive such a threat today. We
reply: Well it may be, but if such is your concern your resort must be to
the democratic institutions for remedy. The Constitution offers only
that protection articulated in its text, understood in the light of
prevailing context, and applied in new circumstances only to the extent
consistent with generic meaning. And all the historical evidence points
to a right heavily dependent on public purpose. Legislation must do the
rest.
E. Other Interpretations Considered
We have argued for the interpretation of the Second Amendment
that seems to us most closely in accord with the provision's text and
context, and most clearly consistent with late-eighteenth-century-era
understanding of its historically-rooted terms of art. There are, of
course, other interpretations of the Amendment's well-known paired
clauses. We pause here to note in some detail only three of the most
interesting academic perspectives that differ in varying degrees from
our own reading.6 7 Of these, the first two, proffered by Professors Carl
Bogus and Sanford Levinson, relate to original intent, while the third,
argued by Professor William Van Alstyne, relies entirely on the
Amendment's "plain" facial meaning, obviating inquiry into intent.
Dividing the three on a different scale, Bogus favors a "collectivist"
reading while Levinson and Van Alstyne side with the "individualist/
insurrectionist" group. After coming to grips with the challenges to our
own thesis inherent in these three perspectives, we return-in
conclusion-to the question of how far fundamental changes to the
militia during the last two centuries effect the vitality of constitutional
language premised on the continuance of an institution no longer
meaningfully analogous to its founding-era antecedent, and give our
final answer.
1. Carl Bogus: An Armed Militia Being Necessary to the Security of
a Slave State
One scholar who has proposed an alternative to our republican
interpretation of the Second Amendment is Professor Carl Bogus of
Roger Williams University, a participant in and guiding spirit of this
Symposium. In his thoughtful and challenging Hidden History of the
637. We do not mean by this economical selection to disparage other contributions to the
debate, some of which have been widely cited.
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Second Amendment,63 8 Professor Bogus advances two fundamental
propositions. The first is that the Second Amendment was designed to
secure a collective right rather than a personal liberty.639 The second is
that the framers' purpose of preserving a collective right to arms
responded directly to strong Southern fears that Congress might disarm
the Southern state militias and thereby undermine social control over
the slave population.640
Bogus's first proposition, linking the right to arms to service in the
militia, puts him in good company. Indeed, it is premised ultimately on
the same classically republican propositions that underlie our reading of
the Amendment,641 even if Bogus at one point dismisses anti-army
sentiment as no more than recycled newspaper rhetoric.642 To be sure,
we differ with him on the importance of the Amendment's main clause
establishing a personal right. However, our difference on this point is
largely a matter of emphasis, as the individual right to arms, in our view,
is expressly conditioned on collective civic responsibility.643
But Bogus's second proposition is, we think, misguided. It is novel,
and explicit documentary evidence to support it is scarce. Thus, Bogus
is forced to build his argument on a series of inferences, some of which,
we feel, are seriously mistaken. For instance, Bogus relies heavily on
the Stono, South Carolina rebellion of 1739. But major slave uprisings
on the North American continent were diminishingly rare-in the
eighteenth century even more so than in the nineteenth. 644 In fact, the
638. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
309 (1998).
639. See id. at 408 ("The Amendment deals with keeping and bearing arms in the militia,
subject to federal and state regulation. Therefore, to the extent original intent matters, the
hidden history of the Second Amendment strongly supports the collective rights position.").
640. See id. at 321. In Professor Bogus's words:
The Second Amendment ... was written to assure the Southern states that Congress
would not undermine the slave system by using its newly acquired constitutional
authority over the militia to disarm the state militia and thereby destroy the South's
principal instrument of slave control. In effect, the Second Amendment supplemented
the slavery compromise made at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and
obliquely codified in other constitutional provisions.
Id.
641. Bogus relies on the same recent classics of republican historiography as the present
authors. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 3-90; POCOCK, supra note 2, at 506-52. For documentary
sources supporting a republican interpretation of the Revolution and Constitution, see 1
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, supra note 2, passim, and especially
the pamphlets cited therefrom in WOOD, supra note 113, at 629-33.
642. See Bogus, supra note 638, at 356.
643. Bogus also sets out to demonstrate that the "insurrectionist" interpretation-founded
on a translation of English experience a century before-is deeply flawed. See id. at 386-404. In
this, too, we heartily join forces with Professor Bogus, endorsing his reliance on several sources,
authorities, and persuasive arguments.
644. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE
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Stono rebellion, along with a Long Island/New York City insurrection
of similarly ancient vintage, was one of only two notable domestic slave
revolts to have occurred before 1789, when the First Congress took the
Second Amendment under consideration. 645 Thus, when the militia
596-97 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972). Although slave rebellion was rare in America in the late
eighteenth century, slave resistance was endemic, and resistance frequently took a violent turn.
From "stealing" food to breaking tools to sabotaging crops to burning woodlands, violence
against property formed part of the annual cycle on the plantation. See id. at 597-621; JOHN W.
BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY 225 (1979). The potential for escalation from
vandalism into violence against people lurked, at least dully, in the back of every planter's mind.
See id. at 225, 235-37; GENOVESE, supra, at 595. Occasionally, when the newspapers reported
that a slave was tried for murder of a white person, that unrest had flared in the West Indies,
that slaves aboard a slave ship had mutinied, Southern planters' awareness became keen and
direct. See id. at 615-17. Vigilance was heightened. See id. Suspicion of poisonings became
rampant. See id. Less enlightened planters feared the conjurers and medicine men. See
BLASSINGAME, supra, at 113; GENOVESE, supra, at 224-25. And occasionally, as when the
refugees from the Haitian Revolution arrived in 1791-93, when Gabriel Prosser plotted in 1800,
and when Nat Turner rose in 1831, whites reacted systemically, if not entirely consistently.
Gabriel's plot hastened the repeal of Virginia's liberal revolutionary era manumission laws
(accomplished 1806). See 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION 131 (1990).
Nat Turner's Rebellion prompted Thomas Jefferson Randolph to introduce a post-nati
emancipation measure in the Virginia legislature which could well have passed had western
counties been proportionately represented. See id. at 186-88.
645. In his most systematic analysis of slave resistance in the New World, Eugene
Genovese-probably the foremost authority on the history of American slavery-acknowledges
that full-blown slave rebellions were notably rare on the North American mainland. See
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, FROM REBELLION TO REVOLUTION: AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVE
REVOLTS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 49-50 (1979). Notwithstanding his
ideological identification with the heroism of the rebels, Genovese joins many other historians
in taking issue with the tabulation of 250 American slave rebellions and conspiracies cited by
Bogus. Those calculations, performed by Herbert Aptheker some fifty years ago, rated abortive
conspiracies in the same column as revolts and rebellions. In William Freehling's words,
"[h]istorians have rightly emphasized that Herbert Aptheker's American Negro Slave
Revolts... is a history not of revolts achieved but of alleged plans gone awry." 1 FREEHLING,
supra note 644, at 579 n.6. According to Genovese, over the entire 243-year period of African
slavery in mainland British North America and the United States, there are records of only four
sustained violent slave uprisings involving large numbers of slaves or large-scale loss of white
life (New York/Long Island 1712 (approximately 25 slaves involved); Stono, South Carolina,
1744 (approximately 100 slaves involved); St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, 1811 (up to 500
slaves organized into military units may have been involved); Nat Turner's Revolt,
Southampton County, Virginia, 1831 (60-70 slaves involved, as many as 70 whites killed)
(omitting the Seminole War of 1835-1842, involving campaigns by U.S. regulars against the
Seminole Indians of Florida and their maroon allies, who had escaped from slavery in Georgia
and South Carolina, often many years before, and costing the U.S. Army 1600 dead and $30-40
million)). See GENOVESE, supra note 644, at 588; GENOVESE, supra, at 41-50, 73. But even if
major revolts were uncommon in America, Southern fear of the potential for violence was
pervasive, in part because of the example of the West Indies and South America, where violent
resistance, and even war, was endemic. See id. at 49-50. The comparatively much larger white
population on the North American mainland stacked the odds in favor of the whites, and served
as a deterrent to insurrection, while less oppressive conditions-at least outside of the Carolina
rice coast-made the impetus to rebellion less desperate than in the islands or South America.
See id.; BLASSINGAME, supra note 644, at 214-15. Ultimately however, Genovese concurs with
Bogus and Aptheker on the essential point that mainland Anglo-American whites were wary,
and that they relied on their militia, the lynch mob, and disproportionate retribution to maintain
security in the plantation districts. See GENOVESE, supra, at 42, 106-07.
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Amendment was drafted, slaveholders were likely less obsessed with
potential revolts than Bogus supposes.
And yet his suspicions are not wholly misplaced. It is true that
Southerners during the critical period were at least dully aware of the
latent potential for violent resistance,646 and that Southern militia took
prominent and leading roles in putting down the major slave
disturbances of the nineteenth century. To give Bogus his due,
Southern state militias suppressed the Gabriel Plot in Virginia in 1800,
the Denmark Vesey Conspiracy in South Carolina in 1822, and Nat
Turner's Rebellion in Virginia in 1831. 647 But it is well to keep in mind
that these attempts at insurrection occurred nine, thirty-one, and forty
years after the Second Amendment was ratified. In 1788, when the
Virginia Ratifying Convention-on whose deliberations and
motivations Bogus's thesis avowedly turns-called for assurance of the
rights of local militiamen to bear arms, the plantations appeared quiet,
Stono (nearly fifty year's distant) was more legend than recollection,
and no one foresaw the nineteenth-century insurrections.
Notwithstanding the seeming settled tranquility on the mainland
plantations during the summer of constitutional ratification, Bogus
might have marshaled stronger circumstantial evidence to support a
claim regarding the minds of the Virginia ratifiers of the Bill of Rights in
1791. Of more immediate impact than Stono on the last ratifiers of the
Second Amendment were very recent events that Bogus fails to
mention.648 On August 22, 1791, the largest slave revolt in Western
history erupted on the island of Haiti, when the 200,000 slaves in the
French colony of Saint-Domingue rose against the island's 20,000 gens
du coleur and 20,000 whites.649 Most of the colony's whites were killed
646. See GENOVESE, supra note 644, at 117. But even Genovese makes the point that this
realization did not acquire sufficient force to drive Southern political behavior until Haiti,
Gabriel Prosser, St. John the Baptist Parish, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner had amplified the
slave rebels' image in American planters' minds, that is to say, until after the Second
Amendment had been ratified. Cf id. at 113-25.
647. Then again, the militia lost its nerve at Harper's Ferry in 1859, and stood by idly while
Colonel Robert E. Lee and a detachment of marines from Washington stormed the arsenal. For
an interesting account of the events surrounding the John Brown-led abortive slave
insurrection, see The Santa Fe Trail, a 1940 feature film starring Errol Flynn (as J.E.B. Stuart),
Ronald Reagan (as George Armstrong Custer), Olivia de Havilland (as Jefferson Davis's
daughter, and the love interest of both the aforementioned), and Alan Hale, who later gained
fame as the Skipper on Gilligan's Island (as a comical sutler turned field gunner).
648. Perhaps the explanation is Bogus's heavy emphasis on the debates of 1788 on the
ratification of the main body of the Constitution and the animating fears behind them. He looks
more to the call for the right to arms than the ratification of the Second Amendment as the
critical bit of business. He thus ignores the state of mind that might have illuminated the
meaning of the provision that the Virginian assembly adopted in the Bill of Rights.
649. See generally THOMAS 0. OTT, THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION 1789-1804 (1973).
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by 1793, but several hundred refugees made it safely to Virginia, and a
smaller number to other Southern states. Their arrival touched off an
obsessive and soul-searching debate on slavery, security, and
manumission in the Virginia newspapers, running many pages of print
in the commonwealth's numerous weeklies and semi-weeklies. This
debate began before Virginia became the ninth state to ratify the Bill of
Rights and the Second Amendment passed into law, and thus certainly
impacted the state senators who considered the Second Amendment in
the fall of 1791.650
Whether events in Haiti-striking as they were-influenced the
Virginians' understanding of the militia-related language they were
ratifying in late 1791 is, however, another question. The outcome of
that inquiry (and, indeed, the validity of the hypothesis that
slaveholders feared an abolitionist plot to disarm the militia by means of
the federal militia powers) must be called into question by the
subsequent Southern stance on the creation of new federal militia law.
It was in 1792, at the very height of the violence in Haiti, that the
national government made its first concerted effort to regulate and
standardize the state militia under the militia powers by passing the
Uniform Militia Act. If Bogus were right about the legislative intent
behind the Second Amendment and the adamancy of Southern
insistence on local control of the militia qua slave patrol, then one
would expect that the same men who championed a Second
Amendment focused on slave control would have made themselves
heard regarding the Militia Act. But no member of the House,
Southern or otherwise, voiced slavery-related opposition to the federal
control over the militia established in the Act, even though the
impending militia legislation was hotly debated for many months.651
650. The influx of refugees from Haiti did not peak until the summer of 1793, when white
resistance to the revolution collapsed. But even as the Virginia Senate considered the Bill of
Rights in the fall of 1791, Southern newspapers obsessed about what was already history's
bloodiest revolution against white colonial rule. See id. at 53. Nor were Southern state
governments silent on Haiti while ratification of the Second Amendment was under
consideration. In September 1791, Governor Charles Pinckney of South Carolina dispatched
the following to the Colonial Assembly of Saint-Domingue: "When we recollect how nearly
similar the situation of the Southern States and St. Domingo are in the profusion of slaves-that
a day may arrive when they may be exposed to the same insurrections-we cannot but sensibly
feel for your situation." Id. Thus, by the time the Virginia Senate ratified the Second
Amendment on December 15, 1791, the senators were well aware that thousands of whites and
tens of thousands of blacks had been killed in Saint-Domingue/Haiti. But when Madison
drafted the Amendment in 1789, his nearest domestic reminder of the potential for slave
insurrection of a scale sufficient to challenge the collective safety of white Southerners was
indeed Stono, then 48 years distant.
651. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1851-75 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1790);
supra discussion accompanying notes 482-91.
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The absence of such statements renders doubtful the proposition that
Southern members feared a Northern plot to use the federal militia
powers to disarm the Southerners with a view to unleashing a second
Haiti on the mainland. If Southern members had no such fears in 1792,
with the political climate sensitized by the much reported slaughter of
their fellow planters, it seems even less likely that they were burdened
by fears of federal disarmament on behalf of putative slave rebels
during the relatively (racially) tranquil summer of 1789 when Madison
and associates drafted the Amendment.
In the absence of explicit documentation, Bogus relies on the
Second Amendment's "hidden" history to make his case that white fear
of black violence generated constitutional protection for the collective
right to keep and bear arms in the militia. He points out that it is not
altogether surprising that expressions of the true purpose of the Second
Amendment are lacking since slavery, and certainly the repression of
slaves, was seldom mentioned by name in the state papers and
manifestos of the Revolutionary years. 6 2 And true enough, of the
twelve members to speak while the proposed Amendment was under
consideration, not one mentioned slavery.653 "A decent respect to the
opinions of mankind," to use the Jeffersonian locution, dictated that the
issue, if broached at all, be broached delicately. It is, however,
significant that when questions bearing directly on local control over
slaves and slavery were raised in the Constitutional Convention,
654
652. In Staughton Lynd's words:
[W]e know why the Founders did not use the words "slave" and "slavery" in the
Constitution. Paterson of New Jersey stated in the Convention that when, in 1783, the
Continental Congress changed its eighth Article of Confederation so that slaves would
henceforth be included in apportioning taxation among the States, the Congress "had
been ashamed to use the term 'Slaves' and had substituted a description." Iredell, in
the Virginia ratifying convention, said similarly that the fugitive slave clause of the
proposed Constitution did not use the word "slave" because of the "particular
scruples" of the "northern delegates"; and in 1798 Dayton of New Jersey, who had
been a member of the Convention, told the House of Representatives that the purpose
was to avoid any "stain" on the new government. If for Northern delegates the motive
was shame, for Southern members of the Convention it was prudence. Madison wrote
to Lafayette in 1830, referring to emancipation: "I scarcely express myself too strongly
in saying, that any allusion in the Convention to the subject you have so much at heart
would have been a spark to a mass of gunpowder."
Staughton Lynd, The Abolitionist Critique of the United States Constitution, in THE ANTI-
SLAVERY VANGUARD: NEW ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITIONISTS 209, 215-16 (Martin Duberman
ed., 1965).
653. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778-80, 796 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
654. See WILLIAM M. WtECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM 68
(1977) (South Carolina's Pierce Butler instructed the Convention that "[tihe security the
Southn. States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which some gentlemen
within or without doors, have a very good mind to do." (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 331, at 605)). As Wiecek comments, "[i]f Butler
seriously thought any of his colleagues contemplated emancipation, he was hallucinating. But
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slavery was defended-by name in the debates and by euphemism in
the constitutional instrument itself.655  South Carolina was then and
always in the vanguard of proslavery militancy, and when the vital
interests of slavery were at issue-however remotely-South
Carolinians were the first to speak. But they were not heard on slavery
during the debate on the Bill of Rights. South Carolina was clearly not
as animated in 1789 by concerns that Congress or the president might
disarm the militia as it was in 1787 by concerns that the Northeast might
carry disproportionate weight in the federal Congress or unduly burden
the South with debt under the proposed Constitution. In 1789, unlike
1787,656 1819-20,657 1832-33,658 1844-46,659 1848-50,660 1857,661 or 1860-
he had expressed an elemental slave-state response to real or imagined exogenous pressures on
slavery that would characterize southern constitutionalism until the Civil War." Id.
655. Wiecek identifies ten clauses of the Constitution "that directly or indirectly
accommodated [eight aspects of] the peculiar institution" in 1787. Id. at 62. Wiecek lists these
as (1) Article I, Section 2 (apportionment of representation according to three-fifths ratio); (2)
Article I, Section 2 and Article I, Section 9 (apportionment of direct taxes among the states
according to the three-fifths ratio); (3) Article I, Section 9 (twenty-year moratorium on
congressional action to abolish the international slave trade); (4) Article IV, Section 2 (Fugitive
Slave Clause); (5) Article I, Section 8 (Congress granted power to call forth state militias to
suppress insurrections); (6) Article IV, Section 4 (federal government required to protect states
against domestic violence); (7) Article V (provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clauses 1 and 4
(regarding slave trade abolition and direct taxes) made unamendable); and (8) Article I, Section
9 and Article I, Section 10 (prohibition on taxing exports). See id. at 62-63. Only the clauses
listed at one through four on Wiecek's list address slavery directly, and none mentions slavery
by name. Cf DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 19-27 (1978) (identifying only three clauses addressing the
existence of slavery). The euphemisms employed in the constitutional text are: Article I,
Section 2 "three fifths of all other persons"; Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 "such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit"; and Article IV, Section 2, Clause 4
"Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof." Id. at 27.
Fehrenbacher makes the point that by not sanctioning slavery by name, and only dealing "with
[certain] peripheral features of the institution," the Constitution of 1787 cannot be said to have
legitimized slavery. Id. at 26.
656. The crisis over counting slave population for purposes of apportioning states'
representation in Congress and share of direct federal taxes was resolved by the "Great
Compromise" at the Constitutional Convention, establishing the three to five ratio. See
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 655, at 20.
657. The crisis over Missouri's application for admission as a slave state was resolved by the
Compromise of 1820. See id. at 100-13.
658. The crisis over South Carolina's nullification of the so-called Tariff of Abominations
eased when South Carolina acknowledged federal authority and Congress lowered the tariff
rates. See 1 FREEHLING, supra note 644, at 272-86.
659. The crisis surrounding the annexation of Texas. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 655,
at 124-28.
660. The crisis surrounding the status of slavery in the territories ceded by Mexico after her
defeat in the Mexican-American War was resolved by the Compromise of 1850. See id. at 157-
63.
661. The crisis surrounding Kansas's petition for admission under rival "free" and "slave"
Constitutions, and the announcement of the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case
festered until secession. See id. at 203-08.
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61,662 no threats of disunion issued, no secessionist stock phrases were
uttered, and no fighting honor was invoked.663 South Carolina did not,
along with whatever support it could rally among its Southern kindred,
threaten to walk out of the Union if slavery was not vouched safe for
the ages.664 The Bill of Rights debate, and more particularly the House
debate on the proposed Second Amendment, simply lacks this telltale
sign and, all told, did not bear the hallmarks of a slavery-focused
constitutional crisis. Rather, the debate sounded in terms of civic
humanism and other values that did not divide along latitudinal lines.665
Ample and readily accessible evidence attests to the anxiety of
Southern whites over social control and safety in the plantation
districts,666 but this local concern hardly proves that Southern drafters of
the Second Amendment feared an abolitionist cabal to disarm the
patrols. Occasionally, Bogus hedges his bets and appears to say no
more than that the preservation of an armed local military force was of
paramount importance in the states where slavery was most widespread
and firmly rooted, and this much is little more than a truism. More
frequently, however, Bogus asserts forthrightly that the Southern
imperative for slave control created the need for, determined the
content of, and ultimately led to the adoption of the Second
Amendment. 667 This much the familiar evidence will not bear.
662. The final constitutional crisis over slavery ushered in secession and the Civil War. See
id. at 544-45, 555-56.
663. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778-80 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
664. See 1 FREEHLING, supra note 644, at 253-86, passim (relating an interesting if slightly
unorthodox analysis of the recurring pattern of secessionist posturing during the great
antebellum constitutional crises).
665. For an authoritative discussion of the pervasiveness of republicanism across all regions
of the country (discussing the drafting of the state constitutions), see WOOD, supra note 113, at
125-255.
666. For exposition and examination of numerous documents relating to slave resistance of
varying levels of violence, see GENOVESE, supra note 645; and the controversial HERBERT
APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS (1949). But see discussion supra note 645
(cautioning about the accuracy of Aptheker's findings).
667. See "strong forms" of the argument set out in Bogus, supra note 638, at 368 ("As a
Virginian, Madison knew that the militia's prime function in his state, and throughout the
South, was slave control. His use of the word 'security' is consistent with his writing the
amendment for the specific purpose of assuring the Southern states, and particularly his
constituents in Virginia, that the federal government would not undermine their security against
slave insurrection by disarming the militia."); id. at 371 ("Madison's colleagues in the House and
Senate almost certainly considered the Second Amendment to be part of the slavery
compromise."); id. at 407-08 ("The Constitution had given Congress the power to organize and
arm the militia. Focusing on this provision, the anti-Federalists sent a chill down the spine of
the South: would Congress, deliberately or through indifference, destabilize the slave system by
'disarming' the state militia? ... [T]he Second Amendment was written to assure the South that
the militia-the very same militia described in the main body of the Constitution-could be
armed even if Congress elected not to arm them or otherwise attempted to 'disarm' them.").
But compare "bet-hedging" variations of the argument set out by Bogus in id. at 408 ("Whether
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Equally problematic is the failure of Bogus's argument to take
account of cross-sectional support for the Second Amendment. The
Antifederalist movement that gave impetus to the adoption of the Bill
of Rights drew support broadly in the new states. While, as Bogus
reminds us, Virginia was a crucial state in the process of securing
constitutional protection for the right to keep and bear arms,
668
republican misgivings concerning a standing army, and hence popular
emphasis on the importance of the citizen's militia, came as strongly
from the North as from the South.669  And given the pacifistic,
nonconfrontational character of the late-eighteenth-century antislavery
movement, 60 we think it highly unlikely that Virginia and other
plantation states could have feared that Northern abolitionists would so
dominate the federal government that they might deprive their
Southern brothers of arms in order to encourage slave revolt.6
1
Perhaps the most serious quarrel we have with the Bogus slave-
suppression thesis is that it ignores the linkage between the
maintenance of a militia and the prevalent repugnance for a
professional standing army. This association of ideas seems to us to be
so open, strong, and pervasive that it easily overcomes the marginal
energy the movement might have acquired from sectional anxiety. In
the face of what seems to us manifest, Bogus disparages the importance
of the founding generation's support for the militia as an alternative to
the feared standing army. Thus, he says: "While some anti-Federalists
continued to talk about the evils of a standing army, they had lost this
argument in Philadelphia. ' 672  Presumably, he means that the
Constitutional Convention itself had resolved the issue: Congress was
granted the power to establish a peacetime army. From this resolution,
Bogus suggests that there could have been no residual concern with the
dangers of a professional army to motivate the adoption of measures
protecting the armament of the civilian alternative. Hence he argues, in
effect, the reason for the formulation and adoption of the Second
Madison personally shared this fear cannot today be known .... "); id. at 366 ("We do not know
why Madison chose to draft his provision precisely this way.").
668. See, e.g., id. at 358, 364.
669. See discussion of militia-related Antifederalist critiques of the Constitution supra Part
I.B.4 (demonstrating strong Northern support for amending the Constitution to support what
Jefferson called the right "against standing armies").
670. See discussion infra notes 696-710 and accompanying text.
671. Bogus asserts that the Virginia delegates to the ratifying convention in Richmond
"knew that the Northern states were increasingly disgusted by slavery," and he cites the
egalitarian preamble to the Declaration of Independence along with Northern "[a]bolition[ist]
fervor." Bogus, supra note 638, at 328-30.
672. Id. at 349.
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Amendment must have been some other concern, and the most likely,
although covert, candidate is slave control.
It is certainly true that the troubling issue of the power of the
central government to raise, train, and maintain a regular army was
settled by the time the draft constitution was ratified in 1789. The
standing army was to be supported only in two-year intervals, at the will
of Congress, and was subject to civilian command; but the regular army
was indeed a federal fact. To that extent, Bogus is right: the Federalists
had had their way. But the issue was far from resolved against
republican apprehensions. The first Congress authorized a standing
army of only two thousand men. It was clear -and still a matter of high
priority on the Antifederalist agenda -that the professional army was to
be only part of the military story. The same instrument that established
the army recognized an independent militia, albeit a militia that was
largely under the control of Congress and the president. Contrary to
Bogus's thesis, we see the Second Amendment as a response to the
Antifederalists' urgent concern that the new-fledged regular army not
be allowed to overwhelm and obviate the citizen brigades.
67 3
Professor Bogus stresses the importance of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights-the score of proposed amendments and second
score of hortatory provisions that became the model for the Bill of
Rights. In particular, he relies on the seventeenth provision, which
contains language very much like the Second Amendment. It provides:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well
regulated Militia composed of the body of the people trained to
arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State. That
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and
therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and
protection of the Community will admit; and that in all cases the
military should be under strict subordination to and governed by
the Civil power.
67 4
Bogus's reliance on this document is somewhat puzzling. In one
breath, he disparages the proclaimed right to arms as "a cathartic
exercise for the defeated anti-Federalists," 675 consisting of nothing but
"rhetoric recycled from newspaper articles and from speeches made and
rejected at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. '67 6 In the
next, he regards the Declaration as a significant departure from the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, which contained no provision for a right
673. See supra Part I.B.4.
674. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 338, at 182.
675. Bogus, supra note 638, at 356.
676. Id.
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to bear arms. Between 1776 and 1788, Bogus contends, "Mason and
Henry had raised the specter of the national government undermining
the slave system by disarming the state militia. '67  Thus, he would have
us believe, the model for the Second Amendment included the
provision of an armed militia in direct response to Virginians' fears of
slave revolt (itself hardly an exercise in empty rhetoric).
We are not persuaded. It seems to us highly unlikely that this
Declaration consciously departed from Virginia's 1776 Bill of Rights to
send a secret message for perpetuation of an ad hoc system of slave
repression. We do not stress the irony that such a proposal should be
made to defend a slave state by reciting the importance of defending a
free state, as other language in the Virginia Declaration more clearly
asserts a different purpose than saving the militia from the abolitionists.
Most obviously, the text expresses support for the armed militia as the
preferred alternative to a standing army. The face of the provision
could hardly be more explicit, the safe defense by a militia being
immediately juxtaposed to the dangerous standing army. This cannot
be fairly dismissed as recycled newspaper rhetoric; rather, the army-
militia dichotomy goes to the heart of military-related rights set out in
the Virginia Declaration. Moreover, no covert hint can be discerned in
the language that the people of Virginia sought domestic tranquility by
the exercise of police power. The document might have been drawn
otherwise if, as Bogus suggests, Virginians conceived of their militia
primarily as a patrol force rather than a hedge against a standing army.
There were, of course, no domestic police units in the eighteenth
century; the concept of a local peacekeeping and law enforcement body
wholly independent of the military did not really arrive on the
American scene until the middle of the nineteenth century.678 But
Virginians could, if such was their thinking, express the value of the
armed militia as domestic peacekeepers without ever mentioning the
forbidden word. Rather than calling for a well-regulated and armed
militia as an alternative to a standing army, they might have appealed to
the need to protect the lives and property of law abiding citizens from
the depredations of outlaws or savages, as was done in the passages of
the Declaration of Independence indicting Britain for inciting slave
revolt,679 or to the importance of bringing criminals to justice, as was
677. Id. at 357.
678. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 52-53, 55 (1980); WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES 73 (1973).
679. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776) ("[The king of Great
Britain] has excited domestic Insurrections amongst us.").
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done in the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution. 680 It is, we submit,
significant that the framers of the Virginia Declaration of Rights chose
not to do so. More fundamentally still, as even Bogus acknowledges,
the right to bear arms did not originate in Richmond. Several states,
including Massachusetts, which abolished slavery by judicial decision in
1783,68 had already incorporated the right to bear arms in their
constitutions before the federal Constitution was ratified in 1789.682
Bogus also turns to the Declaration of Rights to search for clues to
the mind of James Madison, reluctant champion of the Bill of Rights
and drafter of the Second Amendment. 683 Bogus thinks there is little
doubt that item seventeen of Virginia's Declaration became the
template for the Second Amendment. He therefore skillfully employs
the textualist's literary device and examines for significance the words
dropped or changed. He is not surprised to find that the architect of
federalism substituted the word "country" for "State" in the
Declaration.684 He discusses the syntactical change from a right granted,
as expressed by the Virginia draft, to a restraint on infringement of a
presumably inherent right in the Madisonian style that we know
today.65 He suggests that Madison dropped the language defining the
militia as "composed of the body of the people trained to arms" because
it appeared to undercut the provision in Article I, Section 8 granting to
680. The Fugitive Slave Clause provides:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom
such Service or Labour may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
681. See Commonwealth v. Jennison, (Mass. 1783) (unreported), reprinted in PAUL
FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 36 (1986). Jennison is discussed in
ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43-50
(1975). In a series of cases relating to Jennison's efforts to keep Quock Walker enslaved and
avoid prosecution or liability for beating him, terminating in the above referenced case,
Massachusetts established the illegality of slavery. See id. One of the grounds cited for this
decision was that slavery violated Article I of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780,
which provided "All men are born free and equal." Id. at 44. Thus, in Massachusetts, the same
state bill of rights that protected the right to bear arms, see infra note 682, in language strikingly
similar to Virginia's and that of the future Second Amendment, was responsible for ending
slavery, not securing it.
682. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided:
The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. And as in
time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without
the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact
subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 338, at 183.
683. See Bogus, supra note 638, at 366-69.
684. See id. at 368.
685. See id. at 367.
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Congress the authority to "provide for organizing" the militia.686 The
exegesis then arrives at Madison's editorial alteration critical for
Bogus's thesis.
Where the Virginia model stipulated that the militia is "the proper,
natural and safe defence of a free State," Madison wrote, "the best
security of a free country." Passing the substitution of "best" for
"proper, natural and safe," Bogus emphasizes that the myth of a militia
as a defense against foreign invasion had been long discredited, 68 but
Madison knew that security-in the South, at least-meant protection
against slave revolt. The implication of Professor Bogus's point is
unmistakable: Madison, a Southern slave owner, crafted the Second
Amendment to serve the purposes of slave control.68 The argument is,
we think, mistaken.
Security, we concede, suggests a broader purpose than defense. But
security itself implies a broader concept than social control on the
plantations. Either security or defense might be employed to express
several potential uses of a well-regulated militia in the new nation,
including provision of protection against frontier Indian tribes or
incursion by foreign troops. But beyond these basic military purposes,
security could apply to a variety of functions less aptly labeled defensive,
such as suppression of antitax or debt-relief mobs like the Shaysites.
And while security better describes the function of stamping out
domestic insurrection than does defense, it also aptly captures the state
of being politically secure against the dangers of expensive and
corrupting standing armies, a function defense entirely fails to address.689
686. See id.
687. See id. at 368. Veteran officers may well have despaired of the militia's fighting
effectiveness. See supra notes 274-81 (Washington) and note 364 (Hamilton) and accompanying
text. But, from the standpoint of political ideology as opposed to military policy, the perhaps
"mythological" effectiveness of the militia as a bulwark against foreign invasion remained a
powerful symbol. See, for example, Madison's invocation of the militia near half a million men
in The Federalist No. 46, discussed supra text accompanying note 366.
688. In fairness, Professor Bogus says only that his exegesis is "consistent with" the purpose
he suggests, not that it is compelled by it. See Bogus, supra note 638, at 368. But we think the
argument is nonetheless mustered to support the thesis.
689. While defense implies making resistance to a real or potential physical attack, security
suggests additionally and much more broadly maintaining a state of safety. Financial
instruments and insurance policies afforded in the eighteenth century, and continue to afford in
the twenty-first, a sense of security (and can even be traded as securities), but they were not
then and are not now called defensive weapons. When Jefferson informed Madison that the
people were entitled to "a bill of rights providing ... for.., protection against standing armies,"
see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 68, at 440; discussion supra
notes 379-80 and accompanying text, he did not mean military protection against a huge
marching army so much as political security that such an army would not be assembled in the
first place and financial security that such an army would not be funded by taxation or debt.
Both defense and security imply protection. But security has a wider reference, and the safety
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Moreover, there was still-among the die-hard Antifederalists, at
least -substantial concern that the autonomy and integrity of the
individual states would be transgressed by the central government, and
security against such a threat better expressed the object of antifederal
militia enthusiasts than defense. Indeed, the word secure, used in its
other location in the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment, refers quite
pointedly to protection against federal governmental incursion.
In arguing for his thesis, Bogus recites the comments, the speeches,
and the subjective consciousness of the Virginia delegates to the
ratifying convention in Richmond in 1788 as though this band of
patriots had devised, promoted, and by themselves enacted the Second
Amendment.690  Meanwhile, Bogus ignores the commentary of
congressmen during the floor debates in the U.S. House of
Representatives relating directly to the pending Amendment itself.
During the debates in the House, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was
the Amendment's most devoted and long-winded advocate,
notwithstanding the many changes he favored to the version reported
from the Select Committee. 691 Nearly as vocal was Congressman
Benson of New York.692 While six of the twelve members to join the
debate in favor of the Second Amendment were Southerners
(expansively defined),693 an equal number of Northerners (restrictively
that comes with security can be of a type several levels removed from confrontation with real or
potential physical aggression. The Defense Department assures one type of safety, the Social
Security Administration another. The National Security Administration, if it really exists,
presumably provides for both military and political security. From a classical republican
perspective, the militia provided both security in the form of military defense, and security in
the form of political stability.
690. "But for the events at Richmond," Bogus writes, "it is doubtful that Madison would
have included a right to bear arms in his proposed list of rights." Bogus, supra note 638, at 364.
Later he states, "The events at the Richmond ratifying convention in June 1788 provided the
impetus for embodying a right to bear arms in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 375.
691. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778-80, 796 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
692. See id. at 779-80.
693. See id. at 778-80 (Joshua Seney and Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland, John Vining of
Delaware, James Jackson of Georgia, and William Smith and Aedanus Burke of South
Carolina). Note that these six Southerners included a member from Delaware and two from
Maryland. Seney's remarks, moreover, were of a humorous rather than a political stripe. And
while South Carolina's Burke was indubitably a Deep South member with slavery's interests at
heart, his commentary affords perhaps the clearest evidence that Congress was animated by
civic-humanist concerns rather than fear of slave rebellion. Burke did not think the Second
Amendment strong enough security against the dangers of standing armies, and
proposed to add to the clause just agreed to, an amendment to the following effect: "A
standing army of regular troops in time of peace is dangerous to public liberty, and
such shall not be raised or kept up in time of peace but from necessity, and for the
security of the people, nor then without the consent of two-thirds of the members
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defined) spoke in favor of the Amendment.694 More telling, however, is
the breakdown of states whose ratifying conventions appended
recommended amendments: Georgia recommended none, and South
Carolina recommended only mechanical changes to the federal system
unrelated to the militia (but very likely related to the security of
slavery). The states to recommend an amendment protecting the right
to bear arms in the militia were Pennsylvania, New Hampshire,
Virginia, and North Carolina.695 In 1789, these states were considered
hotbeds of republicanism, not of the slavocracy.
In a larger sense, Bogus is right, of course: passage of the Second
Amendment, with its recognition of the importance of the militia's role
in maintaining social peace, was not irrelevant to the future of slavery.
But slave repression was also not an issue that pitted Northern interests
against Southern or even Deep Southern. At the time of the
Constitutional Convention, most delegates, North and South, assumed,
perhaps mistakenly, the existence of a broad, moderate, nationwide
antislavery consensus, at least among the educated classes.696 To the
north of Georgia and South Carolina at least, the enlightened elite
generally agreed that slavery was unjust and that it should one day be
abolished. What, if anything, to do about working its abolition was
generally a different-and much harder-question. 697  But among a
smaller subset of thinkers with evangelical or philosophical inclinations
(again, and more emphatically here, north of South Carolina) it seemed
increasingly certain that termination of the trans-Atlantic slave trade
was a liberal, enlightened, and Christian short-term objective in its own
right, and perhaps a necessary or even sufficient step towards
emancipation as well. 698 A canvass of delegates at the Constitutional
Convention would have revealed that, as one moved further South, the
abstract antislavery commitment waned by degrees, becoming
694. See id. at 778-80, 796 (Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, Egbert Benson of New York, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, and Thomas Hartley
and Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania).
695. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 329, at 157-58.
696. The argument for a transsectional Revolutionary-era consensus on (anti)slavery-or at
least the widespread illusion of such a consensus -is set forth cogently in MACLEOD, supra note
358, at 29-38. On the emergence of worldwide antislavery opinion in the late eighteenth
century, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1770-1823, at 41-49 (1975).
697. Nevertheless, during the Revolutionary period, significant numbers of Southerners
endorsed with varying degrees of commitment private manumissions, slave trade abolition, and
colonization-linked emancipation. See MACLEOD, supra note 358, at 29-31. Southerners also
took permissive stances on freedom suits. See id. at 109-26; DAVIS, supra note 696, at 196-212; 1
FREEHLING, supra note 644, at 121-43.
698. See DAVIS, supra note 696, at 48.
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tempered in the major slaveholding regions by a sense that-evil or
not-slavery remained necessary for the sake of social stability until
African deportation could be effected. 699 Only in the extreme South-
in South Carolina and Georgia-was slavery justified openly for the
sake of economic utility, for without coerced labor, the fertile rice
marshes of South Carolina and Georgia would revert to wasteland. °°
But even South Carolinians hesitated to speak openly of slavery's
unmitigated virtues in the Revolutionary years. And with fire-eating
not yet ascendant, Northern antislavery advocates remained quiescent,
sharing with most of their enlightened compatriots in the North, and
even the upper South, the belief that slavery, left to its own devices and
the munificent course of progress and unforced policy, would continue
quietly along a course towards ultimate extinction. 0'
In these optimistic, forward-thinking Revolutionary years,
Southerners had little reason to fear the abolitionist zeal of the
Northern states. The North was still in the process of effecting gradual
emancipation on its own turf, and before 1800, the lower tier of
Northern states hardly seemed farther down the road to freedom than
the upper tier of Southern ones.702 No Northerners articulated a desire
to interfere actively with Southern slavery in the constitutional period.
No Northern antislavery man or woman of that day would have
699. The archetypal post-Haiti Jeffersonian variation of this theme was that while slave
ownership was inherently immoral, rapid whole-scale emancipation without removal of the
freedmen would lead to intolerably bloody social dislocation, or even racial Armageddon.
Consider Jefferson's famous formulation of this position during the Missouri controversy, by
which time more radically antislavery ideals he had entertained during the Revolutionary era
had been subsumed by temporizing and rationalization:
The cession of that kind of property, for so it is misnamed, is a bagatelle which would
not cost me a second thought, if, in that way, a general emancipation and expatriation
could be effected; and, gradually, and with due sacrifices, I think it might be. But as it
is, we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go.
Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes (Apr. 22, 1820), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 248, 249 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1905).
700. Rawlins Lowndes issued a classic exposition of this position during the South Carolina
legislature's debates on ratification. He warned that Northerners would avail themselves of
powers vested in the federal government to foist slave trade abolition on South Carolina.
According to the reporter's summary, Lowndes argued that
[wlithout negroes, this state would degenerate into one of the most contemptible in the
Union;... [Lowndes] cited an expression that fell from General Pinckney on a former
debate, that whilst there remained one acre of swamp-land in South Carolina, he
should raise his voice against restricting the importation of negroes.... Negroes were
our wealth, our only natural resource; yet behold how our kind friends in the north
were determined soon to tie up our hands, and drain us of what we had!
4 STATE DEBATES, supra note 98, at 272-73, quoted in Bogus, supra note 638, at 357.
701. See generally 1 FREEHLING, supra note 644, at 121-31; MAcLEOD, supra note 358, at
41-49.
702. See DAVIS, supra note 696, at 23-32, 84-89; MACLEOD, supra note 358, at 98-99.
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dreamed of disarming any Southern militia to facilitate slave
insurrections. This was simply not the style of late-eighteenth-century
antislavery. Benjamin Franklin was no John Brown.7 3 The consensus
among antislavery leaders in the 1780s and '90s hardly favored slave
rebellion, let alone slave rebellion instigated by Northern intervention
in the South.7°4 Franklin and the other American Revolutionaries had
long been desperate to proclaim that their own rebellion was no
rebellion at all, but a legitimate exercise of authority to preserve the
British Constitution from perversion.7 5 Stirring up an actual social
rebellion such as the one unfolding in France was anathema in the eyes
of the staid, enlightened gradualists who first spoke out against slavery
during the late eighteenth century. Antislavery was a respectable, not a
heretical, cause. °6 In the Revolutionary era, antislavery leaders pursued
abolition of the slave trade, freedom suits on behalf of individual slaves,
state-level gradual emancipation laws, and improvement of the
condition of freed people.7 °7 Thus, their programs could take much the
same form on either side of the Mason-Dixon Line. In the 1780s and
'90s, the overwhelmingly Quaker-and hence pacifist-American
Convention (of state-level abolition societies) did not seek to set the
plantations aflame with righteous liberty, and its devotees did not pray
the Lord to wash away the sins of the nation in a sea of blood.708 When
703. See DAVIS, supra note 696, at 84. Far removed from Garrisonian immediatism,
Franklin warned (in true Jeffersonian fashion) that "slavery is such an atrocious debasement of
human nature, that its very extirpation, if not performed with solicitous care, may sometimes
open up a source of serious evils." Id. Franklin was chairman of the Pennsylvania Abolition
Society. See id. at 100.
704. See id.
705. See WOOD, supra note 113, at 12-13.
706. See DAVIS, supra note 696, at 48 (regarding the emergence of an antislavery
mainstream in the Western world); see also ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE OVERTHROW OF
COLONIAL SLAVERY, 1776-1848, at 121-22 (1988).
707. See WIECEK, supra note 654, at 84-88.
708. See DAVIS, supra note 696, at 215-22. But consider also the following commentary of
Luther Martin at the Constitutional Convention:
[N]ational crimes ... frequently are punished in this world, by national punishments;
and.., continuance of the slave-trade,... giving it a national sanction and
encouragement, ought to be considered as justly exposing us to the displeasure and
vengeance of Him, who is equally Lord of all, and who views with equal eye the poor
African slave and his American master.
Id. at 323 (quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 331, at
211 (eighteenth-century emphasis of nearly every word omitted)). To be sure, Martin feared
that the Lord might take to washing away sins if America did not repent of its slaveholding
ways, but this is not the same thing as bidding Him haste to do so in the later day fashion of
John Brown. It should also be noted that Martin was addressing the slave trade rather than
slaveholding, and that his perspective was absurdly millennial by the deistic standards of the late
eighteenth century. See id. at 322-23. Thus even the most extreme antislavery formulation of
the constitutional period lacks the interventionist quality of late 1850s radical abolitionist
rhetoric. It was also expounded-less threateningly from the Southern viewpoint-not by a
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the Second Amendment was ratified, South Carolinians, ever slavery's
sentinels, had no activists to fear among the philosophically inclined
antislavery salons of Philadelphia, and they had not yet conjured
millennialists like Nat Turner or John Brown out of the American social
fabric.7 °9
In sum, in 1789, and surely by the fall of 1791 (when news of Haiti
was pouring in), some Southern slaveholders saw in the promise of the
Second Amendment, assurance that their local armed militia troops
would be free to continue patrols to discourage major slave uprisings
and to suppress occasional lawlessness. But such sentiment was
scattered and incidental, and hardly the motivating and actuating force
that generated the drafting and adoption of the Second Amendment.
Professor Bogus can come up with no historical evidence that Southern
champions feared that Northern abolitionists would deprive them of
arms, leaving them helpless in the face of a slave rebellion. Nor is his
thesis plausible in the light of what we know of the moderate character
and gradualist inclinations of the influential political figures of the day.
The inescapable historical fact that torpedoes Professor Bogus's theory
is that the call for an Antifederalist limitation on the powers granted by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution came from Northern as well as
Southern states. Conversely, his root premise that Southerners from
1787 to 1791 feared Northern-instigated federal intervention to facilitate
slave violence in the plantation districts cannot accommodate the
Article IV, Section 4 guarantee that "[t]he United States... protect
each of [the states] ... on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence," or the broad support that that provision garnered from
Northern and Southern delegates alike. And so we return to what
seems to us obvious on the face of the historical record: the guarantee of
an armed militia was sought and enacted to counterbalance the federal
army and to assure states that they would remain securely free of
federal military oppression.710
New Englander, but by a delegate from Maryland who was considered somewhat eccentric.
709. They soon would do precisely that, blaming "Jacobin" intermeddlers for Haiti and the
death of thousands of their fellow slave masters. See MACLEOD, supra note 358, at 154-58.
710. While we disagree with Professor Bogus's thesis that the Second Amendment was
designed to secure the South against potential abolitionist-inspired disarmament of the militia,
we should hasten to add that his supposition of a threat by abolitionist-minded Northern
politicians to weaken slavery in the South through aggressive use of the federal powers does not
strike us as historically misguided, but only as chronologically misplaced. Commitment to use
powers constitutionally vested in the federal government to attack slavery became a mainstay of
Republican Party ideology in the late 1850s, and this commitment was incorporated in the
platform of 1860. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
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2. Sanford Levinson: Citizen Guerillas Being Necessary to the
Security of a Free State
Professor Sanford Levinson disagrees with us that the Second
Amendment slumbers alongside its dormant companion, the Third. He
vehemently protests any suggestion of obsolescence shared with letters
of marque and reprisal and the granting of titles of nobility.7" "The
Second Amendment," he writes, "is radically different from these other
pieces of constitutional text. '712  Support for this assertion is not
summoned from history or doctrinal analysis. Rather, Levinson cites
the frequent appearance of letters to the editor, congressional
campaigns, and the deep concern of members of both the ACLU and
the NRA. He thus casts his contribution to the debate in distinctly
political terms.
In his short, oddly casual comment, published in 1989, Levinson's
only purpose appears to have been to rouse interest in what he
believed to be an unjustly ignored provision of the Bill of Rights.
Courts and scholars, he complained, had failed to give the Second
Amendment the attention that the peoples' interest demanded.
Indeed, as he later explained,
The point of my own Essay, The Embarrassing Second Amendment,
as I have tried on occasion to explain to journalists who want me to
take a strong substantive position, is that this wooden reliance on
Miller,713 coupled with a refusal to confront seriously the arguments
made by such thoughtful opponents of federal regulation of guns as
Senator Orrin Hatch, is fundamentally disrespectful.
714
Levinson insists that it is not his "style to offer 'correct' or
'incorrect' interpretations of the Constitution," and that his only aim is
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 76-80, 83-87 (1970). Thus, by the time
Lincoln first sought the presidency, at least the radical wing of his party favored using the
commerce power to restrict or terminate the interstate slave trade, congressional action to moot
Dred Scott and banish slavery from the territories, and declaration that every federal enclave-
including the District of Columbia-was free soil. No doubt Sumner and Chase would have
favored disarming the patrols as well, if that were within the federal power. The Second
Amendment, however, assured that such action could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. But
when the Amendment was proposed some seventy years before, disarmament for the slaves'
sake was without the realm of possibility, or even contemplation. Antifederalists feared the
specter of Caesarism, not of a mad John Brown elected Speaker of the House.
711. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; id. § 9, cl. 8.
712. Levinson, supra note 7, at 641.
713. The 1939 decision of the Supreme Court holding that the purpose of the Second
Amendment was to "assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [the
militia]." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); see also supra discussion
accompanying notes 34-36.
714. Sanford Levinson, Is the Second Amendment Finally Becoming Recognized As Part of
the Constitution? Voices from the Courts, 1998 BYU L. REV. 127, 129.
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to introduce "skepticism" regarding the "elite, liberal" views epitomized
by Professor Laurence Tribe's then "offhand treatment" of the
subject.715 However, Levinson's somewhat rambling tour of the subject
is susceptible of the reading that it has been commonly accorded:
support for those who contend that the provision prohibits any
interference by Congress with the private possession of guns. Thus he
writes: "[I]t seems tendentious [presumably in the sense of partisan] to
reject out of hand the argument that one purpose of the Amendment
was to recognize the individual's right to engage in armed self-defense
against criminal conduct. '7 16  Further departing from his ostensible
neutrality, Levinson notes that he, for one, has been persuaded that the
term "militia" does not have the "limited reference" to a
"communitarian right" but instead refers to "all of the people, or at
least those treated as full citizens of the community. '717  Levinson,
regrettably, is far from forthright about the point of his conversion to
the individualist interpretation.
He abandons, somewhat reluctantly, the notion (today associated
with Professor Lott)711 that private firearms curtail crime. Thus, he
writes: "Circumstances may well have changed in regard to individual
defense, although we ignore at our political peril the good-faith belief of
many Americans that they cannot rely on the police for protection
against a variety of criminals. '7 9 Levinson then comes to what may be
the crux of this odd-almost coy-argument. While disclaiming
anarchy and withholding the claim that the state is "necessarily
tyrannical," he cites the suppression of the people on Tiananmen
Square to demonstrate that "it seems foolish to assume that the armed
state will necessarily be benevolent."720 This leads to what he terms "the
principal point, that a state facing a totally disarmed population is in a
far better position, for good or for ill, to suppress popular
demonstrations and uprisings than one that must calculate the
possibilities of its soldiers and officials being injured or killed. '721 So
Levinson arrives ultimately at the neo-Lockean assertion that, in the
715. Levinson, supra note 7, at 642. Professor Tribe has since revised his assessment of the
Second Amendment and adopted a position that resonates more closely with Levinson's. See 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 897 n.211 (3d ed. 2000).
716. Levinson, supra note 7, at 645-46.
717. Id. at 646-47.
718. See JOHN R. LoTr, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND
GUN-CONTROL LAWS (1998).
719. Levinson, supra note 7, at 656.
720. Id.
721. Id. at 657.
[Vol. 76:403
THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN CONTEXT
final analysis, the right of armed insurrection is a necessary safeguard
against a tyrannical state.
Yet to the extent-circumlocutions and disavowals notwith-
standing-that Levinson's sketchy but influential paper comes down to
a reading of the Second Amendment as assurance that the people, as
individuals, will have the means to resist the oppression of the state, it is
highly dubious even under the republican banner that Levinson unfurls.
Although Levinson does not pursue the point to its theoretical
foundations, the Second Amendment is based on Whig ideology and
political heritage that postulated constitutional justifications for armed
resistance to illegitimate governance and tyranny in seventeenth-
century Stuart England. These doctrines in turn played a prominent
role in legitimizing the American Revolution. The crucial point for
present purposes, we insist, is that this aspect of radical Whiggery was
forsaken with the adoption of the first seven articles of the Constitution.
The question of how to remedy tyrannical rule was hardly one of
first impression for the seventeenth-century Whigs or Revolutionary
Americans. Resistance to tyranny is one of the oldest problems of
political thought, forming a central theme in the historical and
philosophical writings of the Greeks and Romans. More precisely, the
question was not so much how to bring about the end of illegitimate or
impolitic rule-banishment and indeed tyrannicide were direct and
obvious solutions-but how to justify those ultimate remedies, and
when to invoke them.722 In seventeenth-century England, particularly
after the execution of Charles I, the answer to this question assumed a
distinctly republican cast that foreshadowed the drift towards American
independence in the second half of the next century. To most post-
Restoration Whigs, the remedy against tyranny involved, in the last
instance, coerced substitution of one king for another rather than
abolition of the monarchy. But this violent substitution had now
become enmeshed in layers of legitimizing nuance and constitutional
doctrine that specified limits on kingly government and defined tests by
which to establish whether those limits had been transgressed. John
Locke's Second Treatise of Government, a quasi-official manifesto for
the failed revolutions of 1683723 and 1685724 and the successful one of
722. See, for example, PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 568D-569C, on the desires of the demos
(people) to end tyrannical rule; ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1315bll-1316b27, on the impermanence
of tyrannies and the scarcity of long-lived tyrannical states; PLUTARCH, LIFE OF CAESAR paras.
57-61, on the reasons justifying the assassination of Julius Caesar.
723. For commentary on the constitutional issues behind the Rye House Plot of 1683, see
ASHCRAFT, supra note 119, at 338-407.
724. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of the Duke of Monmouth's
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1688-89,725 epitomizes the Whigs' canonical approach to resistance
theory.
To Locke, the right of resistance was premised on the "Dissolution
of Government," for nothing could have been more alien to his
Whiggish purpose than the forceful overthrow of just, legitimate
polity.72 6  Although Locke developed the people's right to resist
arbitrary power as a fundamental, timeless right, his immediate
objective in the Second Treatise was to justify resistance against the
specific abuses of Charles II, and in so doing firm up the resolve of
conspirators planning a general insurrection and an attempt on the
king's life outside the "Rye House" as he made his way back to the
capital from races at Newmarket.7 27 Locke argued, much as Jefferson
later would in the Declaration of Independence, that the king had
violated the peoples' trust in the magistracy, effectively "unkinging"
himself and so dissolving the civic compact. To this end, Locke
considered two fundamental conditions under which "governments are
dissolved from within," namely (1) "alteration" of the legislature7 2 and
(2) violation of the public trust.7 29 These amounted, in more modern
parlance, to means whereby the executive might assume or subvert the
lawmaking function of the legislature or the law-finding function of the
judiciary. The first condition arose whenever power to make laws was
usurped in contravention of the law, and popularly delegated authority
thereby excluded from power. The second obtained wherever
corruption became so endemic as to preclude the processes of
legitimate governance in any branch.
Locke took pains to argue that removal of Charles II would not
constitute treason. He defined rebellion narrowly as opposition to just
authority "founded only in the Constitutions and Laws of the
Government."730  By this definition, whenever princes, ministers, or
legislators violated the constitution and thereby brought about the
dissolution of government, it was they who were guilty of rebellion. In
the literal Latin sense of rebello, they returned to a state of war by
dissolving the laws preserving "Society and Civil Government." '731 To
Rebellion of 1685, see id. at 447-70.
725. See discussion of the Glorious Revolution supra Part I.A.3.
726. JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, § 212 (Peter Laslett ed.,
student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
727. See ASHCRAFT, supra note 119, at 364-65.
728. See LOCKE, supra note 726, § 212, at 407-08.
729. See id. § 221, at 412.
730. Id. § 226, at 415-16.
731. Id.
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Locke and the radical Whigs he spoke for, there remained no doubt but
that Charles had breached his trust by invading the "lives, liberties, and
estates of the people. '732 In so doing, he dissolved the government. The
people and the monarch, then, were placed in opposition, but there
remained no earthly court to hear their dispute. The king's refusal to
rule under law and abide by the law caused a return to the pre-political
state of perpetual war, and left the people no appeal but to heaven for
vindication of their abridged rights and liberties.
Lockean overtones are unmistakable in the Declaration of
Independence. Jefferson's list of grievances against George III mirrors
Locke's indictment of Charles II for dissolving the government from
within, both by altering the legislature and by breach of trust. Jefferson,
of course, did not simply derive his grievances from Locke. Not only do
the Declaration's grievances correspond to particular acts of the
Westminster Parliament in the 1760s and '70s, they largely rehearse a
list established by the Continental Congress in its Bill of Rights and List
of Grievances and Declaration of Causes.733 Nonetheless, a comparison
of the Second Treatise and the Declaration of Independence reveals a
remarkable continuity in Whig ideology and in Whig resistance theory.
The Revolution of 1688-89 provided more than a historical lens through
which Americans understood their own Revolution. It established the
typology of revolutionary politics that Americans applied to their
experiences. And it proved particularly apt in that the ministry of
George III possessed an uncanny capacity to repeat the failed measures
of the past century as it confronted increasingly intractable colonial
legislatures, growing ever more adamant in their insistence that the
guarantees settled in the last revolution applied in America as in
England.
More even than their hostility to arbitrary power, Locke and
Jefferson shared a suspicion of ministerial conspiracy against liberty,
and a conviction that such conspiracy justified resistance. In this
respect, some have argued that Jefferson was so compelled by Locke's
language that he chose to incorporate it into the Declaration.73 In the
732. Id. § 240, at 426-27.
733. See The Bill of Rights [and] a List of Grievances, reprinted in A DECENT RESPECT TO THE
OPINIONS OF MANKIND: CONGRESSIONAL STATE PAPERS 1774-1776, at 49, 49-57 (James H.
Hutson ed., 1975); A Declaration: By the Representatives of the United Colonies of North-
America, Now Met in General Congress at Philadelphia, Seting Forth the Causes and Necessity of
Their Taking Up Arms, reprinted in A DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND:
CONGRESSIONAL STATE PAPERS 1774-1776, supra, at 89, 89-98.
734. For an interesting discussion on whether the Second Treatise exercised direct influence
on Jefferson's drafting of the Declaration of Independence, see WILLS, supra note 119, at 167-
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Second Treatise, Locke warned,
But if a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending
the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they
cannot but feel what they be under, and see wither they are going;
it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouze themselves,
and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to
them the ends for which government was first erected.
735
Ninety-seven years later, in the Declaration, Jefferson wrote,
But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, begun at a
distinguished period and pursuing invariably the same object,
evinces a design to reduce the [people] under absolute despotism, it
is their right, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to
provide new guards for their future security.
Thus Jefferson's Declaration of 1776, although developed
independently and adapted to different political purposes-abolishing
the monarchy rather than altering the monarch -resounds
unmistakably in the language of Lockean resistance theory. Indeed, if
the Second Amendment were an appendage to the Declaration of
Independence, one might plausibly argue that its context (though not its
text) suggested a purpose of preserving a right to insurrection, if only in
cases where the government of the day was guilty of a long series of
illegal and extraconstitutional transgressions of the class meticulously
described in the Declaration and in Locke's Second Treatise. But the
Second Amendment, of course, is not amended to the Declaration, but
to the Constitution of 1787. And how different Madison's constitutional
universe of 1787 was from Jefferson's of 1776!736 After 1787, with
80, passim, which excerpts Jefferson's own rebuttal to the charge of plagiarism, leveled nearly
forty years after the fact when Locke's Treatises had become more widely known in America
than they were at the Revolution. Wills takes the unorthodox position that Jefferson's phrasing
owed more to mid-eighteenth-century Scottish writings (particularly those of Francis
Hutcheson) than to any manifestoes, pamphlets, or treatises from the Real Whig tradition. Our
view is in harmony with Jefferson's own above referenced characterization that "[aill [the
Declaration's] authority rests ... on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed
in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as
Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sydney, etc., &c." See id. at 172. In other words, Jefferson sounds like
Locke, not because he consciously echoes Locke, but because they both spoke the language of
Whiggery (leavened to differing degrees by enlightened sentiments), and both developed
fundamentals of Whig resistance theory that were as commonplace among the American
patriots as they had been among the Real Whigs of Shaftesbury's, Sidney's, Robert Ferguson's,
Molesworth's, and Locke's day.
735. See LOCKE, supra note 726, § 225, at 415.
736. For a fascinating discussion of Jefferson and Madison's exchanges on constitutionalism
after Jefferson's retirement, see ELLIS, supra note 374, at 275-79. At times in old age, the
"Constitution" apparently meant to Jefferson, not Madison's articles of 1787 and the
subsequent amendments, but the principals of the "Good Old Cause" literature on resistance to
the Stuarts! At these moments, for Jefferson, Real Whiggery still trumped ratification. To
Madison, of course, the written Constitution was self-evidently the highest law of the land. It
seems odd that Jefferson should "just not get it," and deny the fundamental reality at the core of
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remedies against usurpation defined in the constitutional instrument
itself, recourse to external bodies of law or theory was no longer
required to right the ship of state if the government became corrupted.
For purposes of American constitutionalism, Lockean resistance theory
was therefore relegated into dormancy.
The Madisonian specification of instrumental remedies against
tyranny effected the most profound transformation in American
constitutional history.737 By spelling out precisely what remedies were
available to defined bodies of the peoples' magistrates or
representatives in the event of unconstitutional governmental action,
Madison bypassed two unanswerable questions that had forever vexed
Whiggish constitutionalism, namely (1) who constituted the people
entitled to determine when the sovereign had unkinged himself and (2)
what means other than the sword might arbitrate between rival factions
claiming to embody the vox populi in the event of constitutional crises.
Mooting these old conundrums worked two fundamental consequences.
First, civil war ceased to be the court of last resort for troublesome
constitutional questions (excepting, ultimately, only the question of
federal territorial jurisdiction over slavery, and even this question
required resolution by war only because secession dictated forceful
reintegration of the South as a precondition for the reestablishment of
federal authority). Second, the impossible demands that the old
constitutional paradigm had placed on popular civic virtue now fell
silent. No longer was constitutional legitimacy linked to the sainthood
of the voting and office-holding classes. No longer was the incessant
conspiracy watch a lynchpin of legitimacy. Institutional avenues of
balance redressment now replaced the fateful heroes who once stood
guard against corruption. In short order, these institutional systems
acquired legitimacy in the popular eye. Constitutional disputation (at
the American political system. The truth is that he obviously had grasped the situation back in
1787; indeed, it was Jefferson who argued to Madison that the Bill of Rights would be no mere
parchment barrier because the federal courts would be able to exercise judicial review of
government actions and enforce the amendments. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 659, 659.
But in retirement Jefferson traveled back blissfully from the world of structuralism to the
constitutionalism of his rebellious youth. There is a wonderful irony that the man who had been
the most Francophile, most enlightened, most rational, most anti-English, most progressive, and
most egalitarian of the American Revolutionaries should at the end of his days rediscover that
he was at heart still a seventeenth-century English Country Whig.
737. For the classic statement of the argument that the Constitution should not be conceived
of as a counter-revolutionary reaction against the liberalism of the Revolution, but rather that
the fundamental theoretical innovations embodied in Madison's structuralism and instrumen-
talism ushered in a revolutionary new style of democratic constitutionalism unlike anything
known before, see WOOD, supra note 113, at 593-615; discussion supra Part I.B.2-3.
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least constitutional disputation unrelated to slavery) lost its martial
edge.
In his Embarrassing Second Amendment, Levinson endeavors an
extra-textual resurrection of the old heroic doctrine of violent resistance
two-hundred-odd years after its abandonment by the ratifiers. This
effort is ill advised. It is imprudent, in that the Madisonian structural
model, since its installation in 1788, has worked better than the old
"system" of constitutional arbitration. And it is dangerous because the
self-anointed vigilantes of today are far removed in outlook, virtue,
perspective, education, experience, and public-spiritedness from the
Lockeans of yesteryear. The Earl of Shaftesbury, John Locke, and
Algernon Sidney in the 1680s, like John Adams, Benjamin Franklin,
and Thomas Jefferson in the 1770s, were the most educated and
forward-looking public servants of their times. They spoke for
substantial bodies of thoughtful, public-spirited people committed to
the rule of law, who nevertheless believed that a right of resistance
against extreme forms of extralegal rule represented a rational,
principled, and positive alternative to a hopeless subordination to
unchecked, arbitrary absolutism. In their hands, the public weal was
truly safer than in those of royal placemen and salaried fools who
flattered themselves unanswerable to the law. The old Whigs nobly laid
the foundations of American republicanism. Their refusal to accept the
Stuarts' asserted civic duty of nonresistance, like their hostility to
military establishment, helped prevent the English-speaking world from
falling under the absolutism that reigned in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Europe. But in 1787, their doctrine of entitlement
to resist arbitrary authority was supplanted by the new constitutionalism
and the fixation of a nonarbitrary system of government in America.
And no matter how low our opinion of twenty-first-century American
politicians or civil servants, today's gun-wielding insurrectionists' claim
to have better title to determine policy (or annul policy) for the nation
than the constitutionally established and constitutionally answerable
government cannot be justified by implausible analogy to historical
principles long since forsaken. Perhaps Levinson can picture today's
American "militia" safeguarding our independence by raising their
beloved assault weapons against government tanks on some future
Tiananmen Square. Alas, we cannot.
The insurmountable problem with the insurrectionism Levinson
endorses is its hopeless vagueness and the fundamental irresolvability of
any political question submitted to its arbitrage. The "principle" of
insurrectionism, particularly in the modern, postdeferential society we
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live in, is no principle at all unless it comes to grips with the question of
who is justified to undertake armed resistance in the face of tyranny,
usurpation, or difference of opinion on constitutional issues. One of the
old answers to this ancient question was the army. This was the
Cromwellian solution,738 and it is also the solution of modern Turkish
constitutionalism, which provides that the army has the duty to
intervene in civil affairs to protect the constitutional system and
maintain constitutional rule.739 Army intervention, however, becomes
decidedly unrepublican if the army does not represent the virtuous
nation in arms, but instead serves the heavy hand of a corrupted
magistracy or a tyrannical usurper.
Another historically favored solution, to which this paper has
devoted considerable attention, is of course the common militia
composed of virtuous citizens under the command of their elected
natural leaders. In that guise, the militia embodied the people or acted
as agent for the people. The conventional Whig view of the militia as
the "constitutional army" or even as the "army of the constitution" thus
required only slight reformulation along less martial and more political
lines to yield Locke's solution of 1683, John and Samuel Adams's of
1774-75, and Jefferson's of 1776 that the "people" were entitled to
determine if and when the government had breached its trust, and in the
event that it had, to intervene and institute new government. But this
principle of popular intervention as a last resort for reestablishment of
constitutional rule brings us all the way back to the original dilemma of
determining who defines the people entitled to intervene-all the more
so because pivotal constitutional questions by their very nature foster
differences of opinion and passionate factionalism. Locke himself
wrestled elsewhere (in the Letter Concerning Toleration) with the
unknowability of complete truth and inevitable prevalence of error in
human society.7 40 The appeal to arms or to heaven represented the
invocation of a higher authority to arbitrate between rival claimants to
the truth. The results of such appeal in constitutional cases could be
very bloody. In 1688 they were not, because the anti-Stuart consensus
738. See, e.g., POCOCK, supra note 2, at 372, 376-77; discussion supra notes 165-74 and
accompanying text.
739. See TURK. CONST. preamble; id. art. 122; see also Ergun Ozbudun, Constitutional Law,
in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 19, 22-25 (Tugrul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 1996)
(discussing army interventions in the name of the preservation of constitutionalism carried out
in 1960 and 1980 and leading to the establishment of new constitutional instruments in 1961 and
1982). Mr. Merkel thanks noted Ottomanist Can Erimtan of Istanbul and Lady Margaret Hall,
Oxford, for bringing this aspect of Turkish constitutionalism to his attention.
740. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689).
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was so strong that once the Dutch army took the field, the English
militia joined them and the English army melted away. In 1775, things
were very different. One-third of the population favored the patriot
cause, one-third were loyal to the Crown, and one-third tried to stay
neutral. By 1783, perhaps twenty thousand had been killed on the
battlefields, and tens of thousands of loyalists were dispossessed and
exiled.
741
The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 devised a third way to
adjudge constitutional disputes, one involving appeals to heaven by
neither army nor people. This was the Madisonian solution of
constitutionally defined mechanisms to resolve impasses and rectify
abuses. 742 Under the system ratified in 1788, frequent, regular elections
were fixed permanently on foundations more solid than those
underlying the Septennial Act of 1716, and the old Whig doctrine that
legislators must periodically be reduced to civilian status was placed
beyond the reach of Congress. After ratification, when executive
officials -including the president of the United States-claimed to be
immune to process, or to be the ultimate, unilateral arbiters of the
constitutionality of their actions or inactions, or even, in the most
extreme cases, to be beyond accountability to the law, they could now
be compelled by judicial order to answer to and comply with judicially
determined standards of constitutional propriety (consider Marbury v.
Madison, the Aaron Burr trial, the Steel Seizure Cases, and United States
v. Nixon). When the president refused to assent to salubrious laws or to
execute existing laws, Congress might now resort to the override or to
impeachment (both illustrated by the Thirty-ninth Congress's
showdown with Andrew Johnson). When states overstepped their
bounds and judged or legislated in derogation of the Constitution,
federal judicial review now provided a corrective (asserted in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, Cohens v. Virginia, and McCulloch v. Maryland). The
case for the radicalism of Madison's innovations and the related case for
ratification's overthrow of the old Whig right of insurrection are
buttressed by Professor Jack Rakove's convincing argument that the
Convention intended federal judicial review to extend also to
741. Howard Peckham lists 6,824 battlefield deaths out of 25,324 deaths in service on the
"American" side alone. See TOLL OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 271, at 130. Imperial losses
(British, German, and free black) were listed as high as 70,000 by contemporary critics of the
War, but this figure appears greatly exaggerated. Id. at 132. Peckham does not estimate Native
American losses. As a proportion of the population, only the Civil War took a more gruesome
toll on the nation.
742. Cf. WOOD, supra note 113, at 543-62.
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congressional lawmaking.7 43 In fact, Representative Egbert Benson's
above-referenced comments during the debates on the Second
Amendment7" afford strong evidence that, with ratification, judicial
review of federal lawmaking was integrated by the framers into the
constitutional design in 1788, rather than spun from whole cloth by
Chief Justice John Marshall with the Marbury decision in 1803. And
finally, the Constitution established the process of amendment in case
the constitutional system itself should prove insufficient to meet
unforeseen crises (consider the Twelfth Amendment as a response to
the near theft of the presidency by Aaron Burr) or inadequate to cope
with fundamentally altered circumstances (addressed by the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments). The variety and diversity of
remedies provide additional assurance that no usurper could nullify
them all. Thus, so long as these constitutionally guaranteed mechanisms
endure, constitutional government continues capable of unseating a
tyrant and of resisting an abusive office holder; and the moment of
Lockean reversion to first principles need never, and (from the
perspective of constitutional legitimacy) can never, come.
With ratification in 1788, Madisonian structuralism supplanted the
old panoply of Whiggish constitutional doctrines, including the much
contested radical Whig principle of justified resistance to illegal rule
famously memorialized in Locke's Second Treatise.7 4  And while the
American Bill of Rights can be understood as a series of limited, if
meaningful, reassurances and concessions to Antifederalists still deeply
wedded to the old Whig theory of the English Constitution, no radical
right to insurrection can be read into the textually specified guarantees
ratified by the Americans in 1791. Indeed, the Senate, while debating
the Bill of Rights, chose to reject a proposed amendment condemning
as "slavish" the "doctrine of non-resistance 7 46 once espoused by the
743. See Rakove, supra note 421, at 1047, passim; RAKOVE, supra note 305, at 81-82, 175-77,
345.
744. See discussion supra notes 421-22 and accompanying text. Benson noted on the House
floor that writing a conscientious objector clause into the Bill of Rights would present "a
question before the Judiciary on every regulation you [i.e., Congress] make with respect to the
organization of the militia, whether it comports with this declaration or not." 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 780 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1789).
745. See ASHCRAFT, supra note 119, at 521-89,passim.
746. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 419, at 1150-51. As reported in the Senate Journal:
On Monday, the 7th [of September, 1789] ... [tihe following propositions to add new
articles of amendment were then successively made and decided in the negative .... 2.
That government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection, and
security of the people; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power




Vatican, Archbishop Laud, and the Stuarts, and in so doing turned its
back on perhaps the most favored mantra in the whole Lockean
discourse of resistance.
In sum, the arrival of Madisonian constitutionalism has deprived
seventeenth-century Whiggish radicalism of any claim on the
interpretation of the right to arms embodied in the Second
Amendment. Despite its apparent influence on Jefferson's thinking in
1776, after ratification in 1788, Locke's remedy for tyranny was
obsolete. And insofar as Levinson has sounded the ancient trumpet for
armed resistance, he is living in a pre-constitutional era. Though we
find the source of its considerable influence elusive, Professor
Levinson's famous paper has surely accomplished its ostensible purpose
of raising interest-and controversy-in the Amendment that, as he
charges, has been all-but-ignored by the Supreme Court. Beyond that,
we think it regrettable that his unpersuasive thesis has lent respectability
to outlaw libertarians who claim to be the legitimate guardians of
American freedom.
3. William Van Alstyne: The People Having a Right to Arms, the
Security of a Well-Regulated Militia and a Free State Are Assured
Like Professor Levinson, Professor William Van Alstyne professes
confusion at the wording of the Second Amendment.7 47 It is the ill-
matched first clause that makes him stumble. Without it, the provision
would make sense in the same natural "unforced" way as the "right of
the people" is understood in the neighboring Fourth Amendment. Also
echoing Levinson, Van Alstyne bemoans the paucity of Supreme Court
exegesis on the Second Amendment. He then calls upon his readers to
commence the development of a jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment by considering the possibility that the interpretation
favored by the NRA is not wrong after all. Consideration of this
possibility brings him to the point that, notwithstanding its regrettable
discontinuity, the language of the Second Amendment can be read as
simply as that of the Fourth Amendment-or the First-plainly, to
create a personal right to the possession of firearms.748
Id.
747. See Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 1236. Levinson goes so far as to suggest it could well
be the worst written of the lot, see Levinson, supra note 7, at 644; while Van Alstyne contents
himself with the observation, "[T]here is an apparent non sequitur. . . in midsentence," Van
Alstyne, supra note 8, at 1236. As indicated throughout, we believe the Second Amendment,
understood as it was to the founding generation, expresses well its internally harmonious intent.
748. While not labeling himself a textualist or using the term "plain meaning," Van Alstyne
appears to favor that mode of analysis. Thus, he writes, "The stance of those inclined to take
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Van Alstyne says that one of the propositions accepted by "those
inclined to take the Second Amendment seriously 7 49 is that the
provision cannot be read to mean that Congress may restrict the
people's right to keep and bear arms so long as the restriction is not
inconsistent with the maintenance of some kind of militia that is
necessary to the security of a free state.7 0 We take the Amendment
seriously, but we dispute this proposition. We contend that the
Amendment does not prohibit congressional restriction of the
possession of guns that are not part of the armament of a well-regulated
militia. Van Alstyne then asserts (on his own authority, it seems) that
the guarantee to the people to have arms is "the predicate" for the
militia, in that "it looks to an ultimate reliance on the common citizen..
. as an essential source of security of a free state.""75 Thus, despite his
initial confession of confusion, he intuits the meaning of the
Amendment to be that a free state and well-regulated militia depend on
the guarantee of private armament.752
the Second Amendment seriously reverts to the place we ourselves thought to be somewhat
worthwhile to consult-namely, the express provisions of the Second Amendment." Van
Alstyne, supra note 8, at 1241. His alignment with the personal right contingent may be derived
from the following (one of the propositions accepted by "those inclined to take the Second
Amendment seriously"):
The very assumption of the clause, moreover, is that ordinary citizens (rather than
merely soldiers, or merely the police) may themselves possess arms, for it is from these
ordinary citizens who as citizens have a right to keep and bear arms (as the second
clause provides) that such well regulated militia as a state may provide for, is itself to
be drawn.
Id. at 1242.
749. The boundaries of the group including "those inclined to take the Second Amendment
seriously" are left undefined. Does Van Alstyne mean to include among those taking it
"seriously" writers who believe the Amendment worth study (which would include, presumably,
the present authors), or does he refer only to those who take the Amendment to establish an
immutable right of the people? Van Alstyne provides a hint when he tells us that "serious
people" are those who "decline to trivialize" the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at
1254. Yet, he does not take it so "seriously" that he does not admit of circumscription by a
"rule of reason." Id. at 1250-52, 1254 ("There is a 'rule of reason' applicable to the First
Amendment, for example, and its equivalent will also be pertinent here.").
750. We think this is what he says though the meaning of his text is not always plain. What
he actually writes is:
Nor is there any basis so to read the Second Amendment as though it said anything
like the following: "Congress may, if it thinks it proper, forbid the people to keep and
bear arms if, notwithstanding that these restrictions it may thus enact are inconsistent
with the right of the people to keep and bear arms, they are not inconsistent with the
right of each state to maintain some kind of militia as it may deem necessary to its
security as a free state."
Id. at 1242-43.
751. Id. at 1243.
752. We should note that insofar as Van Alstyne means only to note the original connection
between an armed citizenry and an effective militia, we completely agree. Bolstering this
interpretation is the sentence Van Alstyne writes somewhat further along: "The precautionary
text of the amendment refutes the notion that the 'well-regulated Militia' the amendment
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Van Alstyne's argument from plain meaning depends ultimately on
deference to ratified language on the grounds that this language
embodies the voice of the people at the sovereign, constitutional
moment. Yet throughout The Second Amendment and the Personal
Right to Arms, Van Alstyne reads the words of the Second Amendment
as though they were parcels of late-twentieth-century common parlance
instead of late-eighteenth-century terms of legal art. This unwillingness
to heed his own injunction to take seriously the terms of the
Amendment, combined with his confusion of originalism with what
might be called the perceived plain meaning of words as they are
sometimes sloppily used today, seriously undermine Van Alstyne's
argument.
He begins by asserting that "[t]he reference to a 'well regulated
Militia' is in the first as well as the last instance a reference to the
ordinary citizenry." '753 But in truth the militia was never coextensive
with the "ordinary" population, nor even with the special segment of
citizens afforded civil or political rights. Nor was it a self-generating or
self-defining organization. The militia had always been a creature of
provincial or state law, which sprang into being at the command of the
legislature.7 54 As Professor Michael Bellesiles's exhaustive research has
shown, throughout colonial and early national times, colony and state
legislatures determined the extent and composition of the militia,
defined precisely who was to bear arms in such militia, and prohibited
contemplates is somehow a militia drawn from a people 'who have no right to keep and bear
arms.' Rather, the opposite is what the amendment enacts." Id. at 1249.
753. Id. at 1241.
754. Apart from and in addition to eighteenth-century legal practice, the militia could be,
and was, explained and justified with reference to the "ancient" or "gothic" constitution favored
by some opposition thinkers and radical Whigs. The argument here was that the militia was
Saxon in origins, predated the imposition of feudal law under the Normans, and therefore had a
quasi-common law legitimacy that transcended its statutory underpinnings. Logic of this sort
became useful in explaining the local as opposed to the royal command of the militia, and in
providing authority for summoning the legitimate militia when, to use the Lockean terms, the
government under the constitution was dissolved because of executive usurpation and the
inability of parliament to convene. Thus, even to the extent that eighteenth-century thinkers
conceived of the militia as the "nation in arms," they did so to highlight its ancientness and to
contrast it to the royal, Norman feudal array and to the standing army, and not to suggest that
the militia's foundations lay outside the law, let alone that the militia required no legal
foundations to begin with. And these champions of the gothic constitution laid particular
emphasis on ancient regulations defining, according to class and station, who was obligated to
serve in the militia and what arms each man was required to furnish. They were thus neither
anarchists nor universalists. They were eccentrics. Jefferson and James Otis invoked gothic
militia theory, but most American Revolutionaries spent much more time in the state house
reflecting on, modifying, and improving the statutory regime governing their provinces' militia,
particularly from 1774 onwards, when the possibility of armed resistance to the imperial
administration demanded that long dormant militia forces be revived.
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other classes of people not only from serving in the militia, but from
owning weapons for military or other purposes.755 Bellesiles sums up his
comparative review of eighteenth-century colonial statute books in the
following terms:
Local communities and colonial assemblies passed regulatory
legislation throughout the colonial period. As in Britain, American
governments sought to regulate the quality, sale, and storage of
firearms and munitions; the maintenance of arms used for public
purposes; where, when, and by whom firearms could be carried and
fired. Legislatures also granted officials the right to expropriate
firearms during internal or external crises and to conduct gun
censuses. And, most important, legislatures followed the English
example in denying the right to own guns to potentially dangerous
groups: blacks, slave and free; Indians; propertyless whites; non-
Protestants or potentially unruly Protestants. These laws worked
because the political community supported their enforcement,
fearing the consequences of unregulated access to firearms and
munitions.7
56
Thus, Van Alstyne's reading is contradicted by the historical reality that
the late-eighteenth-century militia was nowhere coextensive with the
citizenry, and that its membership was everywhere subject to statutory
definition and control. The text of the Amendment itself so provides,
using the words "well regulated" to remind us that the "Militia" the
framers had in mind is a creature of statute, defined and governed by
laws and regulations.
Despite his insistence that he is only reading the clear language
of the text itself, Van Alstyne ignores not only the implications of the
modifier, "well regulated," but the fact that the critical phrase,
"right ... to keep and bear arms" does not have a timeless and
universal meaning. Rather, in eighteenth-century usage, the terms
had a clearly recognized meaning quite apart from "own and carry."
As Garry Wills has demonstrated with scholarly depth and
precision-as well as humor-(and as we have noted heretofore),
bearing arms had, from its earliest recorded employment and through
the late eighteenth century, an exclusively military connotation.
"One does not bear arms against a rabbit," Wills points out.7 7 "By
legal and other channels," he elaborates,
[the Latin] arma ferre entered deeply into the European language
of war. To bear arms is such a synonym for waging war that
Shakespeare can call a just war "just-borne arms" and a civil war
755. See Bellesiles, supra note 8, at 435; Bellesiles, supra note 198, at 566.
756. Bellesiles, supra note 198, at 576.
757. Wills, supra note 72, at 64.
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"self-borne arms." Even outside the phrase "bear arms," much of
the noun's use alone echoes Latin phrases: to be under arms (sub
armis), the call to arms (ad arma), to follow arms (arma sequi), to
take arms (arma capere), to lay down arms (arma poenere).
"Arms" is a profession that one brother chooses as another chooses
law or the church. An issue undergoes the arbitrament of arms.758
Wills might have added the most famous use of all, the opening
stanza of Vergil's Aeneid, arma virumque cano, wherein the poet
sings of arms and a man, recounting an epic tale of wars and a hero.759
These uses recurred countless times in the literature and legal writing
with which the ratifiers as well as the framers in the First Congress
were fully familiar. Thus, to late-eighteenth-century ears, bearing
arms unequivocally meant rendering military service. But in his
perception of meaning on the surface of the text, Van Alstyne accords
the words "bearing arms" an entirely different connotation-broader,
more casual, and not strictly martial-from that which it conveyed to
the ratifiers and to the drafters in the First Congress.
When Van Alstyne finally lays aside his own intuitions and
inferences and comes at last to a reference to the framers, he cites-of
all people-James Madison to make the point that the United States
was distinct from European nations in its trust in the citizenry to bear
arms. Van Alstyne's reference to constitutional history is confined,
pretty much, to a single sentence in which he writes: "And the quick
resolve to add the Second Amendment, so to confirm that right [the
right to keep and bear arms] more expressly, as not subject to
infringement by Congress, is not difficult to understand."760 The
sentence itself is not easy to understand. It appears to postulate a
preexisting right to bear arms and attributes to the Amendment
nothing more than express-if quick-confirmation."' It would
surely come as a surprise to the vehement Antifederalists to learn
that their prized Amendment was nothing but a restatement of law
already established under the new Constitution. To be sure, there
was a firmly rooted, preexisting Whig tradition that a militia was the
natural defense of a free people, and that the right to bear arms in the
militia should not be infringed by just government. But given the
sweeping powers expressly delegated to the federal government
758 Id.
759. VIRGIL's AENEID 3 (John Dryden trans., Frederick M. Keener ed., Penguin Books
1997) ("Arms, and the Man I sing .... ").
760. Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 1245.
761. Somewhat further along, Van Alstyne notes that the adoption of the Bill of Rights in
1791 made the right to arms "doubly secure." Id. at 1247.
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under the written Constitution -powers including the authority to
raise and maintain armies-preservation of the personal liberty, duty,
and right to bear arms in the local militia required its reaffirmation in
the contemplated amendments.
Rather than rely upon historical context or examine linguistics,
Van Alstyne is fond of reasoning by analogy and favors in particular
the comparison with the First Amendment. Thus, he says that the
proper interpretation of the Second, as it is of the First, is that while a
person may be held accountable for an abuse of the entitlement
granted, those who use it responsibly must be left alone.7 62 Van
Alstyne repeats the point in his concluding section where he concedes
that "restrictions generally consistent merely with safe usage ... are
not all per se precluded. '763  Again associating the Second
Amendment with the First, he says "[t]here is 'a rule of reason'
which may limit, for example, the type of arms one is permitted to
keep or the location in which one is permitted to bear them.64 Apart
from the dubious analogy-which we dispute because of the unique
first clause of the Second Amendment specifying its scope and
purpose-Van Alstyne fails to pause over the contradiction of an
absolute entitlement with the limitations implied by the uncertain
contours of "abuse" or the "rule of reason" (his examples:
noncriminal use of weapons, nonlibelous speech).765 In the final rinse,
Van Alstyne's reliance on common sense and plain meaning is
stunning. Recovering fully from any stumble on the first reading of
the Amendment, he announces that the provision is neither
mysterious, equivocal, nor opaque. 66 It is only unwelcome to those
who would limit arms to the police: "[I]t is for them to seek a repeal
of this amendment (and so the repeal of its guarantee), in order to
have their way. Or so the Constitution itself assuredly appears to
require, if that is the way things are to be. 7 67 Reliance on assured
appearances may satisfy those who believe all should be free of any
government control of arms, but it hardly satisfies the requirements
of rhetorical sufficiency for those not already convinced.
762. See id. at 1250.
763. Id. at 1253-54.
764. Id. at 1254.
765. Id. at 1250.
766. See id. at 1250. At another point, Van Alstyne again demonstrates his comfortable
reliance on his constitutional intuition when he says, "It is difficult to see why they [those who
"decline to trivialize" the Second Amendment presumably by construing it as according full
individual entitlement] are less than entirely right in this unremarkable view." Id. at 1254.
767. Id. at 1250.
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Moving to postbellum events and the applicability of the Second
Amendment to the states, Van Alstyne contents himself with quoting
Senator Howard of Michigan delivering the report of the Senate
Committee on Reconstruction, who informed the body that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
restrains the states from interfering with the "right to keep and bear
arms," along with the other rights protected by the first eight
amendments. Not only the remarks of Senator Howard, but also the
comments of John A. Bingham, who led the fight for adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the House, support the idea that at least
some members of the Congress intended to bind the states to the first
eight amendments wholesale by the guarantee of federal "privileges
and immunities."7 68 Indeed, there is reason to believe that some
thought it necessary to put beyond state infringement the personal
right to possession of firearms, even divorced from its original service
to the organized militia, in order to vouchsafe to the emancipated
slaves the means to protect themselves against the Ku Klux Klan and
other Reconstruction thugs.769
Notwithstanding these sentiments, the case for incorporating into
the Fourteenth Amendment a right to keep arms for private purposes
is not so straightforward as Van Alstyne supposes. Let us assume
that radical Republicans, including the House manager Bingham and
Senate manager Howard, intended the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights,
and that some radical Republicans even intended this incorporation
to extend to a personal right to arms unlike anything envisioned by
the framers of the Second Amendment. This does not prove Van
Alstyne's case, because the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not establish any such objective on the part of its drafters or anyone
else. Only the text as ratified is binding, and passage required
support for the amendment not just from radical Republicans, but
also support from at least some moderate Republicans, conservative
Republicans, and moderate Democrats. And it is quite apparent
from the debates of the Thirty-ninth Congress and from newspaper
accounts from across the nation that moderates and conservatives did
not intend the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause to incorporate the whole of the Bill of Rights. 770
768. See FONER, supra note 30, at 258.
769. See id. at 258-59, 342-43, 425-44.
770. See id. at 258-59; see also discussion of Senate Judiciary Chairman Lyman Trumbull's
later argument on this point in Presser supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text. A moderate
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Instead, moderates and conservatives agreed to join radicals in
reaching a compromise on less sweeping and more ambiguous
language. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not proclaim, "The
Bill of Rights, including a personal right to arms for private purposes
such as self-defense, shall apply against the states." The support
required by Article V-adoption by two-thirds of both houses of
Congress and by three-quarters of the states-could not have been
mustered for such language, and for such dramatic alteration of the
federal balance. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment as ratified
says-perhaps a little ambiguously-"No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; ... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
As far as judicial construction is concerned-a matter that
appears to interest Van Alstyne far less than it interests us-it must
first be noted that when the Court got around to the slow process of
incorporating most of the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth,
it was not the language of privileges and immunities but of due
process that was selected as the vehicle."' This choice puts deeper
into the dubious category Van Alstyne's reliance on the preferences
of the senator from Michigan as the authoritative guide to the
applicability of the Second Amendment to the states. Even a devoted
originalist, not to say textualist, would scruple to rely on the
expressed purpose of a senator or two that has been overwhelmed by
an unbroken line of Supreme Court cases to the contrary. Surely,
stare decisis counts for something with Van Alstyne.
As we see it, the fundamental weakness in the link Van Alstyne
seeks to construct between the First and Second Amendments is
simply that the two provisions are designed to protect against
altogether different evils, one of which is readily applicable as a
restraint against state government and the other is not. The First
announces a prohibition against government interference with
peoples' rights of expression, worship, assembly, and protest. It is
obviously a prohibition that can (and should) be readily applied
against all government, national or local. In contrast, the Second is
not about private rights, but about federalism: the power of the
central government to disarm state military units. If the right of the
Republican, Trumbull did not make an individual right argument in his Second Amendment
defense of Presser.
771. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
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people to keep and bear arms were, as Van Alstyne would like to
have it, like the right of free expression or worship, one could argue
that neither state nor federal government should be allowed to curtail
it. But, as we have sought to demonstrate throughout, that is not a
fair way to describe the import of the Second Amendment. Neither
the ratifying generation nor the courts that have subsequently
touched upon the issue have seen it thus. Hence the analogy fails.
So the Van Alstyne paper concludes, with little more analysis or
authority than what appears to the author self-evident, that the
"essential claim" of the NRA is "extremely strong. 77 2 Not to
disparage Van Alstyne's educated intuition or the importance of plain
meaning in the interpretation of texts, we must protest that in this
instance, there is more to it than that. As we have attempted to show,
agitation for, debate about, and ultimately the adoption of the
constitutional provision on arms and the militia were embedded in
historically significant events and attitudes. These conditions of
enactment not only inform the reading of the text as written, but are
essential to understanding the meaning of the document as
transmitted through the centuries to us today.
CONCLUSION
Inspired by the classical republican model -reinvented in the
Renaissance, expounded by Machiavelli, and transmitted to the
founders' mind-frame by English and colonial pamphleteers-the
Second Amendment guaranteed the individual right to all (all free,
white, adult men, anyway) to own and carry firearms. That individual
right is, however, limited by both text and context to the service of
communal security by provision for a well-regulated military force
known as a militia. By militia is meant a trained, organized, and
armed collection of qualified males, save those of conscientious
scruple and others exempted from service by their states, called
together from their normal pursuits to respond to occasional and
particular threats, internal or external, to community peace. Thus
conceived, the eighteenth-century militia stood in contrast to-and
for many, in preference to-the professional standing army. To the
consternation of the Antifederalists, however, the professional
national army-which Washington knew deserved the most credit for
winning the American War of Independence-was also tolerated by
772. Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 1255.
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the Constitution. By the dawn of the twentieth century, it had
replaced the long-defunct local militia as America's primary fighting
force. Long before the Mexican War, moreover, private arms had
ceased to supply the ordnance of such state militia units as still
lingered. By the time of the Civil War, the old state militia had
vanished, losing all corporeal existence beyond the ghostly whisper of
a name, a faded banner, and, in some instances, a proud, if ill-defined,
history. Elite Volunteer companies had taken their place, but their
members' weapons, the Presser Court made clear in 1885, were
constitutionally protected only insofar as they were held pursuant to
statute, authorization, or license from the state government that
chartered the company. The regular army and existing Volunteer
companies could not meet the enormous manpower demands of the
Civil War, but the newly formed state units that answered "Father
Abraham's" call773 were sworn into federal service as soon as they
made muster and were promptly issued U.S. government arms
purchased pursuant to act of Congress and War Department orders.
With America's rise to world power in the twentieth century, the U.S.
Army ballooned to levels previously unthinkable during peacetime.
But in order to facilitate further rapid wartime expansion, Congress
realized the nation needed a more reliable reserve than the
nineteenth-century-style volunteer state "National Guards." Starting
in 1903, Congress legislated to create a modern, professional, federal
National Guard, and over the course of the century, the U.S. Army
and the War/Defense Departments assumed larger and larger roles in
the administration of the guard. By midcentury, all guard members
took a federal oath upon enlistment, guard units were trained and
supervised by the army, and the guard was issued U.S. Army weapons
and equipment kept in state arsenals built to federal specifications
with federal dollars.
This drastic change in the nature, status, and even vitality of the
militia has utterly drained the Second Amendment right of meaning
in modern America. To conceive of a constitutionally enshrined
personal right to weaponry independent of communal, republican
obligations is to distort beyond recognition the constitutional design.
And with no contemporary descendant to inherit the framers'
concept of a republican militia, the incidental right of citizens to bear
773. President Lincoln's July 2, 1862, call to the states for 300,000 federal volunteers
inspired the popular recruiting song "We Are Coming, Father Abraham." See WEIGLEY, supra
note 8, at 206. To that tune, thousands decamped from the training fields with their regiments
and left home for the front.
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and to keep the arms necessary to the life of such a militia has
atrophied; it has simply lost any relevant application in today's world.
What this means is that on the pressing issue of gun control, the
Constitution is neutral. The Second Amendment would take no
notice if Congress, appalled by the prevalence of gun-assisted crimes,
outlawed all handguns and assault rifles in private hands. By the
same token, Congress could vacate the field, and with a similar
retreat by the states, the NRA would realize its fondest wish, and
every clean, competent adult would be allowed free purchase and
proud ownership of firepower of every description. So, we conclude:
let the great debate continue to rage-in the democratic branch
where it belongs. But let us understand at last that the Second
Amendment has no voice in the matter.
